Tuesday, May 26, 2015

On Prayer: Some Quotations

"So how is God glorified by prayer?  Prayer is the open admission that without Christ we can do nothing.  And prayer is the turning away from ourselves to God in the confidence that He will provide the help we need.  Prayer humbles us as needy and exalts God as all-sufficient."  --John Piper

"We should waste no time in getting down on our knees in prayer in order to release pent-up, divine blessing on multitudes in the devil's clutches.  Where you have people actually praying for the lost, you find the lost being saved."  --Douglas F. Kelly

"It is, therefore, necessary for the Spirit of God to burn into our hearts this mystery, that the most important work we have to do is that which must be done on our knees, alone with God, away from the bustle of the world and the plaudits of men... If the labor of prayer does not precede, as well as accompany, all of our work in the kingdom, it will become nothing but a work of man, more or less capably done and with more or less effort and agitation as the case may be, but resulting in nothing but weariness both to ourselves and to others."  --O. Hallesby

Saturday, May 16, 2015

The Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil

Nicholas Batzig has a nice meditation on the trees in the Garden of Eden and the cross of Christ in his blog post A Biblical Theology of the Trees of the Garden.  Here are a few comments about the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil:
This tree was a symbolic representation of what man could attain to, either by obedience or disobedience; it was a probation. Geerhardus Vos explained:
1. By this tree it would be made known and brought to light whether man would fall into the state of evil or would be confirmed in the state of immutable goodness.
2. By this tree man, who for the present knew evil only as an idea, could be led to the practical knowledge of evil. Or also because he, remaining unfallen, would still, by means of temptation overcome, gain clearer insight into the essence of evil as transgression of God’s law and disregard of His sovereign power, and likewise would attain the highest knowledge of immutable moral goodness.2
Vos explained elsewhere how Satan sought to pervert the meaning of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil when he wrote:
From the true conception of the purpose of the tree we must distinguish the interpretation placed upon it by the tempter according to Gen. 3.5. This carries a twofold implication: first that the tree has in itself, magically, the power of conferring knowledge of good and evil. This lowers the plane of the whole transaction from the religious and moral to the pagan-magical sphere. And secondly, Satan explains the prohibition from the motive of envy. … Again, the divine statement in Gen. 3.22 alludes to this deceitful representation of the tempter. It is ironical.3
Adam did indeed attain to the knowledge of good and evil, but, as Vos noted, he attained it from the standpoint of becoming evil and remembering the good in contrast to the evil he performed. He gained the experiential knowledge of good and evil from the evil side. If we make Genesis 1-3 our starting point, and then consider all the occasions in which man is called to make judgments (i.e. to decided between good and evil in each and every situation) we soon discover that he is always prone to choose the evil over the good in his natural state. When the LORD comes to assess Israel’s actions through the prophet Jeremiah this is what He concludes: ” For My people are foolish, they have not known Me. They are silly children, and they have no understanding. They are wise to do evil, But to do good they have no knowledge (Jeremiah 4:22). A little later on the Lord says of Israel, “‘they proceed from evil to evil, And they do not know Me,’ says the LORD.” It was knowledge of the LORD that was the knowledge of good that men lack. There are many similar verses in the prophets, in which the LORD brings the charge that men, including His people Israel, had not learned how to do good.
2. Geerhardus Vos (2012–2014). Reformed Dogmatics. (A. Godbehere, R. van Ijken, D. van der Kraan, H. Boonstra, J. Pater, & A. Janssen, Trans., R. B. Gaffin, Ed.) (Vol. 2, pp. 28–29). Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press.
3. Vos, Geerhardus  Biblical Theology (1948), pp. 27-33.

Friday, May 15, 2015

Proverbs 6.16-19: A Possible Chiastic Structure

There are six things which the Lord hates,
yes, seven which are an abomination to him:
Haughty eyes, a lying tongue,
and hands that shed innocent blood,
a heart that devises wicked plans, feet that run rapidly to evil,
a false witness who utters lies,
and one who spreads strife among brothers.
Proverbs 6.16-19

Here is a possible chiastic structure for Proverbs 6.16-19:

A  Haughty eyes

            B  a lying tongue

                        C  and hands that shed innocent blood

                                    D  a heart that devises wicked plans

                        C1  feet that run rapidly to evil

            B1  a false witness who utters lies

A1  and one who spreads strife among brothers


1.     A and A1 are seemingly the least connected.  But if the structure holds then A1 may be informed by A.  In other words, the strife among brothers may be due to haughty eyes—pride produces strife.

2.     B and B1 both concern lying and lies.

3.     C and C1 correlate hands with feet and innocent blood with evil.

4.     At the center (D) of the structure is what is at the center of the person—the heart.

Reincarnation, Morality, and God

I've started reading through Is Goodness without God Good Enough? A Debate on Faith, Secularism, and Ethics.  The first part of the book is the contents of a debate between Christian philosopher William Lane Craig and Paul Kurtz who is a proponent of "secular humanism."  This is followed by respondents to the debate from various backgrounds.

Chapter two is by C. Stephen Layman and is entitled "A Moral Argument for the Existence of God."  I will not summarize Layman's argument here.  Rather, I wanted to quote an interesting section regarding reincarnation.  Some people may wish to deny the existence of God and yet hold to some sort of objective moral ethic.  One way of doing this is to affirm a moral universe governed by karma.  Sometimes this is held in a sort of "street-level," non-sophisticated manner--"I don't believe in God; I believe in karma."  Layman's comments should cause pause to any who wish to ground their ethic in karma while simultaneously denying the existence of a personal God.
However, given that reincarnation and karma hold in the absence of any deity, the universe  is governed not only by physical laws (such as the law of gravity) but by impersonal moral laws.  These moral laws must be quite complex, for they have to regulate the connection between each soul's moral record in one life and that soul's total circumstances in its next life, including which body it has, its environment, and the degree of happiness (or misery) it experiences.  Thus, these impersonal moral laws must somehow take into account every act, every intention, and every choice of every moral agent and ensure that the agent receives nothing less than his or her just deserts in the next life.  Now, the degree of complexity involved here is obviously very high, and it serves a moral end, namely, justice.  But a highly complex structure that promotes justice can hardly be accepted as a brute fact.  Such a moral order cries out for explanation in terms of intelligent cause.  And if the moral order is on a scale far surpassing what can reasonably be attributed to human intelligence, an appeal to divine intelligence is justified.  Hence, the moral order postulated by nontheistic reincarnation paradoxically provides evidence for the existence of a personal God.  (pp. 58-59)

See the related post: Reincarnation: Letter to a Co-worker.

Thursday, May 7, 2015

Wayne Grudem and Sam Storms on Prophecy and Acts 21.4

The Grudem/Storms Model and Acts 21.4
The Grudem/Storms model has the following basic structure:

(1)  God reveals something to a person.

(2)  In the reception of the revelation there is the possibility of problems entering into the process.

a.     A faulty interpretation of the revelation may happen.

b.     There may be additions to the revelation that are added by the receiver.

(3)  In the communication moment what is communicated is a mixture of the revelation (given by God) and possible misinterpretations or additions generated by the receiver. 

Sam Storms articulates important distinctions in this regard:

The key is in recognizing that with every prophecy there are four elements, only one of which is assuredly of God: There is the revelation itself; there is the perception or reception of that revelation by the believer; there is the interpretation of what has been disclosed or the attempt to ascertain its meaning; and there is the application of that interpretation.  God is alone responsible for the revelation.  Whatever he discloses to the human mind is altogether free from error.  It is as infallible as he is.  It contains no falsehoods; it is wholly true in all its parts.  Indeed, the revelation, which is the root of every genuine prophetic utterance, is as inerrant and infallible as the written Word of God itself (the Bible).  In terms of the revelation alone, the New Testament prophetic gift does not differ from the Old Testament prophetic gift.

Error enters in when the human recipient of a revelation misperceives, misinterprets and/or misapplies what God has disclosed.  The fact that God has spoken perfectly does not mean that human beings have heard perfectly.  They may interpret and apply, without error, what God has revealed.  But the mere existence of a divine revelation does not in itself guarantee that the interpretation or application of God’s revealed truth will share in its perfection.[1]

Is there any Scriptural evidence for such a model?  Wayne Grudem argues in this way about Acts 21.4:
In this passage Paul is nearing the end of his third missionary journey, and he is drawing near to Jerusalem.  His ship lands at the port city of Tyre (in Syria, on the coast, somewhat northwest of Galilee).  Paul and his companions had to wait there for several days while the ship unloaded its cargo, so they sought out the Christians there.

And having sought out the disciples, we stayed there for seven days.  Through the Spirit they told Paul not to go on to Jerusalem.  And when our days there were ended, we departed and went on our journey (Acts 21:4-5, RSV).

This verse does not mention prophecy directly, but the parallel with Acts 11:28, where human speech activity ‘through the Spirit’ is explicitly attributed to the prophet Agabus, suggests that these disciples were in fact prophesying.  (In contrast to Acts 13:2, human spokesmen are here explicitly credited with the warning.)

But if this really is a report of prophesying, as it certainly seems to be, then it is very significant for understanding the nature of prophetic authority in ordinary New Testament congregations.  It is significant because Paul simply disobeyed their words, something he would not have done if he had thought that they were speaking the very words of God.

On the other hand, if the disciples at Tyre had a gift of prophecy which was similar to what we found at Corinth and at Ephesus, and perhaps also at Antioch (see above), then Paul’s disobedience to the prophecy would be entirely understandable.

In fact, we can surmise something of how such a prophecy would come about.  Suppose that some of the Christians at Tyre had had some kind of ‘revelation’ or indication from God about the sufferings which Paul would face at Jerusalem.  Then it would have been very natural for them to couple their subsequent prophecy (their report of this revelation) with their own (erroneous) interpretation, and thus to warn Paul not to go.[2]

Grudem adds these thoughts in a later essay defending his view:

[T]he expression “through the Spirit” (in Greek, dia tou pneumatos) modifies the verb “they were telling” in the Greek text (it modifies the imperfect verb, elegon). That is why the verse is translated, “And through the Spirit they were telling Paul not to go on to Jerusalem” (italics added). So here is speech given “through the Spirit” that Paul disobeys! This fits well with a view of prophecy that includes revelation given by the Holy Spirit and an interpretation and report of that revelation that is given in merely human words, words that the Holy Spirit does not superintend or claim as his own, words that can have a mixture of truth and error in them. This is why the prophecies have to be tested, and this is why Paul feels free to disobey in this case.[3]

What is important to realize is that there are a number of cessationists who argue in a very similar manner in regards to Acts 21.4.  They may not call this “prophecy” but they, nonetheless, recognize the dynamic of a revelatory word being added to by human interpretations.  Consider the following cessationist treatments of Acts 21.4.  Richard Gaffin recognizes a conceptual distinction between the revelation given by God and the human response that is merged in the “speech-act”:

Again, Luke’s point is not the impaired validity and unreliability of their speech, in which nevertheless the Spirit is somehow instrumental, but their recoil against what the Spirit had revealed to them of Paul’s future.  That revelation and their response to it must not be confused or merged in their speech-act.[4]

In response to Gaffin’s statement Wayne Grudem states:

Here Dr Gaffin seems to understand the event in a way similar to what I expressed above.  There is a revelation from the Holy Spirit to the disciples at Tyre, and in response to that revelation, they tell Paul not to go to Jerusalem.  The difference in our viewpoints is that I would call the response or report of that revelation a ‘prophecy’, and Dr Gaffin would not.  But whatever term is used, it is significant that we would both say that there can be a ‘revelation’ from the Holy Spirit to a person or persons, and also a spoken response to that revelation which can have ‘impaired validity’ and ‘unreliability’.  That is really the essence of what I am arguing for in this book, and what—it seems to me—the New Testament usually calls ‘prophecy’.  But if the concept be admitted even if it is called not ‘prophecy’ but ‘an unreliable human speech-act in response to a revelation from the Holy Spirit’, there does not seem to be much difference in our understanding at this point.  Nor does there seem to be strong reason for saying such an ‘unreliable human response to revelation from the Holy Spirit’ could not happen today.[5]

In a treatment specifically targeting Grudem’s work O. Palmer Robertson writes the following in regards to Acts 21.4:
The strongest case for a different kind of prophecy in the new covenant community may be derived from the prophecies related to Paul’s going up to Jerusalem.  In its baldest form, Acts 21:4 indicates that ‘through the Spirit’ the disciples at Tyre urged Paul not to go on to Jerusalem.  Yet earlier Paul reported to the saints in Ephesus that he was ‘compelled by the Spirit’ to go to Jerusalem (Acts 20:22).  On the surface of things, it appears that the report of an apostle regarding the work of the Spirit is flatly contradicted by the urging through Spirit that comes through the disciples.  This way of putting things captures the issue quite well.  Is it to be concluded that the true nature of new covenant prophecy now has become clear?  Is it that through one and the same Holy Spirit messages are to be delivered to God’s people for their direction that flatly contradict one another?

Several noteworthy commentators of various theological persuasions have no problem resolving the apparent discrepancy.  Neither Johannes Munck nor F. F. Bruce nor J. A. Alexander nor John Calvin suggests that the Spirit has contradicted himself, or that New Testament prophecy hereby is proven to be a mixture of good and bad, of truth and error.  Each in his own way concludes that the Spirit revealed to these disciples the sufferings Paul would undergo at Jerusalem.  To this perfected revelation the concerned disciples appended their own conclusion: that Paul should not proceed to Jerusalem.  It was not that the Spirit or prophecy erred at this point.  Instead, it was simply that the disciples’ concern for the well-being of their mentor limited their apprehension of the good that might come from Paul’s suffering.[6]

Notice that Robertson acknowledges the disciples “appended their own conclusion” and that their prior beliefs “limited their apprehension.”  Dr. Grudem responds to Robertson in this way:

Dr. Robertson, by way of response, refers to four commentators on Acts who all concluded that the Holy Spirit had revealed to these disciples “the sufferings Paul would undergo at Jerusalem” and then to this matter that the Holy Spirit had revealed, “the concerned disciples appended their own conclusion: that Paul should not proceed to Jerusalem” (p. 111; he refers to commentaries by Munck, Bruce, Alexander, and Calvin). It is interesting that this is exactly what I think happened as well, though Dr. Robertson does not indicate this to the readers (see GiftNTT, 93-95=GiftNTT2000, 75-77).

In addition, Dr. Robertson says that none of these commentators suggests, “that the Spirit has contradicted himself” (p. 111). The problem with this objection is that I do not suggest that the Spirit has contradicted himself either, but Dr. Robertson does not indicate that to his readers. More precisely, I think that the interpretation given by some of these prophets contradicted the true message of the Holy Spirit that Paul had earlier received, and that he was following as he went up to Jerusalem.

The difficulty with the entire passage, and one which Dr. Robertson nowhere mentions or deals with, is the fact that the expression “through the Spirit” (in Greek, dia tou pneumatos) modifies the verb “they were telling” in the Greek text (it modifies the imperfect verb, elegon). That is why the verse is translated, “And through the Spirit they were telling Paul not to go on to Jerusalem” (italics added). So here is speech given “through the Spirit” that Paul disobeys! This fits well with a view of prophecy that includes revelation given by the Holy Spirit and an interpretation and report of that revelation that is given in merely human words, words that the Holy Spirit does not superintend or claim as his own, words that can have a mixture of truth and error in them. This is why the prophecies have to be tested, and this is why Paul feels free to disobey in this case.[7]

An interesting historical note is that George Gillespie makes a similar point with respect to Acts 21.4. Gillespie was a theologian at the Westminster convention that produced the famous Westminster Confession of Faith. He is also suspected of being behind some of the specific wording of Chapter One (“Of the Holy Scripture”).  Gillespie wrote the following in A Treatise of Miscellany Questions:

Although such as had the gift of prophecy did not, nor could not err, so far as they were inspired by the Holy Ghost, in prophesying, much less in writing Scripture, yet they might have, and some had, their own mistakes and errors in particular cases…Another instance in those prophesying disciples, Acts xxi.4, ‘Who said to Paul, through the Spirit, that he should not go to Jerusalem.’ Their foretelling and foreknowing of Paul’s danger at Jerusalem was from the Spirit of prophecy; but the consequence they did draw from hence, that therefore Paul should not go up to Jerusalem. This interpreters conceive was only from their own spirits, though they misfathered it upon the Spirit of God.

He goes on to quote the English Annotations upon 1 Cor. 14.31 as saying:

There might be also something mingled with that which the prophets received, and it might fall out that that which they added of their own, by way of confirmation, illustration, or application, might be justly subject to censure, wherefore it must be tried and judged by others, whether the prophecies proceed from the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and according to the rule of faith.’ Isa. viii.20.[8]

Although this discussion has focused only on one passage there is, nevertheless, an important congruence of thought among cessationists and continuationists as to their understandings of Acts 21.4.  Both groups seem willing to affirm the same reality.  The dividing issue seems to be what linguistic token to use when describing this reality.  Continuationists have no problem calling this reality “prophecy” whereas cessationists are very hesitant to use this word to describe the issue.

     [1] C. Samuel Storms, “The Third Wave View,” in Are Miraculous Gifts for Today? Four Views ed. Wayne Grudem, (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 207-208.
     [2] Wayne Grudem, The Gift of Prophecy in the New Testament and Today (Westchester: Crossway, 1988), 93-94. 
     [3] Wayne Grudem, “A Response to O. Palmer Robertson, The Final Word,” 22.  Online: http://www.waynegrudem.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Robertson-O-Palmer-response-by-WG.pdf.
     [4] Richard Gaffin, Perspectives on Pentecost (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1979), 66.
     [5] Wayne Grudem, The Gift of Prophecy in the New Testament and Today (Westchester: Crossway, 1988), 95.
     [6] O. Palmer Robertson, The Final Word: A Biblical Response to the Case for Tongues and Prophecy Today (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1993), 110-111.
     [7] Wayne Grudem, “A Response to O. Palmer Robertson, The Final Word,” 21-22.  Online: http://www.waynegrudem.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Robertson-O-Palmer-response-by-WG.pdf.
     [8] George Gillespie, A Treatise of Miscellany Questions (Edinburgh: Robert Ogle, and Oliver & Boyd, 1649), 35.

Sunday, May 3, 2015

Taking Hold of Christ's Hand: Advice from Jonathan Edwards

In all your course, walk with God,
and follow Christ, 
as a little, poor, helpless child, 
taking hold of Christ's hand,
keeping your eye on the marks of the wounds
in his hands and side,
whence came the blood 
that cleanses you from sin,
and hiding your nakedness under
the skirt of the white shining robes
of his righteousness.

--Jonathan Edwards
(Hickman edition, vol. 1, p. liv)

Thursday, April 23, 2015

Reflections on the Accuracy of Daniel

* A paper I wrote for a seminary class.  It has some good bibliographic information for further study.


            The book of Daniel has been the subject of vigorous debate regarding its historicity, accuracy, and dating.  Conservative evangelical scholars have often defended a sixth-century B.C. date for the book while those of a more liberal, critical mindset have argued for a date in the second-century B.C.  Evangelical scholars Alan Millard and Edwin Yamauchi have both written on the issues related to the accuracy of Daniel.  This paper will summarize two of their articles and then provide an assessment of their argumentation as well as briefly discuss other issues related to the accuracy of the book of Daniel.[1]
            Yamauchi divides his article into two parts as he looks at “historical problems” and then at “linguistic and archaeological data” associated with Daniel.  Under the category of historical problems Yamauchi considers four areas of controversy.  First, there are issues related to Nebuchadnezzar.  These include the dating discrepancy between Daniel 1.1 and Jeremiah 46.2.  This is “readily explained by the use of different calendars (Nisan and Tishri), and of different regnal systems.”[2]  Another concern revolves around the Babylonian names given to Daniel and his three friends.  Yamauchi notes the work of a distinguished Assyriologist who has proposed an explanation on the basis of Akkadian analogies.  The issue of the use of the word “Chaldeans” as anachronistic is looked at as well and given a plausible explanation.
            The second area concerns the relationship of Nabonidus and Belshazzar.  Belshazzar is mentioned in Daniel but Nabonidus is not.  Nabonidus is the acknowledged king of Babylon but cuneiform evidence shows that his son Belshazzar was left in charge in Babylon after Nabonidus moved to the Arabian city Tema. 
            The third area Yamauchi addresses is the potential relationship between Nebuchadnezzar’s derangement and Nabonidus’ exile.  Some have attempted to argue that these two episodes are the same but Yamauchi notes “there are far more dissimilarities than resemblances.”[3]
            A fourth area concerns the identity of Darius the Mede.  Since there is no clear extra-biblical evidence for such a person the identity of Darius has been suspect.  Yamauchi notes that two evangelical responses have been to align Darius with either Gubaru or Cyrus.  Yamauchi does acknowledge that none of the proposed solutions to this problem have been entirely satisfactory.  Yamauchi helpfully adds:
The failure to appreciate the fragmentary nature of available evidence leads to the false assumption that a figure in literary sources must be unhistorical if contemporary epigraphical documentation for his existence is unavailable.  It was not until 1961 that the first epigraphical text for Pontius Pilate was discovered, and it was not until 1966 that similar documentation for Felix, the governor of Judea, was found.[4]

            Yamauchi, in the second section of his paper, interacts briefly with alleged linguistic problems.  He looks at an Egyptian loanword, the use of Aramaic, and the presence of Greek words for instruments in Daniel 3.5.  All of these are given plausible explanations.  Yamauchi, in particular, looks at the debate on Daniel’s Aramaic.  Rowley’s 1929 study alleging a second-century date due to the type of Aramaic is countered by noting the work of a number of scholars who have disputed Rowley’s findings. 
            In light of the above discussions Yamauchi is able to conclude with these wise words:
It is clear that liberal commentators do not acknowledge that there are possible solutions to the historical problems in the Book of Daniel… Conservative scholars welcome the increasing mass of linguistic and archaeological data which helps support an early date or at least helps undermine arguments for a late date for Daniel.[5]

            Millard’s essay covers many of the same items as Yamauchi’s article: the dating issue of Daniel 1.1, the relationship between Nebuchadnezzar’s madness and Nabonidus’ Prayer, the relationship between the kingships of Nabonidus and his son Belshazzar, the identity of Darius the Mede, and the linguistic issues revolving around Persian, Greek, and Aramaic words.  Millard comes to many of the same conclusions as those of Yamauchi.
            Millard does address a few additional issues.  First, there is a discussion of Belshazzar’s feast and death.  Millard links this to other ancient histories and shows the plausibility of the Daniel account.  Second, Millard discusses the reality of the Median kingdom.  He points to the historical data regarding these people and then discusses their role in Daniel.  Millard correlates the Medes with the second element in Daniel’s vision of the statue in chapter two.[6]  Third, Millard briefly examines the relationship between Daniel’s mention of 120 satraps (Dan 6.1) and the mention of Darius I appointing twenty “satrapies” as found in the writing of Herodotus.  Millard explains that the underlying word used in Daniel has the potential for a broader meaning.  He concludes: “The possibility may be envisaged, therefore, that the term could be applied more widely than Herodotus’s report about the reign of Darius I implies.”[7]
            Millard and Yamauchi in their respective articles examine a number of details that point to a sixth-century B.C. date for Daniel.  At the very least, they attempt to provide plausible explanations to objections against a sixth-century date. 
            Although literary documents and archaeological data are important in assessing the date of Daniel the larger issue of background presuppositions plays a role in the assessment of the literary and archaeological evidence.  The book of Daniel is written from a sixth-century perspective but the fact that it prophesies events centuries in the future leads many scholars to conclude that the document must be a second-century creation.  W. S. Towner is very forthright in his presuppositional stance:
We need to assume that the vision as a whole is a prophecy after the fact.  Why?  Because human beings are unable to predict future events centuries in advance and to say that Daniel could do so, even on the basis of a symbolic revelation vouchsafed to him by God and interpreted by an angel, is to fly in the face of the certainties of human nature.  So what we have here is in fact not a road map of the future laid down in the sixth century B.C. but an interpretation of the events of the author’s own time, 167-164 B.C. …[8]

For those, like the present author, who affirm a supernaturalistic worldview Towner’s position is suspect due to its underlying naturalism.  The arguments for a sixth-century B.C. date for Daniel are strong and the objections to such a date have often been addressed by evangelical Old Testament scholars.  Gleason Archer, for example, in a hard-hitting article defending a sixth-century date concludes his essay with the following: “It is therefore safe to say that no Bible scholar can today make a defensible claim to intellectual respectability and still maintain the theory of a Maccabean time of composition for this remarkable book…”[9]
            For the rest of this essay the perennial issue of the identity of Darius the Mede will be briefly examined.  Both Yamauchi and Millard mention the work of Donald Wiseman who argued that Darius the Mede is to be identified with Cyrus.  Yamauchi and Millard both recognize that this view is not entirely convincing in light of the lack of archaeological confirmation.  Lester Grabbe in a 1988 article surveys three evangelical perspectives on Darius the Mede—including Wiseman’s view.  Grabbe dismisses Wiseman in less than a page.  He argues that Wiseman’s view has no positive data or argumentation.  He concludes that Wiseman’s view is “only an exercise in apologetics.”[10]  Grabbe’s view is the typical critical perspective: Darius “is simply a creation from commonplace beliefs about Persian times.”[11] 
            Subsequent to Grabbe’s discussion William Shea took up the challenge of Darius the Mede and responded to Grabbe’s conclusions.[12]  Space forbids a full summary of Shea’s arguments but the general structure of his analysis is to walk through the textual data as well as the archaeological evidence to see how the “Darius as Cyrus” hypothesis fares.  Shea concludes:
The ultimate argument for Cyrus as Darius the Mede must stem from the issue of how well this hypothesis explains all of the data involved.  I would suggest that the use of D. J. Wiseman’s theory that Cyrus was Darius the Mede affords better explanations for more biblical references than any other hypothesis.  In fact, some of these very intimate details of history have gone unexplained until this hypothesis has been applied to them.  Thus, the identification of Cyrus as Darius the Mede in the book of Daniel brings to these unexplained details of that book the very best explanation yet available.[13]

It is instructive to compare the methodology of Grabbe and Shea in this matter.  Grabbe considers Wiseman’s “working hypothesis” to be devoid of any “positive data or argumentation.[14]  This is a truncated view of the matter.  Shea’s methodology is to truly take Wiseman’s proposal as a working hypothesis and to test how the relevant data that is available is illuminated by such a proposal.  This is an appropriate “inference-to-the-best-explanation” approach to historiography.  William Craig, in his discussion of the nature of historical knowledge, describes the process this way:
According to this approach, we begin with the evidence available to us and then infer what would, if true, provide the best explanation of that evidence.  Out of a pool of live options determined by our background beliefs, we select the best of various competing potential explanations to give a causal account of why the evidence is as it is rather than otherwise.[15]

Craig’s comments draw attention to the issue of one’s “background beliefs” as one element of determination.  For the conservative evangelical a part of one’s relevant background beliefs will be such items as the epistemic authority of the Scriptures in general as well as the belief in a transcendent God who rules over creation and history.  Given these presuppositional commitments it is entirely rational to seek historical harmonization utilizing plausible scenarios as a working hypothesis.[16]
            While critical scholars have often alleged a second-century B.C. date for Daniel conservative evangelicals have provided reasonable answers to the typical objections for a sixth-century B.C. date.  Although certainty is not possible in every instance, there are plausible explanations for the challenges to the early date.  Many times the philosophical presuppositions play an important factor in the assessment of the data.


Archer, Jr. Gleason L. “Modern Rationalism and the Book of Daniel.” Bibliotheca Sacra 136
(1979): 129-147.

Craig, William Lane. Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics. Wheaton, Ill.:
Crossway, 1994.

Dillard, Raymond B. and Tremper Longman III. An Introduction to the Old Testament. Grand
Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1994.

Grabbe, Lester L. “Another Look at the Gestalt of ‘Darius the Mede’.” Catholic Biblical
Quarterly 50 (1988): 198-213.

Millard, Alan R. “Daniel in Babylon: An Accurate Record?” Pages 263-280 in Do Historical
Matters Matter to Faith: A Critical Appraisal of Modern and Postmodern Approaches to Scripture. Edited by James K. Hoffmeier and Dennis R. Magary. Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2012.

Shea, William H. “Darius the Mede in his Persian-Babylonian Setting.” Andrews University
Seminary Studies 29 (1991): 235-257.

Shea, William H. “Nabonidus Chronicle: New Readings and the Identity of Darius the Mede.”
Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 7 (1996): 1-20.

Shea, William H. “The Search for Darius the Mede (Concluded), or The Time of the Answer
to Daniel’s Prayer and the Date of the Death the Mede.” Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 12 (2001): 97-105.

Waltke, Bruce K. “The Date of the Book of Daniel.” Bibliotheca Sacra 133 (1976): 319-329.

Yamauchi, Edwin M. “The Archaeological Background of Daniel.” Bibliotheca Sacra 137
(1980): 3-16.

     [1] The two articles to be discussed are: Edwin M. Yamauchi, “The Archaeological Background of Daniel,” Bibliotheca Sacra 137 (1980), 3-16; Alan R. Millard, “Daniel in Babylon: An Accurate Record?” in Do Historical Matters Matter to Faith: A Critical Appraisal of Modern and Postmodern Approaches to Scripture (ed. James K. Hoffmeier and Dennis R. Magary; Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2012), 263-280.
     [2] Yamauchi, “The Archaeological Background of Daniel,” 3.
     [3] Yamauchi, “The Archaeological Background of Daniel,” 7.
     [4] Yamauchi, “The Archaeological Background of Daniel,” 9.
     [5] Yamauchi, “The Archaeological Background of Daniel,” 13.
     [6] Bruce K. Waltke in an essay also arguing for a sixth-century B.C. date for Daniel argues that the Medes should be linked with the Persian empire as the second element with the third element being Greece and the fourth element being the Roman empire.  “The Date of the Book of Daniel,” Bibliotheca Sacra 133 (1976), 326.
     [7] Millard, “Daniel in Babylon,” 277.
     [8] Quoted in Raymond B. Dillard and Tremper Longman III, An Introduction to the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1994), 332.
     [9] Gleason L. Archer, Jr. “Modern Rationalism and the Book of Daniel,” Bibliotheca Sacra 136 (1979), 147.
     [10] Lester L. Grabbe, “Another Look at the Gestalt of ‘Darius the Mede’” Catholic Biblical Quarterly 50 (1988), 207.
     [11] Grabbe, “Another Look at the Gestalt of ‘Darius the Mede’,” 211.
     [12] William H. Shea, “Darius the Mede in his Persian-Babylonian Setting,” Andrews University Seminary Studies 29 (1991), 235-257.  It should be noted that Shea subsequently changed his mind regarding the Cyrus and Darius connection.  In later essays he went back to a view he had previously propounded, namely that Darius is to be identified with Ugbaru, the general who conquered Babylon for Cyrus.  Either way, Shea has effectively argued for two possible answers for the identity of Darius.  For Shea’s later view see: “Nabonidus Chronicle: New Readings and the Identity of Darius the Mede,” Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 7 (1996), 1-20; “The Search for Darius the Mede (Concluded), or The Time of the Answer to Daniel’s Prayer and the Date of the Death the Mede,” Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 12 (2001), 97-105.
     [13] Shea, “Darius the Mede in his Persian-Babylonian Setting,” 255-256.
     [14] Grabbe, “Another Look at the Gestalt of ‘Darius the Mede’,” 207.
     [15] William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 1994), 182-183.
     [16] To speak of “presuppositional commitments” is to stress how these beliefs function.  It is not to allege that such commitments are without rational support or devoid of demonstration themselves.