Asatru: Some Critical
Interaction
Richard Klaus richardjklaus@gmail.com
December 4, 2017
1.
For brief summaries of Asatru beliefs see
“Asatru Questions and Answers” by Stephen A. McNallen from The Asatru Alliance website as well as the interview with Vincent
Enlund (at the time, the Chieftain of the Asatru Alliance).[1]
2.
When examining a worldview it is helpful to
think in terms of three major philosophical components. Roughly stated, these three components
are:
a.
Metaphysics: What is the underlying nature of
reality as espoused by the worldview?
This concerns the question of “what is it that constitutes reality?”
b.
Epistemology: How do we know things? What is it
that can be known? What methods
bring us knowledge?
c.
Ethics: What is the nature of right and
wrong? What are the elements of a
moral action?
3.
These philosophical components of a worldview
should cohere together. In other
words, one’s metaphysical commitments ought not to be in tension or contradiction
to one’s epistemology and ethics.
Metaphysics
1.
Asatru is polytheistic—it believes in many
gods. In particular, it believes
and attempts to interact with the Norse pantheon of gods. In addition to this, followers of
Asatru recognize that other peoples have their own gods. According to Vince Enlund, “Ours is not
the only way. Nor are our Gods and
Goddesses the only Gods. They are
simply our Gods for us. Others may
have theirs and their Gods may have a place [hell] for them, that would be
between them and their God or Gods.”
2.
Is there something more ultimate back or behind
the gods? In answering the
question, “What are the basic beliefs of Asatru?” McNallen provides the
following answer:
We
believe in an underlying, all-pervading divine energy or essence which is
generally hidden from us, and which is beyond our immediate understanding. We
further believe that this spiritual reality is interdependent with us - that we
affect it, and it affects us.
We believe that this underlying divinity
expresses itself to us in the forms of the Gods and Goddesses. Stories about
these deities are like a sort of code, the mysterious "language"
through which the divine reality speaks to us.
Left unanswered are questions about this
“all-pervading divine energy or essence.”
Is this divine energy personal or impersonal? Is this divine energy a fundamental unity or is it a
plurality? What is the
relationship between this divine energy and its expressions in the gods? Does the divine energy contain within
both good and evil? Is the divine
energy behind just the Norse deities or is this the same divine energy behind
all conceptions of polytheistic gods?
3.
Is the Asatru religion true? Does it correspond to reality? It would seem that Asatru is caught in
a fundamental kind of metaphysical relativism. This comes out when McNallen states:
We do not claim to be a universal religion
or faith for all humankind. In
fact, we don’t think such a thing is possible or desirable. The different branches of humanity have
different ways of looking at the world, each of which is valid for them.
What does it mean to say that all
the different ways of looking at world are “valid for them?” Do any of these worldviews approximate
the truth?
4.
Is there a good reason for thinking multiple
gods exist?
“[I]t seems clear that there are
no good philosophical arguments for the existence of many beings of the sort
classified as gods by polytheistic religions… Whenever people in polytheistic
contexts have begun to think carefully and critically about the supernatural,
they typically have rejected polytheism in favor of pantheism, monotheism, or
naturalism. The philosophical
impulse among human beings has usually led to the conclusion that alternatives
for divine reality are either one or none.”[2]
Epistemology
1.
Polytheism cannot provide the preconditions
philosophically necessary for the scientific method. As a historical reality it is monotheism that provides the
conditions necessary for the scientific endeavor to get off the ground.
a.
“The polytheistic religion of
Greeks said that there were many gods. There were as many divine plans and as
many purposes as there were gods. Since the gods interacted in a chaotic
fashion, people had no guarantee that the world would show any stable order.
Greek religion discouraged any hope for a scientific exploration of a rational
order.
Modern science arose in the context of Christian
monotheism, which displaced the Greek gods and gave confidence to prospective
scientists by means of three fundamental principles:
1
One rational God rules all
things (Genesis 1:1; Psalm 33:6), and so we can expect
universal order.
2
God made man in his image (Genesis 1:26-27), and so man is
naturally in tune with God’s mind and has hope of grasping the order that God
had given.
3
The world that God made is not
divine, and hence is open for human investigation.”[3]
b.
"Anthropologist Ernest Gellner, a secular
critic of postmodernism, pays tribute to biblical monotheism when he says
that the Enlightenment emphasis on 'the uniqueness of truth' and the
hope of discovering nature's objective secrets is rooted in monotheism's
avoidance of 'the facile self-deception of universal relativism.' He
further sharpens his analysis by claiming this connection between the
singularity and supremacy of God with a fundamental logical principle closely
related to the law of non-contradiction.
It was a jealous Jehovah who really taught
mankind the Law of Excluded Middle: Greek formalization of logic (and geometry
and grammar) probably would not have been sufficient on its own. Without
a strong religious impulsion toward a single orderly world, and
the consequent avoidance of opportunist, manipulative incoherence,
the cognitive miracle [of the Enlightenment] would probably not
have occurred."[4]
2.
How does one know that any of these various gods
exist? The traditional arguments for
the existence of God do not apply to polytheistic gods. Cosmological arguments speak to a
singular Creator of immense power that brings everything into existence. Teleological (design) arguments won’t
work since the created order is of a such a unitary character that is seems
inconsistent with multiple gods—at least the created order would not expressly
reveal any one of the many finite gods.[5] The ontological argument argues for a
singular perfect Being of which none greater can be conceived. Of course, this conception applies to
none of the finite gods of polytheism.
Typically a moral argument speaks of an objective moral order (moral
realism) but varying gods within polytheism may have different moral values. If they all share a common moral value
system then what justifies this system?
Ethics
1.
Polytheism cannot account for moral objectivity
and tends to degenerate into moral relativism.
“So long as there is a multiplicity of
gods, it is impossible to believe that the universe is profoundly ethical. Each god has different wishes and
desires, often conflicting with those of others. An exclusive attempt to please one would almost certainly
produce behavior that would offend another god. So the best policy is not to become too radical in obedience
to any set of principles. Beyond
that, since no one god originated the universe, then no one god’s character is
reflected in it. Its principles
and character are more diverse than can be imagined, far too complex for anyone
to spend a lot of time trying to understand. Ethical relativism is not merely a possibility in a world of
continuity but a necessity.”[6]
2.
This charge of relativism is sustained when one
considers the words of Stephen McNallen of The Asatru Alliance. In response to the question, “What do
you have to say about good and evil?” McNallen answers:
“Good and evil are not constants.
What is good in one case will not be good in another, and evil in one
circumstance will not be evil under a different set of conditions. In any one instance, the right course
of action will have been shaped by the influence of the past and the
present. The result may or may not
be ‘good’ or ‘evil’, but it will still be the right action.
“In
no case are good and evil dictated to us by the edicts of an alien, authoritarian
deity, as in the Middle East. We
are expected to use our freedom, responsibility, and awareness of duty to serve
the highest and best ends.”[7]
It is unclear how Asatru can
philosophically define “the highest and best ends.” Even if they do define them it raises the philosophical
issue of how to ground these values.
A further issue is why one is obligated to such values. The interplay of one’s metaphysical
view and one’s ethical system are seen here. If ultimate reality is ultimately impersonal nature then how
does one develop an objectivity of ethics? As John Frame notes, “In brief: nothing impersonal has the
authority to impose ethical norms.
Only a person can do that (e.g., a mother, father, teacher, policeman),
and only an absolute person can impose ultimate, universal norms.”[8]
3.
Polytheism falls prey to the Euthyphro dilemma
that Plato develops in his famous dialogue by that name. This is especially relevant in that the
original context of Euthyphro was polytheistic in nature. As Socrates dialogues with Euthyphro he
challenges Euthyphro’s definition of “piety” (value) as that which is “dear to
the gods.” Socrates brings out the
fact that differing gods can have different values so there must be something
that is beyond the mere opinions of finite gods.
Socrates: Then
the same things, as appears, are hated by the gods and loved by the gods, and
are both hateful and dear to them?
Euthyphro: True.
Socrates: Then
upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious and also impious?
Euthyphro: That,
I suppose, is true.
Socrates: Then,
my dear friend, I remark with surprise that you have not answered what I
asked. For I certainly did not ask
what was that which is at once pious and impious: and that which is loved by
the gods appears also to be hated by them. And therefore, Euthyphro, in thus chastising your father you
may very likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos
or Uranus, and what is acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Here, and
there may be other gods who have similar differences of opinion.[9]
NOTE: Ideal
polytheism
Although Asatru is not an example of ideal polytheism it may
be helpful to cover this conception briefly.
1.
Ideal polytheism defined
a.
Posits gods that are at least uncreated,
immaterial, and sufficiently great
b.
Also need personality (property of being a
person)
c.
“The word God
is not merely a descriptive term (a label for a being that satisfies a certain
description) but also an evaluative or honorific term. It legitimately applies only to a kind
of being that is sufficiently great
in a variety of respects.”[10]
d.
A being worthy of worship must possess an
extremely high degree of greatness—perhaps excellence or even
perfection—especially with respect to goodness.
e.
“Given all these assumptions about the
characteristics required of something for it legitimately to be called a god,
ideal polytheism can be true only if there can be more than one god possessing
exactly the same degree of greatness.”[11]
2.
Philosophical problems with ideal polytheism
a.
Argument #1: Argument from conflict of wills
i. If
more than one god, “then there is more than one ultimate and fundamentally
distinct divine center of thought.”[12]
ii. If
they have free wills, then it must be possible for them to have a conflict of
wills.
iii. But
to be omnipotent means to be able to get whatever one wants.
iv. Therefore,
both cannot be omnipotent.
v. “As
a result, there cannot be more than one all-powerful being. Consequently, if being as great as it
is possible to be, and therefore all-powerful, is required to be a god (this
was argued above), then there cannot be more than one god. If there cannot be more than one god,
then no version of polytheism can be true. If polytheism cannot be true and monotheism can be true,
then, for this reason alone, it is more reasonable to accept monotheism than
polytheism.”[13]
b.
Argument # 2: The argument from causal order
i. “One
of the most popular arguments for monotheism is drawn from the world's unity.
If there were several designers who acted independently or at cross-purposes,
we would expect to find evidence of this in their handiwork—one set of laws
obtaining at one time or place, for example, and a different set of laws
obtaining at a different time or place. We observe nothing of the sort,
however. On the contrary, the unity of the world, the fact that it exhibits a
uniform structure, that it is a single cosmos, strongly suggests some sort of
unity in its cause—that there is either a single designer, or several designers
acting cooperatively, perhaps under the direction of one of their number.
“This evidence does not force
us to conclude that there is only one designer, and the ablest proponents of
the argument have recognized this. Thus, William Paley asserts that the
argument proves only “a unity of counsel” or (if there are subordinate agents)
“a presiding” or “controlling will” (Paley 52). Nevertheless, in the absence of
compelling reasons for postulating the existence of two or more cooperating
designers, considerations of simplicity suggest that we ought to posit only one
designer. It isn't clear that there are any. Some have thought that the
existence of evil and apparent disorder is best explained by postulating
conflicts between two or more opposed powers. Whether this is true or not, evil
and apparent disorder provides no reason for preferring the hypothesis of
several cooperating designers to the hypothesis of a single designer.
That is, having once decided that natural good and natural evil are consequences
of the operation of a single system of laws, and that their cause must
therefore be unitary, the existence of evil and apparent disorder is to
longer relevant to the question of monotheism (although it may be relevant to
the question of the goodness of the cause).”[14]
Appendix:
Yahweh versus Odin
Steve Hays responds to an
atheistic objector who alleged that the Christian God is like the Norse god
Odin and that both should be dismissed.
Hays brings out the following differences that are relevant to this
paper and is able to conclude: “Yahweh and Odin are categorically different
kinds of beings.”
___________________________________
[W]e might briefly dispatch his attempted comparison
between Yahweh and Odin. There are two considerations:
1. Sources of information
i) According to Scripture, Jesus is Yahweh Incarnate. In
the NT, we have a set of 1C documents about a figure who appeared in the 1C.
Contemporaneous reports.
Traditionally, these documents are ascribed to people
who knew Jesus or people who knew people who knew Jesus. Either firsthand
accounts or accounts based on firsthand informants.
The traditional attributions have been defended in
scholarly articles, commentaries, monographs, and NT introductions. Likewise,
there are various lines of internal and external evidence for the historicity
of these documents.
These accounts describe Jesus as God Incarnate,
performing miracles.
In addition, reported miracles aren't confined to the
Gospels. There's credible evidence for Christian miracles throughout church
history, right up to the present. Likewise, answered prayers in the name of
Jesus.
We also have corroboration from some church fathers.
Either early church fathers or somewhat later fathers with an antiquarian
interest who made a point of gathering information from early sources.
In addition, there are messianic types and prophecies
that foreshadow or predict the advent of a person just like Jesus.
ii) By contrast, what evidence is there that legends
about Odin were written by anyone who actually encountered Odin? Is the genre
even ostensibly historical?
What are the dates of the sources in relation to the
first reports?
What evidence is there that Odin answers prayer? What
evidence is there for continued miracles in the name of Odin?
2. Nature of the deity
i) According to Scripture, Yahweh/Jesus is the
preexistent Creator of the world. According to the OT, Yahweh is essentially
incorporeal.
ii) According to Nordic/Teutonic mythology, Odin is a
physical, humanoid "god". A mortal being. Finite in knowledge and
power. He didn't create the world. He is the son of Bor and Bestla. He has two
brothers. He has affairs with human women, female giants, &c.
So the concept of Odin isn't comparable to the concept
of Yahweh. Odin is a different kind of being than Yahweh. What theistic proofs
would even apply to a being like Odin?
iii) Odin is not immortal.
iv) Moreover, even if he were immortal, it wouldn't be
in the same sense that Yahweh is immortal. Physical immortality is hardly
equivalent to the timeless eternality of an incorporeal being. [15]
[1]
“Asatru Questions and Answers” by Stephen A. McNallen (1995) at The Asatru Alliance—online: http://www.asatru.org/aboutasatru.php. Interview with Vincent Enlund/Viking
Jack (Saturday, November 26, 2011) at You,
Me & Religion—online: http://youmereligion.blogspot.com/2011/11/vincent-enlundvikingjack.html.
[3]
Vern Poythress, “Has Science Made God Obsolete?” Available online: http://frame-poythress.org/god-and-science-has-science-made-god-obsolete/.
[4]
Douglas
Groothius, "Facing the Challenge of Postmodernism" in To Everyone
An Answer: A Case for the Christian Worldview eds. Francis J.
Beckwith, William Lane Craig, and J. P. Moreland (Intervarsity Press, 2004), p.
242--Groothius
is quoting Ernest Gellner, Postmodernism, Reason, and Religion (New
York: Rutledge, 1992), pp. 95-96.
[5]
There is both a unity and multiplicity to reality—the problem of the “one and
the many.” Christian theism which
is Trinitarian in structure best accords with this unity/multiplicity. John Frame notes that the thought of
Cornelius Van Til regarding the Trinity speaks to this issue: “Van Til’s view
was that because God is both one and many, he has made a world that is both one
and many: that is, no unity without particulars, nor vice versa.” A
History of Western Philosophy and Theology (Phillipsburg, New Jersey:
Presbyterian and Reformed, 2015), 18.
[7]
“Asatru Questions and Answers” by Stephen A. McNallen (1995) at The Asatru Alliance—online: http://www.asatru.org/aboutasatru.php.
[14]
William Wainwright, “Monotheism,” Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy—online, (Sept. 2013). Available online: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/monotheism/. Wainwright lists out a number of other
arguments that he argues are even more forceful.
[15]
Steve Hays, “Odin” Triablogue
(January 28, 2016). Online: http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2016/01/odin.html.
