Keeping Faith While Growing Up Evangelical: Reflections on My Journey

* The following essay was published at the Christian Post (there are a few extra footnotes in this version): 

Keeping Faith While Growing Up Evangelical--Part One

Keeping Faith While Growing Up Evangelical--Part Two

Keeping Faith While Growing Up Evangelical

O God, you have taught me from my youth 

and I still declare your wondrous deeds.

–Psalm 71.17

I was raised in the Christian faith within the evangelical church.  I am still a Christian and I am still an evangelical.  I have read with interest, and sadness, of many who have a similar background growing up but who, for various reasons, no longer remain Christian.  The narrative usually follows a common path.  The simplistic faith of one’s youth is jettisoned under the pressure of intellectual challenges.  This opens up new intellectual vistas and a new worldview—many times, atheism—is embraced.  This “de-conversion” process has been analyzed by Scot McKnight and Hauna Ondrey in chapter one of their book Finding Faith, Losing Faith: Stories of Conversion and Apostasy.  

A few months ago the Christian Post did a series of articles on “Leaving Christianity” which discussed why many Americans are rejecting the faith they grew up with.  The first installment was written by Luke Douglas--I Lost My Faith in a Chik-fil-a. Douglas narrates his experience of growing up in an evangelical context where he was home-schooled and was taught a curriculum “centered on Creation Science.”  In another narration of his past, found on a Humanist website, Douglas fills out the details of his pilgrimage.  

“In 2008 I traveled to California to volunteer for the Proposition 8 campaign, which amended the state constitution to define marriage as being between one man and one woman.  It passed.  When I was seventeen, I had made the rounds in conservative circles and started getting invited to speak at rallies and conferences as a sort of rising star for the new Tea Party movement that was sweeping the nation.  They loved me because they loved a token young person who gave them hope for the next generation.  At eighteen I moved to northern Virginia for my first full-time job at a consulting firm where I raised money for major Republican organizations and campaigns.  At nineteen I earned my bachelor’s degree and went to a conservative Christian law school on a full-ride scholarship.  At twenty I was working in Washington DC, for a fundamentalist legal defense and lobbying organization.”

Then, in 2014, while at law school, Douglas watches the debate between Ken Ham—his “childhood icon”—and Bill Nye.  He saw Ken Ham “embarrassingly destroyed before my very eyes.” With his legal training giving him the ability “to argue both sides of a case” he begins to examine other viewpoints outside of Christianity, focusing on philosophy, science and history. In 2016—at the age of 23—this leads to the final break.  In a Chik-fil-a, while reading the philosopher Baruch Spinoza, he breaks down in tears, sheds his Christian belief, and finally admits to himself that he is “an atheist, a humanist, and a progressive.”

Luke Douglas’ Journey and Mine: Comparisons and Contrasts

In reading Luke Douglas’ narrative of his life-story (so far), I find myself reflecting on my life-story—its similarities and differences.  I, too, was raised in evangelical churches.  When I was in sixth or seventh grade, Josh McDowell came to our church, and I asked my parents to buy his book Evidence That Demands a Verdict.  In eighth grade I would try to do my book report on this book but its length was a bit much for me at that age.  During my seventh and eighth grades I became fascinated about the Bible.  My youth pastor noticed my interest and began to help me develop a devotional habit of daily Bible reading, prayer, and Scripture memorization.  My memorization efforts have not yielded the twenty-two books that Douglas can claim but I have kept up this discipline for close to forty years now.  In high school I continued these devotional habits and, like Douglas, I was given training in how to study and teach the Bible.  During my junior and senior years of high school I taught a small Bible study for Christians at my high school.  I would also co-lead a larger mid-week group from our church.  My youth pastor helped teach me basic theology and let me use his library as I began to build my own theological library.

It was during my junior year of high school that I had, what I call, my “cognitive awakening.” I, too, like Douglas, was taught a version of Creationism.  This opened up the intellectual possibility that the standard neo-Darwinian narrative could be critiqued.  My interest in this issue of creation and evolution has continued to this day. The second, and more important, element of my cognitive awakening came from reading the works of Francis Schaeffer.  Schaeffer taught me that Christian theism was not merely an assemblage of independent assertions. It was a coherent worldview that could be understood as a philosophical system that made sense of the world. This notion of “worldview thinking” has been a hallmark of my intellectual development since this time in high school.  Reading Schaeffer with his philosophical analysis of historical trends prepared me for the next formative influence—Dr. William Lane Craig.

William Craig came to my church when I was a senior in high school and gave a seminar on basic Christian apologetics.   I subsequently read his book on the topic and began to follow his career. I later heard him give a talk at Arizona State University and was able to have lunch with him.  As we were parting for the day, I asked him who I should be reading if I wanted to pursue philosophy.  He immediately replied, “Master the work of Alvin Plantinga.”  Now, I can’t say I’ve mastered his work, but Craig’s comment opened a larger world of evangelical scholarship in the area of philosophy and through this opening I was exposed to an even broader tradition of Christians engaged in philosophy.  It was exciting to see the depth and breadth of scholarship displayed by the Christian philosophical community.  William Craig and J. P. Moreland speak to this issue in the latest edition of their book Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview:

“Over the last forty years a revolution has been occurring in Anglo-American philosophy.  Since the late 1960s Christian philosophers have been coming and defending the truth of the Christian worldview with philosophically sophisticated arguments in the finest scholarly journals and professional societies. And the face of Anglo-American philosophy has been transformed.”[1]

And this is where my story begins to diverge significantly from Luke Douglas’—at least as far as he narrates it in his published online work.  Douglas’ “testimony” shows no awareness of this renaissance of Christian philosophy and the evangelicals engaged in it.  Douglas states that it was Ken Ham who was “the apologist who influenced me most growing up.”  Whatever else may be said for Ken Ham, he is not a philosophical scholar or a trained theologian.  He is a popularizer of a certain brand of Creationism.  It seems, from what Douglas has written, that Ken Ham influenced him heavily as a child and into his early teens.  At the age of fifteen, as mentioned above, he began a heavy interest in politics—even traveling out of state to take up political causes in California.  He then later states that when he was about twenty-years old during the Ken Ham/Bill Nye debate that he “hadn’t thought about creationism since I was a teenager.”  He even mentions that, “the last thing I had time to do was revisit the underlying worldview.” It seems that during his later teens he gave no serious thought to this issue and, perhaps, the larger philosophical worldview issues needed for serious apologetics.  At least his narration of events shows no development in this area.  It is this lack of theological and philosophical maturation that comes up again and again in my mind as I read his of his intellectual journey and compare it with my own.

Some Key Areas of Theology and Apologetics

I will mention three areas that Douglas brings up repeatedly in his online testimonials.  I find it instructive to contrast our differing approaches to these facets of theology and philosophy.

(1)  The Inerrancy of Scripture.  Douglas states, “Everything else, from politics to law to communications, had been built on the foundational truth claims of the Bible being an inerrant historical source and science textbook.”  It is true that evangelicals—at least historically—have endorsed the theological notion of “inerrancy.”  When I first learned about this concept I was directed to The Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy as a competent, well thought out exposition of the doctrine.  Early in college I also read evangelical philosopher Paul Feinberg’s essay “The Meaning of Inerrancy” in which he gives a theologically robust and philosophically nuanced definition of inerrancy.  At one point in his discussion he even states, “One should not expect the writers of Scripture to use the language of modern scientific empiricism.”[2]  I would later read J. P. Moreland’s essay “The Rationality of Belief in Inerrancy” in which he articulates a philosophically defensible theory of rationality informed by insights from the philosophy of science and then relates this to the rationality of belief in the inerrancy of Scripture.  Had Douglas been keeping up the literature he may have also noticed the important essay on this topic in 2009 by Jason Sexton—"How Far Beyond Chicago? Assessing Recent Attempts to Reframe the Inerrancy Debate".

(2)  Creationism.  The issue of “creationism” looms large in Douglas’ personal journey.  He states, “ I was eight when I first heard the earth was 6,000 years old, which quickly became a central theological litmus test for whether one took God at His Word.”  So the litmus test developed by a Douglas as a boy would seem to be the one used throughout the rest of his journey.  Keep in mind his words mentioned earlier: “You have to understand I hadn’t thought about creationism since I was a teenager.”  Again, the lack of maturation in thought is apparent.  When faced with difficulties in his understanding of Genesis and the creation narrative, Douglas is unable to nuance his view or change in his understanding.  As he puts it, “To bend my rigid faith was to risk shattering it entirely.”

I, too, learned a version of Young Earth Creationism (YEC) in high school and knew of Ken Ham.  But I also learned of a hierarchy of importance in which the fact that God created with teleological intentionality was more important than the dating of the event.  In the summer of 1991 I read Phillip Johnson’s recently released Darwin on Trial.  This was to become an important piece in the newly developing Intelligent Design movement and I fully embraced his focus on the philosophical issue of naturalism as the crucial issue to be examined in contemporary theories of evolution.[3]  More sophisticated proponents of YEC also recognized the importance of focusing energies on the underlying issue of naturalism.  Philosophers Paul Nelson and John Mark Reynolds write in their defense of YEC:

“It is obvious that a person who is generally committed to a traditional understanding of Christianity can be ‘old earth.’… Our disagreements on these points should not distract from the main topic.  Philosophical naturalism is retarding science, philosophy, and theology.  It seems to both of us that our reviewers agree in finding such a situation intolerable.  To fail to unify with such people of goodwill in the assault on naturalism would not just be foolish; it would be intellectual treason.”[4]

Douglas’ testimony regarding his development of philosophy and apologetics shows none of this nuance or development.

Douglas mentions, in yet another narration of his journey, his reading of Richard Dawkins as being part of the “final nails in the coffin of my longtime struggle to hold onto faith.”  I, too, read Richard Dawkins.  In late 1991 I was in a Philosophy of Biology class at the University of Arizona and one of our textbooks was The Blind Watchmaker by Dawkins.  I chose to do my research paper on Dawkins’ book.  I found the exercise to be both intellectually challenging as well as faith confirming.  Examining the arguments by Dawkins allowed me to see his lack of empirical evidence, his unwarranted extrapolation of minor variation to major morphological change, and his completely speculative origin-of-life scenario.  I also found that even positive reviewers of the book recognized the non-empirical basis of the book.  One of my favorite descriptions comes from Jon Marks in his review of The Blind Watchmakerin theJournal of Human Evolution:

“The prose is extraordinary, especially from a scientist.  As in his previous books, Dawkins shows himself to be a master of the seductive metaphor… And consequently, one may need to step back periodically from Dawkins’ engaging style to recognize that there is precious little substance to The Blind Watchmaker.  The work abounds with wonderfully clever expositions, turn of phrases …, plausible scenarios and captivating analogies.  But at the bottom line The Blind Watchmakerdiscusses at great length what biological evolution is like, not what biological evolution is.  While this is a very useful literary and pedagogical device, it is simply that—a device.  I venture to say that Dawkins is without peer as an illustrator-by-analogy, … all of which is interesting and appealing, as long as you do not think too hard about it.”[5]

Whereas Douglas had not thought about his version of creationism since his early teenage years, I continued to read in the field and focus on the underlying issue of philosophical naturalism and how this affected the analysis of evidence.

(3)  Presuppositional Apologetics.  Luke Douglas merely mentions the phrase “presuppositional apologetics” once. There is no reason to believe that he had a mature or developed understanding of this apologetic tradition except what was mediated to him through his “childhood icon,” Ken Ham. 

I also learned of presuppositional apologetics.  I read some of the key works of Cornelius Van Til as well as those who were influential scholars in the field: Greg Bahnsen, John Frame, and James Anderson.  As part of my apologetic development, I spent time in two summer seminars at Dr. Bahnsen’s house in California.  The first time we were required to read two books (totaling nearly 800 pages) by atheist philosopher Michael Martin—Atheism: A Philosophical Justification and The Case Against Christianity.  We then spent three days critically examining the arguments of Martin. The second seminar I attended was a detailed discussion of transcendental arguments—their nature, structure, and relevance for Christian apologetics.

Douglas does attempt to provide something of a description of the kinds of arguments he once believed.  He writes:

“See, my whole upbringing’s teaching was that, apart from God, there would be no basis for morality, for purpose, or even for logic itself.  If there were no higher power Whose nature exemplified right, there would be no such thing as wrong. The further removed I become from presuppositional apologetics, however, the less sense that whole line of argument makes.”

But given Douglas’ simplistic understanding of these issues—at least as described in his writing—he seems unaware of the more sophisticated versions of these arguments.  I have actually defended versions of these arguments regarding morality and purpose in public forums.  The argument from logic as that which needs a theistic base has been defending by philosophers James Anderson and Greg Welty in their paper "The Lord of Noncontradiction: An Argument for God from Logic."  

Of course, Douglas offers no reasons as to why he does not accept these arguments and the alternative foundation for morality that he offers is not well thought out.  He simply states, without evidence or reason, the following: “My morality post-evangelicalism is driven by tough questions about maximizing happiness in a complex world.  It’s driven by empathy for my fellow beings …” This is a fine sounding sentiment, but is it rational given an atheistic worldview?  Does an atheistic worldview have the needed philosophical resources to ground the ethic Douglas espouses?  A Humanist ethic is not simply justified by rejecting theistic ethics.  As William Craig argues, “The problem the humanist confronts is this: If theism is false, humanism doesn’t win by default.  If theism is false, you’ve got to ask yourself, why wouldn’t nihilism be true? What proof do you have that nihilism is not the correct remaining alternative?”[6]

It is not merely Christian philosophers or those with a theistic background that make this argument.  A number of atheistic philosophers also draw the same conclusion.  Consider the words from Tamler Somers and Alex Rosenberg from their article "Darwin's Nihilistic Idea: Evolution and the Meaninglessness of Life":

“But when we combine an evolutionary account of ethical beliefs with the conception of Darwinian theory as a ‘universal acid’… the result is moral nihilism.  If all apparently purposive processes, states, events, and conditions are in reality the operation of a purely mechanical substrate neutral algorithm, then as far [as] explanatory tasks go, the only values we need attribute to biological systems are instrumental ones.  An evolutionary account of moral belief will not only explain ethics but it will explain it away.”[7]

This is an argument I find persuasive but it doesn’t appear that Douglas has yet to critically engage with this challenge.  He doesn’t show how his commitment to naturalistic evolution—which was the primary cause of his leaving the faith of his youth—does not reduce his ethics to moral nihilism.

Where is Jesus?

Conspicuously absent from Luke Douglas’ account of his Christian past is the person of Jesus. For an evangelical, this is puzzling.  Albert Einstein is noted as saying, “I am a Jew, but I am enthralled by the luminous figure of the Nazarene…. No one can read the Gospels without feeling the actual presence of Jesus.”  Yet for Douglas, in his narration, Jesus hardly merits mention.  Even in his recounting of his apologetics there is no concern for the historical rootedness of the Christian faith, nor for the historical arguments that have been marshaled for the resurrection of Jesus.  

There was also very little in Douglas’ account about the personal dynamics of his relationship with Jesus Christ—a usual staple of evangelical spirituality.  He does, however, mention, “spending hours on my knees in prayer, my entire emotional focus pinned on talking to God, only to hear nothing back.”  This experience of “divine silence” is not an anomaly for those who follow Jesus.  As philosopher Paul Moser notes, the existential problem of “divine hiddenness” can be said to even touch Christ Jesus himself in his tortured moments on the cross when he cries out, “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” (Mark 15.34)  Thus, it may be that times and seasons of divine silence and the perceived absence of God’s presence may be a normal part of the Christian life.

In my own experience there have been those seasons of divine silence.  I remember one particular time as a pastor struggling with the seeming absence of God.  The usual antidotes to such times do not normally include philosophical theology but it was during this season I did read a piece that was helpful. Notre Dame philosopher, Michael Rea, wrote an essay entitled "Narrative, Liturgy, and the Hiddenness of God" which actually helped as part of the process of navigating that time. I bring this up, not to appeal to this essay as the panacea for all persons and times of seeming abandonment, but, rather, to show that there are intellectual resources available for such issues.  Without meaning to demean Luke Douglas’ own internal crisis, I do wonder if his youthful and intellectually undeveloped faith might not have been helped by wise guidance and more mature reflection available from within the Christian tradition.

The Way Forward for Luke, Me, and Others

Luke Douglas has moved from evangelical Christian faith to atheism.  He has embraced this new worldview with the zeal of a new convert. He has become the Executive Director for the Humanist Society of Greater Phoenix.  In a recent interview Douglas speaks of his goal of campus outreach to attract a younger audience as well as “prostheletizing militant nonbelief.”

I also was raised in the evangelical Christian tradition and have stayed in.  This was not a result of closing my mind to alternatives; my faith has been sharpened and honed over the past thirty-some years since my time in high school.  I, too, am still zealous for outreach on college campuses which is part of the reason I am associated with Ratio Christi which seeks to influence faculty and students on college campuses by giving them historical, philosophical, and scientific reasons to follow Jesus.

A large part of my journey has been shaped by the influence of Christian philosophers and theologians.  This has served to both deepen and stabilize my faith.  J. P. Moreland and Klaus Issler poignantly articulate the importance of Christian scholarship for the church in their book In Search of a Confident Faith: Overcoming Barriers to Trusting in God:

“A helpful strategy of offense is to develop a counterculture in which believers are regularly exposed to Christian scholars, sophisticated Christian alternatives to secular ideas, and thoughtful Christian books, magazines and journals.  Note, such exposure is not important merely so Christians can come to develop Christian alternatives to secular ideas.  It is not just secular ideas that must be countered. It is the process of secularization itself that must be confronted, including the process of socializing Christians into thinking of themselves as marginalized, weak, gullible, uneducated people. Thus, even if you are not yourself particularly well-educated, and even if you cannot understand the line of reasoning of articulate Christian scholars and carefully thought-out Christian books, exposure to the very existence of such things can provide you with confidence and remove doubt rooted in cultural background assumptions.”[8]

I hope and pray the church will heed this admonition so that this might be one of the means used to stem the flow of those leaving the faith.  One wonders what might have been the outcome if Luke had been exposed to such scholarship.

So for now, here’s where things stand: Luke left; I stayed.  But Luke still can come home to Jesus—there is every reason to do so.

·     Richard Klaus is on staff with Ratio Christi.  He also works part-time as Student Engagement Staff at Glendale Community College in the Philosophy & Religious Studies Department. The ideas articulated in this article do not necessarily represent the views of Glendale Community College or the Maricopa County Community College District.

---

     [1]J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview—2^nded. (Downers Grove, Ill.: Intervarsity Press, 2017), 5.

     [2]Paul D. Feinberg, “The Meaning of Inerrancy” in Inerrancy ed. Norman L. Geisler (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1980), 300.

     [3]For a cogent discussion on the relationship between Young Earth Creationism and Intelligent Design see Marcus Ross and Paul Nelson, “A Taxonomy of Teleology: Phillip Johnson, the Intelligent Design Community and Young-Earth Creationism” in Darwin’s Nemesis: Phillip Johnson and the Intelligent Design Movement ed. William A. Dembski (Downers Grove, Ill.: Intervarsity Press, 2006), 261-275,

     [4]Paul Nelson and John Mark Reynolds in Three Views on Creation and Evolution(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1999), 100.

     [5]Jon Marks, “Review of The Blind Watchmaker” Journal of Human Evolution vol. 15, no. 6, 

1986, 517—emphasis added.

     [6]William Craig in Is Goodness Without God Good Enough? A Debate on Faith, Secularism, and Ethicseds. Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), 44.  

     [7]Tamler Sommers and Alex Rosenberg, “Darwin’s Nihilistic Idea: Evolution and the Meaninglessness of Life” Biology and Philosophy 18(5); November, 2003, 661.

     [8]J. P. Moreland and Klaus Issler, In Search of a Confident Faith: Overcoming Barriers to Trusting in God(Downers Grove, Ill.: Intervarsity Press, 2008), 54-55.

Why Science Needs God: Analyzing the Religion and Science Conflict

* The following was posted on The Christian Post.  The version below is slightly larger--I had to cut a few sections to fit the word-count constraints--and has endnotes with all the bibliographic references.

Why Science Needs God: Analyzing the Religion and Science Conflict

As our culture becomes more secularized it has become fashionable to see “science” as the engine of this secularization.  As science advances, religion must retreat—so the theory goes.  This viewpoint draws much of its continuing inspiration from two books in the late nineteenth century.  John William Draper wrote History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science in 1874 and Andrew Dickson White penned A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in 1896.  Both books came to exemplify what became known as the “warfare thesis” in the history of the relationship between science and religion.  Contemporary historians recognize that the “warfare thesis” is much too simplistic and that Draper and White’s arguments are not well supported. 

“Today historians of science generally no longer favor a conflict model.  Colin Russell, formerly the president of Christians in Science, criticized the conflict model noting that, ‘Draper takes such liberty with history, perpetuating legends as fact that he is rightly avoided today in serious historical study.  The same is nearly as true of White, though his prominent apparatus of prolific footnotes may create a misleading impression of meticulous scholarship’ (Russell 2000, 15).”[1]

Although the “warfare thesis” has suffered at the hands of historians who recognize a more interactive approach, the view continues to find expression in our culture.  Since this is the case it may serve us well to consider more fully another way of challenging this thesis. 

Naturalism: Definition and Challenges

For many the pursuit of science is thought to require a belief in naturalism.[2]  Naturalism can be defined in various ways but atheistic philosopher Kai Nielson captures the main core of naturalism in the following manner:

“Naturalism denies that there are any spiritual or supernatural realities transcendent to the world or at least we have no good ground for believing that there could be such realities… It is the view that anything that exists is ultimately composed of physical components.”[3]

Naturalism, as a worldview, is not without its own philosophical difficulties.  In its denial of any supernatural reality and its affirmation of the merely physical naturalism has difficulty accounting for objective morality and ultimate meaning in life.[4]  For those who are more convinced of objective moral realism and ultimate meaning in life these items become reason to reject naturalism.  However, some naturalists are simply willing to jettison objective morality and meaning as a necessary consequence of their belief in naturalism.  The late William Provine of Cornell never tired of speaking of this reality.  He argued, “Naturalistic evolution has clear consequences that Charles Darwin understood perfectly. 1) No gods worth having exist; 2) no life after death exist; 3) no ultimate foundation for ethics exists; 4) no ultimate meaning in life exists; and 5) human free will is nonexistent.”[5]  Philosophers Tamler Sommers and Alex Rosenberg come to the same conclusions:

“Darwinism thus puts the capstone on a process which since Newton’s time has driven teleology to the explanatory sidelines. In short it has made Darwinians into metaphysical Nihilists denying that there is any meaning or purpose to the universe its contents and its cosmic history. But in making Darwinians into metaphysical nihilists, the solvent algorithm [random variation acted on by natural selection--rjk] should have made them into ethical nihilists too. For intrinsic values and obligations make sense only against the background of purposes, goals, and ends which are not merely instrumental.”[6]

If the reasoning of these thinkers is to be accepted then it seems as if a naturalistic pursuit of science leads to the loss of both morality and meaning—at least in any objective sense.  But what if naturalism entails the loss of something more?  What if naturalism leads to the undermining of the scientific enterprise itself?

Proverbs 21.22 elegantly states, “A wise man scales the city of the mighty and brings down the stronghold in which they trust.”  Those who would scale the walls of the secular city must bring down the stronghold of science in which they trust.  This is done by showing that on the basis of the naturalistic worldview science is problematic.  In short, naturalism cannot account for science itself. 

Naturalism, Science, and Scientism

In attempting to show the incompatibility of naturalism and science there are two related issues to consider.  Since naturalism’s approach to science seems to entail a version of “scientism,” the first thesis to consider is that scientism is fundamentally irrational.  Second, it can be shown that science itself rests upon philosophical commitments that do not comport well with naturalism.

In his book Scientism and Secularism: Learning to Respond to a Dangerous Ideology, J. P. Moreland articulates and, then, critiques two versions of scientism. 

Strong Scientism: “Strong scientism claims that some proposition is true and/or rational to believe if and only if it is a well-established scientific proposition—that is, if and only if it is a well-established scientific proposition that, in turn depends on its having been successfully formed, tested, and used according to appropriate scientific methodology.  There are no truths apart from scientific truths, and even if there were, there would be no reason whatever to believe them.”

Weak Scientism: “Advocates of weak scientism allow for truths apart from science and even grant that they have some minimal, positive rationality status without the support of science.  But those advocates still hold that science is the most authoritative sector of human learning.  Every other intellectual activity is inferior to science.  Further, there are virtually no limits to science.  There is no field into which scientific research cannot shed light.  To the degree that some issue outside science can be given scientific support or can be reduced to science, to that degree the issue becomes rationally acceptable.”[7]

It is not hard to find scientists and philosophers who operate with some version of scientism.  Consider this short litany of quotations as illustrative of scientism:

“The great questions—‘Who are we?’ ‘Where did we come from?’ Why are we here?’—can be answered only, if ever, in the light of scientifically based evolutionary thought.”    —E. O. Wilson

“A Darwinian fundamentalist is one who recognizes that either you shun Darwinian evolution altogether, or you turn the traditional universe upside down and you accept that mind, meaning, and purpose are not the cause but the fairly recent effects of the mechanistic mill of Darwinian algorithms.  Many have tried to find a compromise position [but]… [i]t cannot be done.”  —Daniel Dennett

“We seem to be reaching a point at which science can wrest morality from the hands of the philosophers.”[8]    —Frans de Waal

“’You,’ your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules.  As Lewis Carroll’s Alice might have phrased it: ‘You’re nothing but a pack of neurons.’”[9]   --Francis Crick

All the above are examples of philosophical commitments masquerading as empirical science.  As J. Daryl Charles notes, “Seemingly at work here are distinctly metaphysical—over against strictly physical or material—assumptions, which, nevertheless, are touted as science.”[10]  Charles goes on to conclude:

“[O]ne is justified, I think, in questioning whether individuals in the hard sciences, where theories and hypotheses are measured and tested on the basis of empirical evidence, should be making moral-philosophical and metaethical claims.  Is this really science?  What is particularly questionable is to extrapolate from the physical realm and make authoritative metaphysical pronouncements about material and nonmaterial reality and to do so in the name of science.”[11]

So when Charles asks, “Is this really science?” the answer is “no.”  This is scientism—and scientism has some very big problems.

Problems with Scientism

Strong scientism can be briefly summarized in this way: Only scientific assertions can be true and known.  But this overly stringent conception of scientism is actually self-contradictory.  The claim of strong scientism is not open to scientific verification or falsification.  It is a philosophical claim; not an empirical, scientific claim.  As J. P. Moreland argues,

“The irony is that strong scientism is a philosophical statement expressing an epistemological viewpoint about science; it is not a statement of science, like ‘water is H₂O’ or ‘cats are mammals.’  Strong scientism is a philosophical assertion that claims that philosophical assertions are neither true nor can be known; only scientific assertions can be true and known.”[12]

Strong scientism is, in more technical language, “self-referentially incoherent” and cannot possibly be true.[13]

Weak scientism fares no better.  Advocates of weak scientism assume that science is “the most authoritative sector of human learning.”[14]  But this is to implicitly deny the intellectual integrity of other fields of knowledge.  Moreland succinctly states the objection:

“In sum, the first problem with weak (and strong) scientism is that it diminishes the intellectual authority of other important fields, especially biblical studies and theology.  This is not because the arguments are better, but simply because it is assumed that science by definition has more plausibility and inherent authority.”[15]

In chapter seven of Scientism and Secularism—“The Availability of Nonscientific Knowledge”—Moreland examines three areas in which one is rationally justified in affirming propositions without scientific support.  These three areas are: (1) the rational certainty of the laws of logic and mathematics, (2) the greater epistemic authority for knowledge one’s own conscious states, and (3) the greater epistemic weight of self-evident moral claims.[16]  Indeed, according to Moreland, these areas are actually more certain as knowledge claims than scientific ones.  Moreland is, thus, able to conclude, “These points individually, but especially collectively, show that the claims of scientism are simply false.”[17]

Thus, both strong and weak scientism fail.  Furthermore, both versions fail to properly note that the scientific endeavor rests upon philosophical assumptions and that the conclusions of science can only be as certain as those assumptions.  In fact, the philosophical assumptions needed for science do not fit well within a naturalistic framework but, rather, make more sense in a theistic context.

The Presuppositions of Science and Worldview Analysis

Consider just a few of the philosophical presuppositions upon which science relies.  Moreland offers the following list of presuppositions that are utilized by scientists to undergird the scientific methodology.[18]

(1) The existence of the external world.

(2) The orderly nature of the external world and its knowability.

(3) The uniformity of nature and induction.

(4) The laws of logic, epistemology, and truth.

(5) The reliability of the senses and the mind.

(6) The adequacy of language to describe the world.

(7) The applicability of mathematics and the existence of numbers.

(8) The existence of values.

In reference to the last item (the existence of values) Moreland breaks this category down into moral values (one ought to record and report data honestly), rational values (one ought to prefer a theory that is simpler, more empirically accurate, more predictively successful, and has a wider scope of explanation) and aesthetic values (one ought to prefer theories and equations that are more beautiful and elegant).

In light of these fundamental philosophical presuppositions needed by science the question becomes, “Which worldview best makes sense of these presuppositions?”  In other words, can naturalism provide the preconditions needed to account for these philosophical presuppositions or does a theistic worldview provide a better answer?  Moreland argues that theism with its transcendent God provides a better explanatory context. 

“The nature of the assumptions of science do not prove the existence of a God very much like the God of the Bible, but in my view, they provide reasons for preferring theism over scientistic naturalism.  The assumptions are at home in a theistic worldview; they fit quite naturally.  If God is himself a rational being, then it stands to reason that he would create a rational, orderly universe.  If he created us, then it naturally follows that he would give us the proper faculties to know and appreciate the inner workings of his world by ‘thinking his thoughts after him.’  The existence of objective values makes far more sense if there is an objective Lawgiver than if there is not.

“If we begin with ‘In the beginning there was the Logos,’ then we have reasonable explanations for these assumptions.  But if we begin with “In the beginning were the particles (or plasma, strings, etc.),’ it is hard to see how these assumptions could have obtained.”[19]

It is, therefore, argued that science rests upon philosophical assumptions and those assumptions fit more adequately in a theistic context rather than a naturalistic system.  Looking specifically at a few of the presuppositions listed above may help elucidate the argument.

Three Specific Philosophical Presuppositions

Space constraints rule out an exhaustive analysis but a few details can be spell out regarding three of the presuppositions listed above.  Consider (2) “The orderly nature of the external world and its knowability.”  It is helpful to distinguish two types of order.  One is the order of objects and the other is the order of processes and patterns.  A classic example of the order of objects is the human eye.  The order and design is manifest in the object.  This kind of order is important and modern examples, like the bacterial flagellum, play an important part in the current debates about evolution.  It is, however, the other kind of order—the order of processes and patterns—which is at issue here.  Oxford philosopher Richard Swinburne refers to this type of order when he writes the following:

“The orderliness of the universe to which I draw attention here is its conformity to formula, to simple formulable, scientific laws.  The orderliness of the universe in this respect is a very striking fact about it.  The universe might naturally have been chaotic, but it is not—it is very orderly.”[20]

This “formulable orderliness” exists across space and time.  Arizona State University astrophysicist Paul Davies further describes this reality:

“There exists a deep and elegant underlying mathematical unity that links everything together in an abstract conceptual scheme.  There is thus an underlying rational order of which the fall of an apple is but one example.  We could never get at that type of deep mathematical unity other than by using science, and it’s an astonishing thing that we can get at it at all because it seems to have no survival value.”[21]

Christian philosopher J. P. Moreland asks, “So, how do we explain the existence and nature of these laws?  Where did they come from?”

“There are two major options here: (1) take them as unexplainable, brute entities, or (2) provide a theistic explanation.  For many thinkers, myself included, the ‘unexplainable-brute-entity’ option is not a good one.  Since the actual brute entity might not have existed, we naturally seek an explanation as to why the contingent entity exists instead of not existing.  And the fundamental laws of nature are contingent realities—after all, it is easy to conceive of worlds that have different fundamental laws of nature.  So why does our world contain certain fundamental laws instead of others.”[22]

Thus, presupposition (2)—““The orderly nature of the external world and its knowability”—better fits a theistic context.

Consider, also, presupposition (5) from above: “The reliability of the senses and the mind.”  Evolutionary psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby give a naturalistic explanation of the brain as a physical system:

“The brain is a physical system whose operation is governed solely by the laws of chemistry and physics.  What does this mean?  It means that all of your thoughts and hopes and dreams and feelings are produced by chemical reactions going on in your head.”[23]

But if Cosmides and Tooby are correct about all of our thoughts being merely the result of chemical reactions then a number of questions clamor for answer: “Why should we trust these thoughts to be true?  What is about these chemical reactions that guarantees truth?”  Naturalistic evolutionary theory states that the products of evolution are better able to reproduce over time but there is no reason to think that this mindless process should fit humans for the acquisition of truth.  Moreland penetrates to the core of the issue:

“If mind emerged from matter without the direction of a superior Intelligence, two problems arise immediately.  First, why should we trust the deliverances of the mind as being rational or true, especially in the mind’s more theoretical activities?  …  Second, if thinking involves having abstract entities (propositions, laws of logic, and the like) instanced in one’s mind, then it seems to be incredibly unlikely that a property which emerged from matter in a struggle for survival would be the sort of thing that could have thoughts in the first place.  Why this emergent property would be such that it could contain abstract entities would be a mystery.”[24]

Again, the existence of the reliability of the senses and the mind fits better within a theistic context that has “the direction of a superior Intelligence” that both creates and correlates the human mind for the acquisition of knowledge.

Lastly, consider presupposition (8): “The existence of values.”  Naturalism has problems explaining the existence of values and objective morality.  Paul Copan summarizes the issue when he writes:

“How do we move from a universe that originates from no prior matter into a universe of valueless matter and energy, eventually arriving at moral values, including human rights, human dignity, and moral obligation?  It is hard to see how the naturalist could bridge this chasm.  Matter just does not have moral properties, let alone mental ones.”[25]

In light of naturalism’s failure to properly ground moral value Copan concludes:

“A moral universe and human dignity are best explained in the context of a morally excellent, worship-worthy Being as their metaphysical foundation, as opposed to nontheistic alternatives, and naturalism in particular. If objective moral values and human dignity and rights are a reality (and there is very good reason to think they are), then it is extremely likely that some intrinsically valuable Being and Creator exists.” [26]

The presupposition of moral value fits better within a theistic worldview rather than in the worldview of naturalism.

Science Needs God!

Although science is seen by many to be antithetical to belief in God, in actuality it is the existence of God that best provides the philosophical context for the presuppositions needed for science to flourish.  Naturalism as a philosophical worldview cannot adequately account for fundamental features needed for the scientific endeavor to succeed.  As one scales the secular city and critically probes the foundations of science it becomes apparent that naturalism’s scientism is flawed and the worldview cannot sustain itself in its use of science.  Ultimately, science itself needs God to make sense of itself.

·      This piece is a development of a presentation at Glendale Community College (AZ) and their annual “God & Truth” series entitled Is There Meaning in the World? Religion or Secular Humanism: That Is the Question?

--Richard Klaus is a graduate of Phoenix Seminary and is currently the Ratio Christi Chapter Director for the campus of Glendale Community College (AZ).  He blogs at White Rose Review.

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     [1] Jonathan McLatchie “Conflict Thesis” in Dictionary of Christianity and Science, eds. Paul Copan, Tremper Longman III, Christopher L. Reese, and Michael G. Strauss (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2017), 106.

     [2] See, for example, Iris Fry, “Is Science Metaphysically Neutral?” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (2012), 665-673.  Fry writes of how “naturalistic metaphysical presuppositions are active in science.” (p. 671) She concludes her essay with these words,” Currently it is the role of historically and philosophically enlightened evolutionary naturalists to defend and promote the naturalistic-evolutionary worldview.” (p. 672)

     [3] Quoted in Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro, Naturalism (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2008), 9.  James Sire’s The Universe Next Door—5^th ed. (Downers Grove, Ill.: Intervarsity Press, 2009) has a chapter—chapter four: “The Silence of Finite Space: Naturalism”—which contains a good discussion of philosophical naturalism. 

     [4] I have addressed both the issue of morality and meaning in two public talks.  For the notes to these addresses see: Richard Klaus, “’What’s Your Problem?’ How Euthyphro Challenges Us All” God & Truth V (October 24, 2017)—online: http://whiterosereview.blogspot.com/2017/10/whats-your-problem-how-euthyphro.html and Richard Klaus, “Metaphysics and the Meaning of Life: How the Kingdom of God Changes Everything!” God & Truth IV (October 18, 2016)—online: http://whiterosereview.blogspot.com/2016/10/metaphysics-and-meaning-of-life-how.html.

     [5] Quoted in Casey Luskin, “Darwin’s Poisoned Tree: Atheistic Advocacy and the Constitutionality of Teaching Evolution in Public Schools” Trinity Law Review 21.1 (Fall, 2015), 166.

     [6] Tamler Sommers and Alex Rosenberg, “Darwin’s Nihilistic Idea: Evolution and the Meaninglessness of Life” Biology and Philosophy 18(5); November, 2003, 653.

     [7] J. P. Moreland, “Scientism” in Dictionary of Christianity and Science, eds. Paul Copan, Tremper Longman III, Christopher L. Reese, and Michael G. Strauss (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2017), 621.  Variants of these definitions can be found in Moreland’s Scientism and Secularism (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2018), 29-30.

     [8] The above are all quoted in J. Daryl Charles, “Blame It on My Criminal Brain: Materialism, Metaphysics, and the Human Moral Instinct” Philosophia Christi (vol. 15, no. 1, 2013), 67-68.

     [9] Quoted in Casey Luskin, “Darwin’s Poisoned Tree: Atheistic Advocacy and the Constitutionality of Teaching Evolution in Public Schools” Trinity Law Review 21.1 (Fall, 2015), 162.  Luskin is quoting Crick’s The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul (1988).

     [10] J. Daryl Charles, “Blame It on My Criminal Brain: Materialism, Metaphysics, and the Human Moral Instinct” Philosophia Christi (vol. 15, no. 1, 2013), 67.

     [11] J. Daryl Charles, “Blame It on My Criminal Brain: Materialism, Metaphysics, and the Human Moral Instinct” Philosophia Christi (vol. 15, no. 1, 2013), 69.

     [12] J. P. Moreland, Scientism and Secularism (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2018), 52.

     [13] J. P. Moreland, Scientism and Secularism (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2018), 49-51.

     [14] J. P. Moreland, “Scientism” in Dictionary of Christianity and Science, eds. Paul Copan, Tremper Longman III, Christopher L. Reese, and Michael G. Strauss (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2017), 621.

     [15] J. P. Moreland, Scientism and Secularism (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2018), 73.

     [16] J. P. Moreland, Scientism and Secularism (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2018), 84.

     [17] J. P. Moreland, Scientism and Secularism (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2018), 84.

     [18] The following list of presuppositions is drawn from J. P. Moreland’s Christianity and the Nature of Science (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1989), 108-133 and Scientism and Secularism (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2018), 57-69.

     [19] J. P. Moreland, Scientism and Secularism (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2018), 75.

     [20] Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Clarendon Press, 1979), 136.

     [21] Paul Davies, Are We Alone? Philosophical Implications of the Discovery of Extraterrestrial Life (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1995), 124.

     [22] J. P. Moreland, Scientism and Secularism (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2018), 141.

     [23] Quoted in J. P. Moreland, “Intelligent Design and Evolutionary Psychology as Research Programs: A Comparison of Their Most Plausible Specifications” in Intelligent Design: William A. Dembski and Michael Ruse in Dialogue (Fortress, 2007), 131.

     [24] J. P. Moreland, Scaling the Secular City (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1987), 97.

     [25] Paul Copan, “God, Naturalism, and the Foundations of Morality” in Robert Stewart (ed.), The Future of Atheism: Alister McGrath and Daniel Dennett in Dialogue (Fortress, 2008), 155

—online: http://www.paulcopan.com/articles/pdf/God-naturalism-morality.pdf.

     [26] Paul Copan, “God, Naturalism, and the Foundations of Morality” in Robert Stewart (ed.), The Future of Atheism: Alister McGrath and Daniel Dennett in Dialogue (Fortress, 2008), 142.