A CRITIQUE OF ERIK WIELENBERG’S GODLESS NORMATIVE REALISM
Erik Wielenberg sets out to provide a justification for objective morality within a framework of philosophical naturalism. He recognizes that some influential philosophical atheists have argued that the denial of God renders moral realism unlikely. Wielenberg takes up the challenge of defending “the plausibility of a robust brand of moral realism without appealing to God or any weird cognitive faculties.”[1] He refers to his view as “Godless Normative Realism” (GNR). Wielenberg summarizes his view in the following manner:
It is a version of moral realism in that it implies that there exist ethical facts that are objective in the sense just explained. It is non-natural in that it implies that ethical facts and properties are not reducible to natural facts and properties. And it is non-theistic in that it implies that objective morality does not require a theistic foundation; indeed, the view implies that objective morality does not require an external foundation at all.[2]
Moral facts are thus, sui generis in that they are not reducible to natural properties or in need of any external foundation. Moral states of affairs supervene on natural states. As Wielenberg states,
For example, the claim that the property of intrinsic badness supervenes on the property of pain is
Wielenberg refers to these moral facts as “substantive, metaphysically necessary, brute facts.”[4] These “basic ethical facts” are simply part of reality and to ask “where they come from?” or “on what foundation do they rest?” is misguided.[5]
Wielenberg’s project is bound up with providing a critique of theistic ethics—especially Divine Command Theory ethics (DCT). He has to argue that theistic versions of moral realism are not more adequate or robustly explanatory. This attack on DCT is crucial for Wielenberg since his defense of GNR proceeds “not primarily by providing positive arguments for it but rather by defending it against various objections as well as fleshing it out further.”[6] This argumentative strategy is important to note in that criticisms of GNR by advocates of DCT will often be met by a tu quoque response in which Wielenberg alleges that the DCT of ethics suffers from the same difficulty and, thus, offers no reason to consider DCT as explanatorily advantageous.
Although Wielenberg’s thought is nuanced and creative there are a number of potential problems. Four areas of controversy for his thesis will be examined: (1) the issue of moral Platonism, (2) the nature of Wielenberg’s naturalism, (3) evolutionary arguments against naturalism as applied to Wielenberg’s ethics
First, consider the issue of moral Platonism. There is an interpretative ambiguity in Wielenberg’s work as to whether his view is a version of moral Platonism. William Craig, as a critic of Wielenberg’s position, has consistently described the position as Platonic.[7] Wielenberg has admitted to a kind of moral Platonism in his book:
Craig is correct that in Robust Ethics and elsewhere I committed myself to the existence of abstract entities like propositions and properties.” I did so because I didn’t see how, for example, people could have moral obligations without there being an abstract property like being morally obligated.[8]
In response to Craig’s interaction with his views, Wielenberg seems ready to jettison the Platonic aspect of his project. In light of this, it will
Platonism posits a bifurcation of reality into two causally unconnected domains. How these domains relate to each other is a perennial problem and Wielenberg has no discussion as to how this relationship between a realm of abstract objects and a realm of concrete objects is possible. In light of Wielenberg’s notions of supervenience, Craig asks, “How can a physical object somehow reach out and
Does the non-Platonic interpretation, seemingly embraced by Wielenberg after criticism of the Platonic version, offer a better alternative? In relinquishing the Platonic version of his thesis this opens him to the charge that “his ‘metaphysics of morals’ becomes vacuous.”[11] In rejecting moral Platonism, Wielenberg’s position loses what it was claiming to provide, namely, a metaphysical basis for non-naturalistic moral realism. Beyond this
Suppose some moral property, say, loyalty or civility, has not yet been instantiated in the course of human evolution. How, then, can some physical situation be causally related to loyalty so as to cause its supervenience upon that physical state of affairs? For there is literally nothing to be causally related to, there
Thus, on either a Platonic or
Another area of concern regarding Wielenberg’s view is his conception of naturalism and to what extent his view is “naturalistic.” It will be helpful to see Wielenberg’s own words describing his position.
In contemporary philosophy, the term “naturalism” is used as a label for a wide range of views. I endorse a number of theses that are commonly associated with naturalism, including (i) there is no God or non-physical souls; (ii) every physical event that has a cause at all has a complete physical cause; and (iii) the physical sciences are entirely successful in their own domains. At the same time, I reject a number of claims that are commonly included in strong versions of naturalism, including (i) all there is to reality is the natural or physical world and (ii) empirical science is the sole source of human knowledge.[13]
One could quibble with the looseness of some of these descriptive indicators of naturalism but Wielenberg’s general picture is clear. His is a “naturalism”
My brand of robust normative realism is naturalistic at least to the extent that Chalmers’ naturalistic dualism is. Like Chalmers, I endorse the existence of non-physical properties but do not reject the causal closure of the physical or deny that the physical sciences are entirely successful in their own domains. If naturalistic dualists can get by without invoking the forces of darkness, then so can robust normative realists.[15]
This appeal to “Chalmers-like” naturalism can be challenged. It does not appear as if this brand of naturalism is sufficiently “natural” enough. J. P. Moreland explains:
However, Chalmers’ approach is a version of panpsychism, and it is ‘natural’ in only two senses: it is not theistic and it establishes ‘regular and normal’ connections between the relevant states. But it is not natural in the sense that
Therefore, even though Wielenberg wants to refer to his view as “naturalistic,” it contains features that do not comport well with a full-blown naturalism. In his interaction with Wielenberg, J. P. Moreland attempts to specify the nature and boundaries of philosophical naturalism. Moreland notes the three areas of ontology, epistemology, and a creation account. These categories must also be internally consistent with each other and that by clarifying the relationship between these three categories will allow a picture to emerge regarding what ought to constitute the naturalist’s ontology.[17] Moreland then describes naturalism as follows: “Fundamentally, naturalism is the view that the
Given N[aturalism] and E[volution], I see no good reason to think our moral intuitions point
So, if our moral beliefs happened to align with truth, which Wielenberg’s perspective posits, this would be the result of a “lucky coincidence” thus further rendering his view as ad hoc. Wielenberg does admit that if “there is no God, then it is in some sense an accident that we have the moral properties that we do.”[24] He also admits that his “view undoubtedly entails that certain elements of the universe (the actual laws of nature and basic ethical facts) fit together in a nifty and perhaps amazing way.”[25] It is precisely here that Wielenberg’s theistic interlocutors argue that Wielenberg’s GNR lacks the explanatory depth and scope that DCT exhibits.
The fourth area of critical analysis in regards to Wielenberg’s non-theistic moral realism concerns the nature of
We can think that, e.g., numbers and mathematical rules are brute facts but they do not compel us morally. Failing in [a] math test makes us stupid but not guilty. Non-natural brute moral facts need therefore an additional guilty-making property, which cannot be reduced to harm.[26]
Wielenberg attempts to specify the nature of obligation (i.e., the “additional guilty-making property”) by grounding moral obligation in the fact of having a normative reason to act. Wielenberg uses the example of a fellow student who has his arm engulfed in fire and is screaming for assistance. The example further stipulates that you have time and access to a bucket of water. From this example, Wielenberg concludes, “The intrinsic features of the student’s pain
First, if
Raz suggests that there is value in us being able to form our own plans and
This move by Wielenberg seems questionable given his system. Why is it not the case that the “total balance of moral reasons” does not provide a moral obligation that cannot be overridden? This modification of view by Wielenberg (what he calls a “tweak”) is actually an abandonment of his earlier view. “For now moral obligations are not determined by having decisive moral reasons for doing some action, which contradicts normative realism.”[29]
Even if Wielenberg can overcome the supererogation objection and hold to a view in which moral obligations are determined by having moral reasons, this view of obligation will be seen to fit better within a theistic context with a personal God. As Vainio, relying on the work of Robert Adams, notes, “the central feature of ethics is the obligatory nature of moral facts, and obligations make sense only in social contexts.”[30] Although Wielenberg states that these brute ethical facts of moral obligation just obtain, it does seem, as Stephen Evans states, that this is “the kind of truth that cries out for an explanation.”[31] And, again, it is the case that
Erik Wielenberg has attempted to defend a non-naturalistic moral realism that is consistent with atheism. A significant part of his project is to compare and contrast his view with divine command theory ethics in an effort to demonstrate the superior explanatory power of his view. This paper has critically engaged Wielenberg’s view and found there to be significant problems in the following areas: (1) the issue of moral Platonism, (2) the nature of Wielenberg’s naturalism, (3) evolutionary arguments against naturalism as applied to Wielenberg’s ethics and (4) the nature of
[1]Erik Wielenberg, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), ix.
[2]Erik Wielenberg, “In Defense of Non-natural, Non-theistic Moral Realism,” Faith and Philosophy 26 (2009), 24.
[7]William Craig, “Review of Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism. By Erik J. Wielenberg. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014,” Philosophia Christi 19 (2017): 473; “Erik Wielenberg’s Metaphysics of Morals,” Philosophia Christi20 (2018): 333; and Craig’s contributions to William Lane Craig and Erik J. Wielenberg, A Debate on God and Morality: What is the Best Account of Objective Moral Values and Duties?Adam Lloyd Johnson, ed. (New York: Routledge, 2021).
[8]Erik Wielenberg, “Reply to Craig, Murphy, McNabb, and Johnson,” Philosophia Christi20 (2018), 367. Also, “Additionally, while in Robust EthicsI freely help myself to various abstract entities—e.g., properties and states of affairs—it may be that those aspects of my view are dispensable.” Johnson, ed., A Debate on God and Morality, 40.
[14]Erik Wielenberg, “Evil and Atheistic Moral Realism,” in Explaining Evil: Four Views, W. Paul Franks, ed., (New York: Bloomsbury, 2019), 132.
[16]J. P. Moreland, “Oppy on the Argument from Consciousness,” Faith and Philosophy 29 (2012), 79-80.
[17]J. P. Moreland, “Wielenberg and Emergence: Borrowed Capital on the Cheap,” in Craig and Wielenberg, A Debate on God and Morality, 95.
[20]Craig and Wielenberg, A Debate on God and Morality, 108. Consider also Craig’s description of Wielenberg’s “extravagant metaphysical claims” (32).
[21]The language of “only game in town” comes from Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 24.
[22]Alvin Plantinga’s argument is developed in Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and naturalism(New York: Oxford, 2011), 307-350. Philosophers using variants of this argument against Wielenberg include William Craig in Craig and Wielenberg, A Debate on God and Morality; Mark Linville, “Darwin, Duties, and the Demiurge,” in Craig and Wielenberg, A Debate on God and Morality, 166-184; Adam Lloyd Johnson, “Debunking Nontheistic Moral Realism: A Critique of Erik Wielenberg’s Attempt to Deflect the Lucky Coincidence Objection,” Faith and Philosophy17 (2015), 353-367.
