* A paper I wrote for my Philosophical Theology class for the MA in Philosophy from Biola University.
Challenging Strict Divine Simplicity
April 29, 2024
Abstract
The strict doctrine of divine simplicity is enjoying a resurgence of interest and defense. In this paper I challenge this conception of divine simplicity both directly and indirectly. Directly, the doctrine suffers from a modal collapse regarding God’s freedom in creation. Indirectly, the doctrine is driven by arguments against composition that are not beyond challenge.
Defining Divine Simplicity
The doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) has been affirmed throughout the history of Christian theology.[1] There have been, however, various conceptions of DDS.[2] Peter Leithart offers a historically informed perspective when he writes:
“God is simple” is a near-universal Christian confession about God. It is not the case that every theologian means the same thing when he or she says it. It is highly misleading to present a rigorous Augustinian or Thomistic doctrine of simplicity and then treat it as the sine qua non of the Christian doctrine of God.[3]
There is, thus, a spectrum of understandings regarding DDS. The most basic definition of DDS is God is not assembled out of parts and cannot be decomposed into parts. William Hasker notes, “This sentence formulates the most basic and unquestionably true (given that there is a God) assertion of the doctrine of simplicity; I shall term it, ‘Simple Simplicity.’”[4] At the other end of the spectrum are highly specified versions of DDS usually associated with Thomas Aquinas and the Classical Theistic tradition. The Classical version of DDS makes the following claims:[5]
· God’s essential attributes are identical to each other and identical to the divine nature.
· God does not possess any properties, forms, immanent universals, or tropes.
· God does not possess any intrinsic or extrinsic properties.
· God is purely actual and does not possess any potentiality whatsoever.
· Since all of God’s actions are identical, there is only one divine act which is identical to the divine substance.
It is this Classical Theism view of DDS which is being promoted today within evangelical circles as “nothing less that the truth about God as He has disclosed himself in creation and in the Holy Scripture.”[6]
However, this strict version of DDS can be challenged both directly and indirectly. The direct problem concerns the issue regarding the creation of world by God. Either such an act of creation is necessary thus entailing a modal collapse or it is freely chosen by God in which case the strict doctrine of DDS is compromised. This dilemma will be examined below along with possible responses to alleviate the tension. An indirect challenge can be mounted against DDS by examining the alleged problems with divine complexity and the arguments put forward against any notion of complexity in God. These arguments will be examined and possible rejoinders offered.
The Creation Dilemma and Responses
Within classical Christian theology, the existence of the universe is contingent, resting upon God’s creative power. Further, the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo posits that within this actual world—out of the many possible worlds—there is a state of affairs where God exists alone without the universe and then, in a subsequent moment, a state of affairs where God exists with the universe. This state of affairs where God exists with the ever-dependent-upon-God universe is a result of God’s freedom to create the universe. As Ryan Mullins and Shannon Byrd state, “Classical Christian theology says that the contingency of the existence of the universe is ultimately grounded in God’s free and contingent act to cause the universe to exist.”[7]
In that God, in the classical tradition, has infallible causal power, the universe exists of hypothetical necessity. Mullins and Byrd note a key distinction:
Hypothetical necessity is distinct from absolute necessity. If something is absolutely necessary, it cannot be otherwise. As the classical theist Paul Helm maintains, the universe exists of hypothetical necessity because the existence of the universe is freely brought about by the intentional action of an infallibly omnipotent God.[8]
Affirming the hypothetical necessity of the existence of the universe safeguards the freedom of God. It is this freedom which is considered necessary for God to be maximally great and self-sufficient (a se). Dolezal highlights the problem:
God’s ontological absoluteness appears to be endangered if one insists that God is not free in his act of willing the world. If he wills the world with absolute necessity then something non-divine would be necessary to him and he would be correlative in being and essence. God would depend upon something outside himself for his end and purpose.[9]
Thus, divine freedom to create ex nihilo is necessary to uphold the perfection of God.
However, this divine freedom does not comport well with DDS. In fact, DDS and its implications entail a necessarily existing universe. This is a modal collapse of the contingency of the created universe into necessity. Mullins and Byrd outline the argument in the following manner:[10]
(M1) God’s existence is absolutely necessary.
(M2) Anything that is identical to God’s existence must be absolutely necessary.
(M3) All of God’s intentional actions are identical to each other such that there is
only one divine act.
(M4) God’s one divine act is identical to God’s existence.
(M5) Therefore, God’s one divine act is absolutely necessary.
(M6) God’s intentional act to create the universe is identical to God’s one divine act.
(M7) If God’s one divine act is absolutely necessary, then God’s intentional act to
create the universe is absolutely necessary.
(M8) Therefore, God’s intentional act to create the universe is absolutely necessary.
(M9) Therefore, the universe exists of absolute necessity.
This argument demonstrates a deep tension between the need to affirm to divine freedom with its attendant idea of a hypothetically existing universe and a doctrine of divine simplicity which renders the universe as existing of absolute necessity.
This tension can be construed as a dilemma for those affirming DDS and the doctrine of creation. Either the act of creation is absolutely necessary, or it is freely chosen and contingent. Defenders of DDS recognize this challenge as is evident by the discussion in Dolezal’s God Without Parts. He writes:
Whether his will for the universe is free or necessary, then, it seems that doctrine of divine absoluteness is doomed. If God’s will is free then seemingly he must be composed of act and potency, and thus cannot be existentially absolute (which requires that he be eternally pure act). If his will for the world is absolutely necessary then his nature requires the world and thus God cannot be essentially absolute. For Christians, both of these alternatives are unacceptable.[11]
This proposed dilemma will be called the “Creation Dilemma.” Either horn of the dilemma is problematic for the defender of DDS and the doctrine of contingent creation flowing from God’s free act to create.
Defenders of DDS have responded to the Creation Dilemma in at least three ways.[12] First, some defenders of DDS have simply been willing to “bite the bullet” and affirm the modal collapse horn of the dilemma. Katherin Rogers clearly embraces the modal collapse regarding the Creation Dilemma. “The traditional doctrine of divine simplicity does seem to entail that God ‘must’ create, and He ‘must’ create this world. This is a defensible conclusion which need not force us to abandon the doctrine.”[13] This certainly allows one to maintain the strict version of DDS, but it comes at a cost which most in the Christian theological tradition are not willing to countenance. DDS defender James Dolezal balks at embracing this modal collapse for the sake of philosophical consistency since, “there does seem to be biblical and theological warrant for saying that God could do things other than he does.”[14] As noted above, Dolezal also argues that denying divine freedom and embracing the modal collapse actually endangers DDS in that “something non-divine would be necessary to him and he would be correlative in being and essence.”[15] Furthermore, as Mullins and Byrd note, “It is just intuitive to think that the way the world is could have been otherwise. The notion that everything is absolutely necessary is deeply counterintuitive.”[16] Finally, for those who use the distinction between God’s “active” and “permissive” will in their theodicy, embracing the modal collapse horn of the Creation Dilemma will be problematic. Any notion of God “permitting evil” (as opposed to actively willing evil) becomes incoherent in that “God could not have done otherwise, so there is no sense in which God can be said to be permitting an event from occurring if that event is absolutely necessary.”[17]
A second avenue of response to the Creation Dilemma by defenders of DDS is to weaken the doctrine of divine simplicity to make room for God’s freedom. In responding to elements of the Creation Dilemma, Eleonore and Norman Kretzmann put forward a view of DDS which “is faithful to the spirit of Aquinas’s position on these issues” but which, nevertheless, allows for the idea that “God is not the same in all possible worlds.”[18] Stump and Kretzmann argue that the Thomistic view of God’s nature, in which only necessity exists (no potentiality), can be understood as applying “within any initial-state of possible worlds.”[19] Thus, different possible worlds may have a different actualized nature of God. According to other defenders of the Thomistic version of DDS, this modification by Stump and Kretzmann is not a mere “weakening” of DDS but an overthrow of key components of DDS as espoused by Aquinas. James Dolezal responds:
But Stump’s account is fraught with difficulties. The question immediately comes to mind: What is it about God that is ‘not the same’ in different possible worlds? Furthermore, if this divine difference is intrinsic yet not accidental, is it not then substantial or essential? Simply saying that God is not ‘insubstantial’ in any possible world in which he exists is not the same as saying that he is substantially or essentially the same in every possible world. God might be one complete substance or essence in world A and a different complete substance or essence in world B. Either way there is nothing ‘insubstantial’ about him. If this is what Stump’s explanation amounts to then it is hard to square with Thomas’s actus purus conception of God’s simplicity. Surely Aquinas did not simply mean to say that God is pure act in whatever world he happens to create but that he could have been a different pure act if he had chosen to create a different possible world. Pure act simply will not allow one to introduce differentia into the divine essence and existence.[20]
Of course Stump and Kretzmann could argue that one need not slavishly follow the Thomistic version of DDS with its attendant Aristotelian metaphysics of actus purus. But if this course is taken, then it is an open question whether a strong version of DDS continues to stand.[21] As Mullins notes, “What Stump and Kretzmann seemed to have missed, however, is that divine simplicity is a determinative concept that cannot be weakened without destroying all of the other elements of the doctrine.”[22]
A third response to the Creation Dilemma is to affirm both DDS with its seeming necessary creation along with divine freedom and to appeal to ineffable mystery as to how these realities are related. Dolezal specifically takes this approach.
It should be readily confessed that the exact function of free will in God who is himself pure act is beyond the scope of human knowledge. Just as we cannot comprehend God as ipsum esse subsistens, we cannot comprehend the identity between God as eternal, immutable, pure act and his will for the world as free and uncoerced. Though we discover strong reasons for confessing both simplicity and freedom in God, we cannot form an isomorphically adequate notion of how this is the case.[23]
Dolezal believes “there are compelling reasons for confessing that God is both simple and free” so the inability to specify exactly how these two relate in a noncontradictory manner can legitimately be left in the category of “mystery.”[24] Of course, it can be argued that the presence of a contradiction in the argumentation may actually be a reason to question the alleged “compelling reasons” for confessing that God is simple. As Mullins and Byrd note, “Contradictions are not mysteries. Contradictions are necessarily false.”[25] The critics of DDS have provided arguments with specified premises. It is incumbent on the defender of DDS to state clearly which premise, or set of premises, he is rejecting and why.[26]
Questioning the Argument Against Complexity
Beyond this challenge offered by contradiction there are further reasons to question the strength of DDS. The strict version of DDS, as outlined above, entails a complete absence of complexity in God. Dolezal accurately follows the Thomistic tradition in denying any, and all, composition in God. God is not physically, logically, or metaphysically composite. He lays out in short form the basic arguments against divine composition.
Non-composition, it is argued, must characterize God inasmuch as every composite is a dependent thing that cannot account for its own existence or essence and stands in need of some composer outside itself. To be composite is to be composed by another and to be dependent upon the parts that enter into the composition. Furthermore, composition signifies the capacity of a thing to change or even be annihilated. If God is to be understood as “most absolute” all such composition must be denied of him.[27]
Three specific claims are offered in Dolezal’s statement:
1. To be composite is to be in need of a composer who put the parts together.
2. To be composite is to be dependent upon the parts that enter into the composition.
3. To be composite is to entail that the thing in question can change and even be annihilated.
Are these claims true? Must a modified, non-Thomistic version of DDS comport with these claims? It is these three claims that are examined below.
The strict version of DDS claims that composition entails a composer, but this seems to be a mere claim without argumentation. Matthew Baddorf posits a notion of divine complexity (DC) in which God has metaphysical parts.[28] Referencing the work of Vincent Spade, he notes that “medieval philosophers rejected DC because they endorsed complexity implies causation (CIC). Any complex thing has an efficient cause.”[29] Baddorf challenges this notion in the following manner: “Why accept CIC? Unfortunately, Spade is unaware of any clear medieval argument for this view. Nor am I aware of any argument for this view by contemporary philosophers.”[30] Baddorf considers possible defenses of CIC based on either induction or the intuitive plausibility of the principle. In both cases, Baddorf finds the reasoning to be less than compelling.[31] Therefore, the claim that composition entails a composer is not adequately defended; it is a metaphysical claim without reasoned support.
The second of Dolezal’s claims is that composition entails dependence upon the parts that enter into the composition.[32] This dependency is thought to compromise God’s aseity. But a key question to consider is whether alldependency relations conceivable of God compromise his aseity. Oliver Crisp’s “parsimonious model of divine simplicity” challenges the strict DDS at this point. Crisp’s model allows for God to have distinct attributes that he exemplifies.[33] He further specifies the following features of God which are consistent with the history of theology and contemporary philosophical reflection:[34]
1. God is maximally excellent in all possible worlds, making him maximally great.
2. God is a necessary being, that is, a being that exists in all possible worlds.
3. The attributes God has he has essentially, in that they are part of his nature.
This multiplicity of divine attributes is true of God in all possible worlds, and he holds them necessarily. Crisp then probes the dependency relation and minimizes its significance. He writes:
It may still be true that he “depends” on these attributes in the sense that in order to be the entity he is he must exemplify omnipotence, omniscience, and the like. But so what? Why is that damaging to the model? If there are no possible worlds in which he fails to exemplify these attributes, then the dependence in question is not one that can damage his greatness, for the reasons just given. Does it damage his aseity? Not obviously. He is independent of his creatures; he is not dependent on anything contingent, or accidental. He may be said to “depend” on his nature, and on the attributes he exemplifies. But that seems like a rather picayune sense of “depend.”[35]
To argue that God is “dependent” on his necessarily existing nature and attributes is not to undermine aseity but, rather, to illustrate this divine attribute.[36] Peter Leithart helpfully adds, “We can’t conceive a being whose parts and wholeness are equiprimordial and mutually constituting, but then we can’t conceive of a simple being either. An ineffably composite God seems to protect the Creator-creature distinction just as well as an ineffably simple one.”[37] Thus. Dolezal’s second claim regarding composition in God is seen to be without substantive merit.
The third claim regarding composition states that a composed entity is open to change and, potentially, destruction. This is a claim that is not intuitively obvious. The remarks above in analyzing the second claim are also of relevance here. It does seem correct that some kinds of composition would render a being subject to change. For example, a being composed of matter—a mereological aggregate—does seem open to change and it is even conceivable that such a being is dissolved. But why should one think that a necessary Being who is maximally great and has a multitude of distinguishable properties (i.e., omniscience, omnipotence, righteousness, etc.) should be open to fundamental change or destruction? Yann Schmitt, in fact, argues for a “moderate simplicity” which allows for some metaphysical complexity but stresses “absolute indivisibility.”[38] And Thomas McCall mentions a notion of DDS in which predications of the divine nature are a “sort of unbreakable package” in which the divine attributes “are mutually and necessarily coextensive.”[39] This seems to be all that is needed to avoid the problem of potential change or destruction to the essential divine nature.[40]
Conclusion
Although the doctrine of divine simplicity has been nearly ubiquitous throughout the history of Christian theology, there have been differing conceptions of the doctrine that should be noticed. The strict version of DDS most fully developed in the thought of Thomas Aquinas has a long pedigree of proponents as well as recent defenders. This paper has attempted to challenge the rationality of this strict doctrine by directly challenge the internal coherence of the doctrine by appeal to a modal collapse argument. The Creation Dilemma has generated a number of responses by defenders of DDS, but the ones canvassed in this paper are all seen to be problematic. Further, DDS was indirectly challenged by examining some of the rationale for denying composition or complexity in God. Three traditional arguments were examined and found to be wanting. Nothing like a full-scale rebuttal of DDS in its most strict form has been accomplished but several key motivating factors have been surveyed which challenge the rationality and need for DDS.
Bibliography
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica—Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas—vol 1. Ed., Anton Pegis. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997.
Baddorf, Matthew. “Divine Simplicity, Aseity, and Sovereignty.” Sophia 56.3 (2017) 403-418.
Crisp, Oliver D. “A Parsimonious Model of Divine Simplicity.” Modern Theology 35.3 (2019) 558-573.
Dolezal, James E. All That Is In God: Evangelical Theology and the Challenge of Classical Christian Theism. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Reformation Heritage Books, 2017.
Dolezal, James E. God Without Parts: Divine Simplicity and the Metaphysics of God’s Absoluteness. Eugene, Ore.: Pickwick Publications, 2011.
Fowler, Gregory. “Simplicity or Priority?” In Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, vol. 6, ed. Jonathan L. Kvanig, 114-138. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
Hasker, William. “Is Divine Simplicity a Mistake?” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 90.4 (2016) 699-725.
Leithart, Peter J. Creator: A Theological Interpretation of Genesis 1. Downers Grove, Ill.: Intervarsity Press, 2023.
Leithart, Peter. “What Sort of Parts Is God Without?” Theopolis Institute (July 25, 2019)—online: https://theopolisinstitute.com/conversations/what-sorts-of-parts-is-god- without/.
McCall, Thomas H. “Trinity Doctrine, Plain and Simple.” In Advancing Trinitarian Theology, eds. Oliver D. Crisp and Fred Sanders, 42-59. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2014.
Mullins, Ryan T. “Classical Theism.” In T & T Clark Handbook of Analytic Theology, eds. James M. Arcadi and James T. Turner, Jr., 85-100. New York: Bloomsbury, 2021.
Mullins, Ryan T. “Simply Impossible: A Case Against Divine Simplicity.” Journal of Reformed Theology 7 (2013) 181-203.
Mullins, Ryan T. and Shannon Eugene Byrd, “Divine Simplicity and Modal Collapse: A Persistent Problem,” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14.3 (2022) 21-52.
Ortlund, Gavin. “Divine Simplicity in Historical Perspective: Resourcing a ContemporaryDiscussion. International Journal of Systematic Theology 16.4 (2014) 436-453.
Radde-Gallwitz, Andrew. “Gregory of Nyssa and Divine Simplicity: A Conceptualist Reading.” Modern Theology 35.3 (2019) 452-466.
Rogers, Katherin A. “An Anselmian Approach to Divine Simplicity.” Faith and Philosophy 37.3 (2020) 308-322.
Rogers, Katherin A. Perfect Being Theology. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000.
Rogers, Katherin. “The Traditional Doctrine of Divine Simplicity.” Religious Studies 32.2 (1996) 165-186.
Steele Jeff and Thomas Williams. “Complexity without Composition: Duns Scotus on Divine Simplicity.” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 93.4 (2019) 611-631.
Stump Eleonore and Norman Kretzmann. “Absolute Simplicity.” Faith and Philosophy 2.4 (1985) 353-382.
Schmitt, Yann. “The Deadlock of Absolute Divine Simplicity.” International Journal of Philosophy of Religion 74 (2013) 117-130.
[1] James Dolezal quotes historian Richard Muller, “The doctrine of divine simplicity is among the normative assumptions of theology from the time of the church fathers, to the age of the great medieval scholastic systems, to the era of Reformation and post-Reformation theology, and indeed, on into the succeeding era of late orthodoxy and rationalism.” James E. Dolezal, God Without Parts: Divine Simplicity and the Metaphysics of God’s Absoluteness (Eugene, Ore.: Pickwick Publications, 2011), 3.
[2] “It is frequently noted that the doctrine of divine simplicity has been a recurrent feature of the church’s theology throughout patristic, medieval and post-Reformation traditions. But diversity in how divine simplicity has been understood throughout these different eras is not as frequently recognized. It is a doctrine both enduring and elastic—standard and yet slippery.” Gavin Ortlund, “Divine Simplicity in Historical Perspective: Resourcing a Contemporary Discussion,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 16.4 (2014), 438.
[3] Peter J. Leithart, Creator: A Theological Interpretation of Genesis 1 (Downers Grove, Ill.: Intervarsity Press, 2023), 84-85.
[4] William Hasker, “Is Divine Simplicity a Mistake?” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 90.4 (2016), 701-702.
[5] This list is drawn R. T. Mullins, “Classical Theism,” in T & T Clark Handbook of Analytic Theology, eds. James M. Arcadi and James T. Turner, Jr. (New York: Bloomsbury, 2021), 88.
[6] James E. Dolezal, All That Is In God: Evangelical Theology and the Challenge of Classical Christian Theism (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Reformation Heritage Books, 2017), xiii.
[7] Ryan T. Mullins and Shannon Eugene Byrd, “Divine Simplicity and Modal Collapse: A Persistent Problem,” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14.3 (2022), 28.
[10] Mullins and Byrd, “Divine Simplicity and Modal Collapse: A Persistent Problem,” 33-36. Mullins and Byrd defend all these premises. Most are simply uncontroversial to proponents of DDS. They do respond to “two complaints raised by some contemporary proponents of DDS” regarding (M6). Both complaints allege an ambiguity in key pieces of premise M6. The first is an alleged ambiguity regarding what phrases like “God’s act” refer to; it does not need to rigidly designate God. The second alleged ambiguity also revolves around how to understand God’s action. Does this refer to God’s action in a causal or effectual sense? Both complaints are neutralized by demonstrating that DDS with its attendant identity account readily clears up the ambiguity. Mullins and Byrd provide full documentation of this from defenders of DDS.
[12] The following three ways of responding to the Creation Dilemma are outlined in R. T. Mullins, “Classical Theism,” 95-96. Mullins further develops the potential replies in Mullins and Byrd, “Divine Simplicity and Modal Collapse: A Persistent Problem,” 38-47. The latter essay contains discussion related to other possible responses than the three dealt with in this paper.
[13] Katherin Rogers, “The Traditional Doctrine of Divine Simplicity,” Religious Studies 32.2 (1996), 180. In a more recent essay, Rogers again affirms the possibility of modal collapse: “Combining isotemporalism with the thought that God makes the best world—possibly a multiverse—may entail a ‘modal collapse.’ (I prefer the more positive term “modal simplicity.”) If all times exist equally and are immediately present to God (even in all the universes of a multiverse) and if God inevitably does the one best thing there is to do, then it looks to be the case that things (even things in all of the multiverses) cannot be other than they are.” Katherin A. Rogers, “An Anselmian Approach to Divine Simplicity,” Faith and Philosophy 37.3 (2020), 318.
[18] Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, “Absolute Simplicity,” Faith and Philosophy 2.4 (1985), 369.
[20] Dolezal, God Without Parts, 199. Katherin Rogers likewise calls into question the legitimacy of Stump and Kretzmann’s account: “But it is very difficult to see how God in the actual world could be the same being as God in some other possible world, if (1) God in the actual world is identical to His eternal and immutable act in this world, (2) God in a different possible world is identical to His act in that world, and (3) God’s act in the actual world is not identical to His act in the other possible world.” Katherine A. Rogers, Perfect Being Theology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 34.
[21] Remember the words of James Dolezal mentioned earlier, that the Thomistic version of DDS is “nothing less than the truth about God as He has disclosed himself in creation and in the Holy Scripture.” Dolezal also states, “It is my contention that God’s absoluteness is diminished to just the extent that one denies or softens the DDS.” Dolezal, God Without Parts, 2.
[22] Ryan T. Mullins, “Simply Impossible: A Case Against Divine Simplicity,” Journal of Reformed Theology 7 (2013), 186-187.
[23] Dolezal, God Without Parts, 210. Dolezal spends the next two pages quoting other scholars who also argue for mystery in this way.
[26] Mullins and Byrd, “Divine Simplicity and Modal Collapse: A Persistent Problem,” 40. William Hasker adds, “A mere dismissive reference to ‘univocal predication’ won’t do the job.” Hasker, “Is Divine Simplicity a Mistake?” 717.
[31] Baddorf, “Divine Simplicity, Aseity, and Sovereignty,” 407-409. Briefly, Baddorf argues that the induction does not work due to the uniqueness of God from creatures and that CIC may be plausible for ordinary physical parts but that it seems “less clearly correct when we consider metaphysical parts” (408).
[32] In the words of Thomas Aquinas, “every composite is posterior to its component parts, and it dependent on them.” Summa Theologica 1.3.7—Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas—vol 1, (ed.) Anton Pegis (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997), 34.
[33] Oliver D. Crisp, “A Parsimonious Model of Divine Simplicity,” Modern Theology 35.3 (2019), 569.
[36] Gregory Fowler defends a model of God involving the “Doctrine of Divine Priority (DDP)” which is articulated in the following manner: “For all x, if x is a proper part of God or x is a property of God, then x [metaphysically] depends on God for its existence.” With this definition, Fowler argues: “DDP certainly does not imply that God depends on his proper parts or his properties for his existence. If anything, since dependence is asymmetric, it implies that God does not depend on them. Furthermore, DDP does not entail that there is anything else upon which God depends for his existence. Hence, DDP is consistent with God’s aseity.” Gregory Fowler, “Simplicity or Priority?” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, vol. 6, ed. Jonathan L. Kvanig (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 122-123.
[37] Peter Leithart, “What Sort of Parts Is God Without?” Theopolis Institute (July 25, 2019)—online: https://theopolisinstitute.com/conversations/what-sorts-of-parts-is-god-without/ . Given the Thomistic emphasis on analogical predication, Leithart playfully asks, “Is the argument haunted by an implicit univocity, which assumes that “composite” must have an identical meaning for Creator and creatures?”
[38] Yann Schmitt, “The Deadlock of Absolute Divine Simplicity,” International Journal of Philosophy of Religion 74 (2013), 129.
[39] Thomas H. McCall, “Trinity Doctrine, Plain and Simple,” in Advancing Trinitarian Theology, eds. Oliver D. Crisp and Fred Sanders (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2014), 50. McCall is discussing the DDS allegedly endorsed by Gregory of Nyssa. McCall is relying on the interpretive work of Andrew Radde-Gallwitz in his book Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Transformation of Divine Simplicity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) in which he argues that Gregory of Nyssa’s DDS “actually comes to entail that God has multiple properties (p. 212).” In his most recent essay on Gregory, Radde-Gallwitz now disputes his earlier reading and argues for a “conceptualist” reading which is more in alignment with the strict identity thesis of Thomas Aquinas. See Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, “Gregory of Nyssa and Divine Simplicity: A Conceptualist Reading,” Modern Theology 35.3 (2019), 455. Apart from the interpretive issues about Gregory of Nyssa, McCall’s articulation would answer the charge under discussion here regarding change and destruction.
[40] Mention should be made of John Duns Scotus’ view of DDS and his use of his famous “formal distinction” in which God has distinct realities which are “existentially inseparable.” This distinction allows Scotus to have some measure of complexity within God without composition. See Jeff Steele and Thomas Williams, “Complexity without Composition: Duns Scotus on Divine Simplicity,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 93.4 (2019), 616-625.
