* This is a paper I wrote in 1991 for a Philosophy of Biology class. A great deal of development has happened over the past 25 years in terms of the Intelligent Design movement and its critics. In that Dawkins' book has been continually reissued and referenced this paper's discussion of a number of early reviews may still be relevant.
___________________________
The resurgence of creationism as a contender against
evolution in the 1970’s and ‘80’s has brought forth a whole host of defenders
for the standard neo-Darwinian model of evolution. Such titles as Darwinism
Defended, Taking Darwin Seriously,
and The Blind Watchmaker are put
forth as ammunition to decimate the dreaded scourge of “Scientific
Creationism.” The Blind Watchmaker (hereafter BW) by Richard Dawkins is
particularly zealous to defend the sacrosanct position of neo-Darwinism. Dawkins is not merely arguing for the
truthfulness of neo-Darwinian evolution as a scientific fact but he is also
seeking to convince his readers that the Darwinian worldview is correct.
Dawkins states up front that his book “is not a dispassionate scientific
treatise” (BW, p. x). Dawkins
wants to “persuade” and “inspire” the reader with the grandeur of the Darwinian
worldview. He very pointedly
states:
More, I want to persuade the
reader, not just that the Darwinian world-view happens to be true, but that it is the only known theory that could, in principle, solve the mystery
of our existence. (BW, p. x)
So convinced is Dawkins that he feels that those who reject
Darwinism do so for three main reasons: 1) Religious reasons, 2) Political or
ideological reasons, or 3) They work in the “media” and they “just like seeing
applecarts upset, perhaps because it makes good journalistic copy” (BW, pp.
250-251). Of course, for Dawkins
there can be no scientific reasons to reject Darwinism because it is the only
possible explanation for the “mystery of our existence.”
Given that Dawkins’ goal is nothing less than a view of
neo-Darwinian evolution which is so compelling that all other views are seen as
nonsense, a crucial question to ask is, “Does Dawkins succeed in his
endeavor?” The answer would appear
to depend on the reader’s prior worldview with which he approaches BW. Charles Lumsden in his review of BW has
written, “The informed will read and have their views reaffirmed by the clear
arguments. Skeptics will read and
remain unmoved. In part the
division is not one of stupidity, but of faith” (Lumsden, p. 500).
It is this issue of “faith”—or what I will call one’s control beliefs—that I wish to examine
in this paper. I will examine how
Dawkins’ control belief of naturalistic neo-Darwinism functions to interpret
the date—and at times, the lack thereof—that one finds in the world.
I borrow the notion of control beliefs from Nicholas
Wolterstorff.[1] Wolterstorff points out that in
examining a theory one does not approach the data with an empty mind. “On the contrary, one remains cloaked
in belief” (Wolterstorff, p. 66).
As R. H. Brady observes, “Scientists are only human after all. They begin their adult lives, like
everyone else, armed with all sorts of a
priori ‘knowledge’” (Brady, p. 94).
Part of these beliefs are control beliefs which function in two ways.
Because we hold them we are led to reject certain sorts of theories—some
because they are inconsistent with those beliefs; others because, though
consistent with our control beliefs, they do not comport well with those
beliefs. On the other hand control
beliefs also lead to devise theories. We want theories that are consistent
with our control beliefs. Or, to
put it more stringently, we want theories that comport as well as possible with
those beliefs. (Wolterstorff, p. 68)
Dawkins has such control beliefs which cause him to reject
certain theories and ideas and which in turn lead him to postulate certain
theories about how evolution works and why it is true in spite of gaps in
empirical evidence.[2]
What are Dawkins’ control beliefs? Reading BW and its reviewers one quickly comes to see that
an atheistic naturalism serves as the foundation for Dawkins’ noetic
structure. One reviewer stated
that what Dawkins has written is “chiefly a philosophical advertisement for
atheistic naturalism” (Nelson, p. 10).
This remark appears justified in view of the way Dawkins speaks of God
or a designer (see BW, pp. 92, 93, 141, 316—these references are discussed in
the appendix). Dawkins’ own stated
thesis of BW is set forth in a straight forward manner: “The basic idea of The Blind Watchmaker is that we don’t
need to postulate a designer in order to understand life, or anything else in
the universe” (BW, p. 147).
Furthermore, Dawkins tips his atheistic hand in the very beginning of BW
when he writes, “that although atheism might have been logically tenable before Darwin, Darwin made it possible to be an
intellectually fulfilled atheist” (BW, p. 6). Thus the remark of philosopher David Hull is apropos: “In
short it (BW) is an atheistic tract against Paley’s argument from design”
(Hull, p. 289).
Given that Dawkins’ control belief is one of atheistic
naturalism, how does this affect the way Dawkins views the empirical data in
nature? It is my contention that
Dawkins’ perception of reality is colored by his control belief of atheism and
that his arguments in BW are not empirically grounded but instead driven by his
atheistic worldview.[3] To some of Dawkins’ arguments we now
turn.
Dawkins’ argument in BW is not that there is no design—or,
to use Dawkins’ word choice, “complexity”—in nature. On the contrary, Dawkins desires to “follow Paley in
emphasizing the magnitude of the problem that our explanation faces, the sheer
hugeness of biological complexity and the beauty and elegance of biological
design” (BW, p. 15). Later he
writes, “I do not want the reader to underestimate the prodigious works of
nature and the problems we face in explaining them” (BW, p. 37). Dawkins’ explanation is that of
gradualistic neo-Darwinian natural selection.
Dawkins’ aim is to show how neo-Darwinian natural selection
can account for the complexity of living organisms and their “apparent
design.” For those who observe
features, organs, or organisms and are uncertain about how such examples of
complexity could have arisen by step-by-step gradualistic measures, Dawkins
retorts that such people are merely using what may be called the “Argument from
Personal Incredulity” (BW, p. 38).
Dawkins adds, “This is not an argument, it is simply an affirmation of
incredulity” (BW, p. 39). Having
disposed of the incredulous, what is Dawkins’ explanation for the observed
complexity around us? Dawkins
takes the human eye—William Paley’s favorite example to demonstrate design—and
asks five questions (BW, pp. 77-79).
1.
Could the human eye have arisen directly from no
eye at all, in a single step?
2.
Could the human eye have arisen directly from
something slightly different from itself, something that we may call X?
Dawkins’ answer to 1. is a “decisive no.” But the answer to
2. for Dawkins is “equally clearly yes.”
Dawkins defines the X of 2. as “something very like a human eye,
sufficiently similar that the human eye could plausibly have arisen by a single
alternation in X” (BW, p. 77). He
then applies question 2. to X itself, proposing that X could have arisen from
something slightly different than itself which, for convenience sake is called
X’. X’ arises from X’’ in the same
manner, and so on. “By interposing
a large enough series of Xs, we can derive the human eye from something not
slightly different from itself but very
different from itself” (BW, p. 78).
Dawkins’ third question is:
3.
Is there a continuous series of Xs connecting
the modern human eye to a state with no eye at all?
His answer is “yes, provided only that we allow ourselves a sufficiently large series of Xs” (BW, p.
78).
Questions four and five are as follows:
4.
Considering each member of the series of
hypothetical Xs connecting the
human eye to no eye at all, is it plausible that every one of them was made
available by random mutation of its predecessor?
5.
Considering each member of the series of Xs
connecting the human eye to no eye at all, is it plausible that every one of
them worked sufficiently well that it assisted the survival and reproduction of
the animals concerned?
In reference to 4. Dawkins’ belief is that as long as the
difference between X and X’ is sufficiently small “the necessary mutations are
almost bound to be forthcoming” (BW, p. 79). In answer to 5. Dawkins asserts that five percent of an eye
is better than four percent and that as one increases the percentage of the eye
this confers reproductive advantage to the organism so that the answer to 5. is
“yes.”
These five questions and the discussion following them in
the rest of the chapter I take to be the central case for Dawkins’ book. All else in the book appears to be
further additions to these ideas outlined in chapter four of BW so it may be
wise to begin the analysis here.
In reference to question 1. Dawkins is undoubtedly
correct. No one wishes to claim
that the human eye could have arisen by chance directly from no eye at all in a
single step. Question 2. is also
probably deserving of an affirmative answer as well. It does appear that a human eye could develop from something
slightly different as long as the gap between the two is sufficiently
small. Although I grant the answer
to 2. is “yes,” that does not justify what Dawkins does with the answer. He begins a process of extrapolation
from human eye to X to X’ to X’’… all the way back to a state of no eye at
all. This move raises the
troubling issue of extrapolation.
The extrapolation from demonstrable microevolution to large
macroevolutionary claims has always been problematic for neo-Darwinism but
frequently the problem is passed over, especially by zealous neo-Darwinian
apologists. Michael Denton,
however, calls attention to this problem and urges caution. He writes:
However attractive the
extrapolation, it does not necessarily follow that, because a certain degree of
evolution has been shown to occur, therefore any degree of evolution is
possible.
Denton latter concludes:
There is no doubt that the success
of the Darwinian model in explaining microevolution invites the hope that it
might be applicable also to macroevolutionary phenomena. Perhaps in the end this might prove to
be the case; but, on the other hand, there is the depressing precedent, as the
history of science testifies that over and over again theories which were
thought to be generally valid at the time proved eventually to be valid only in
a restricted sphere. Newtonian
physics, for example, which accounted perfectly for all the empirical data
available in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and is still used for
calculating the trajectory of a space rocket, is absolutely inapplicable to
phenomena at the subatomic and cosmological levels. Theories are seldom infinitely extendible. (Denton, pp. 88,
92)
Dawkins’ third question to which he gave an affirmative
response—“Is there a continuous series of Xs connecting the modern human eye to
a state with no eye at all”—is also mired in the problem of extrapolation. The reasonableness of Dawkins’ answer
will depend on whether Dawkins can deal with the complexities of extrapolation
and provide a reasonable argument for the legitimacy for extrapolation in this
case. Dawkins fails to offer any
such argument in BW so the reader is left to wonder about the cogency of
Dawkins’ affirmation of 3.[4]
Since I find question 4. to be beyond my scientific background
I do not feel equipped to adequately evaluate Dawkins’ answer. I instead move to question 5. which I
find much more important to Dawkins’ overall argument.[5]
Question 5., it will be remembered, concerned the issue of
whether each X in the series of eye to no eye would have worked well enough to
assist the survival and reproduction of the animals concerned. Dawkins answered “yes” but had to argue
for his answer against those who say “no.” There are those who argue that certain organs or systems,
like the eye, are too complex to have developed in a gradualistic manner. Dawkins’ assessment is that “(t)his is
often just another case of the rather pathetic ‘Argument from Personal
Credulity’” (BW, p. 86). Dawkins
takes up one such argument offered by someone critical of neo-Darwinian
evolution.
The book (Hitching, p. 82) goes on
to quote Stephen Jay Gould, the noted Harvard palaeontologist, as saying:
“We avoid the excellent question, What
good is 5 percent of an eye? by arguing that the possessor of such an incipient
structure did not use it for sight?
An ancient animal with 5 per cent
of an eye might indeed have used it for something other than sight, but it
seems to me as least as likely that it used it for 5 per cent vision. And actually I don’t think it is an
excellent question. Vision that is
5 per cent as good as yours or mine is very much worth having in comparison
with no vision at all. So is 1 per
cent vision better than total blindness.
And 6 per cent is better than 5, 7 per cent than 6, and so on up the
gradual, continuous series. (BW, p. 81)
The above is essentially Dawkins’ argument for an
affirmative answer to question 5.
The argument is utterly fallacious and trades upon an equivocation of
the eye itself and the process of vision.
Phillip Johnson appropriately responds to Dawkins when he writes:
The fallacy in that argument is
that “5 per cent of an eye” is not the same thing as “5 per cent of normal
vision.” For an animal to have any
useful vision at all, many complex parts must be working together. Even a complete eye is useless unless
it belongs to a creature with the mental and neural capacity to make use of the
information by doing something that furthers survival or reproduction. What we have to imagine is a chance
mutation that provides this complex capacity all at once, at a level of utility
sufficient to give the creature an advantage in producing offspring. (Johnson,
pp. 34-35)[6]
Dawkins’ confusion on this point renders his argument
useless and question 5., including Dawkins’ affirmative answer, is therefore
devoid of support.
Although failing to recognize the problem of extrapolation
and engaging in fallacious reasoning, Dawkins states that:
It is thoroughly believable that
every organ or apparatus that we actually see is the product of a smooth
trajectory through animal space, a trajectory in which every intermediate stage
assisted survival and reproduction. (BW, pp. 90-91)
Dawkins then quotes Charles Darwin from The Origin of Species where Darwin issues the following challenge:
If it could be demonstrated that
any complex organ existed which could not possibly have been formed by
numerous, successive, slight modifications, my theory would absolutely break
down. (BW, p. 91)
Dawkins goes on to add his approval:
One hundred and twenty five years
on, we know a lot more about animals and plants than Darwin did, and still not
a single case is known to me of a complex organ that could not have been formed
by numerous successive slight modifications. I do not believe that such a case will ever be found. (BW, p. 91)
But what of those scientists who do not share Dawkins’ faith
in the power of gradualistic, step-by-step evolution? Michael Denton, for example, in chapter nine of his work Evolution: A Theory in Crisis speaks of
the amazing complexity of the flight feather of birds. As he states, “The flight feather of a
bird is one of the most beautiful and well known of all biological adaptations”
(Denton, p. 202). Another such
complexity is the avian lung. The
avian lung is distinct from all other vertebrate lungs—“the structure of the
lungs in birds and the overall functioning of the respiratory system is quite
unique. No lung in any other
vertebrate species is known which in any way approaches the avian system”
(Denton, p. 211). Denton remarks,
Just how such an utterly different
respiratory system could have evolved gradually from the standard vertebrate
design is fantastically difficult to envisage, especially bearing in mind that
the maintenance of respiratory function is absolutely vital to the life of an
organism to the extent that the slightest malfunction leads to death within
minutes. (Denton, pp. 211-212)
Denton thus concludes, in direct opposition to Dawkins, that
“the avian lung and the feather bring us very close to answering Darwin’s
challenge” (Denton, p. 213).
Denton goes on to list other avian features which “defy plausible
explanation in gradualistic terms”: the design of the heart and cardiovascular
system, the gastrointestinal system, and the unique sounding producing organ,
the syrinx (Denton, 213).
Why the divergence of opinion between Dawkins and
Denton? Why, after looking at the
same evidence—the raw data of birds and other organisms—do these scientists
come to such contrary conclusions?
It is my contention that Dawkins’ control belief of atheistic naturalism
will not allow him to find data
contrary to his worldview.
Gradualistic, step-by-step evolution must
have happened for the simple reason that alternatives invoking the supernatural
are not acceptable to Dawkins. J.
Kerby Anderson and Harold Coffin comment on this concept in relation to
paleontology. They write in their
book Fossils in Focus:
In the face of this evidence, why
is it that a majority of the scientific community has been unwilling to
consider the creation model? The
answer may lie in the presuppositions of the observers rather than in the facts
that are available. Many
paleontologists feel that it is scientifically required that they continue to
work within the confines of the evolutionary model rather than to consider
alternative models. (Anderson and Coffin, pp. 79-80)
Dawkins’ faith in the continuous series of Xs leading from a
state of no eye to the human eye is not a belief empirically shown to be the
case. Rather, it is a story
(albeit, perhaps a true one) that allows him to explain complexity in light of
his naturalistic assumptions. When
Dawkins states,
It
is thoroughly believable that every organ or apparatus that we actually see
is the product of a smooth trajectory through animal space… I have no trouble at all in accepting
that these statements are true of eyes, ears, including bat ears, wings,
camouflaged and mimicking insects, snake jaws, stings, cuckoo habits… (BW, pp.
90-91—emphasis added)
he is merely telling the reader that he, Richard Dawkins,
believes and has great faith in gradualistic, step-by-step processes. This tells us more about Dawkins’
imaginative ability than it does about the actual evidence involved for
substantiating his claims. This
same device was used by Darwin and Michael Denton takes him to task for it.
In effect, what Darwin is saying,
and what many subsequent evolutionists have echoed, is that though we cannot
imagine exactly how the gaps were bridged in any particular case this is merely
because our imagination is relatively crude alongside the ingenuity of
nature. Thus the problem of
providing detailed reconstructions of credible sequences of transitional forms
is avoided and we are asked instead to wonder at the bountiful creativity of
nature. But rather than convince,
this strategy only tends to emphasize the fundamental inability of evolutionary
theorists to confront the problem of the gaps. Further, this sort of argument smacks of tautology. Of course, if gradual evolution is true
then the gaps must have been closed gradually even if we can’t imagine how it
occurred! (Denton, pp. 227-228)
As one reviewer, turning Dawkins’ words against him, argues,
this is merely the “Argument from Personal Credulity” (Watson, p. 201). Dawkins has imbibed deeply from the
wells of naturalism and obviously feels that strong statements from Oxford
scientists will effectively replace empirical data.
This lack of data is most clearly seen in his treatment of
bat echolocation in chapter two.
He spends a great deal of time explaining the complexity of bat
echolocation in order to demonstrate the need for an explanation for
complexity. Dawkins feels that
“the hypothesis that can explain bat navigation is a good candidate for
explaining anything in the world of life (BW, p. 37). Dawkins’ hypothesis is, of course, gradualistic natural
selection. It is at this point
that reviewer Paul Nelson critiques Dawkins:
Now here Dawkins does a rather odd
thing. One might expect that while
the reader’s mind is full of the wonders of bat echolocation, Dawkins would
demonstrate what he elsewhere calls the “power” of Darwinism “to explain
prodigies of apparent miracle (p. 318), and show how the system of echolocation
arose gradually in bats. But he
doesn’t. Instead he lampoons an
easy target, an Anglican bishop, and then presents a surprisingly poor argument
based on the breeding of dogs. (Nelson, p. 10)
Dawkins never raises the actual empirical data to confirm or
falsify his hypothesis.[7]
Yet another example of Dawkins’ lack of using empirical
evidence occurs in chapter seven—“Constructive Evolution.” It is Dawkins’ desire to demonstrate in
this chapter that natural selection is a constructive force and not merely destructive.[8] The analogy used is that of an “arms
race” between cheetahs and gazelles in which each generation gets progressively
faster and faster due to the competition relationship between them. But Dawkins himself repeatedly admits
the lack of empirical data to support such a claim.
We are unlikely to witness arms
races in dynamic progress, because they are unlikely to be running at any
particular ‘moment’ of geological time, such as our time.
Progressive ‘improvement’ of the
kind suggested by the arms race image does go on… even if its net rate of
progress is too slow to be detected within the lifetime of a man, or even the
timespan of recorded history.
In the case of a biological arms
race, on the other hand, we can usually see only the end-products. (BW, pp. 192, 181, 188)
The arms race story is intriguing but “how much more
convincing the theory would be if fossils had ever been found of a slow cheetah
or a slow gazelle” (Watson, p. 202).
I am inclined to agree that arms races may have occurred but once again
justification for the extrapolation from this analogy to the real world is
needed. It is one thing to claim
that cheetahs and gazelles became progressively faster and quite another to say
that the major morphological gaps (i.e., the avian lung from a reptilian
ancestor) could be bridged in the same way. Once again, the empirical evidence is not dealt with but,
instead, glossed over by the use of an analogy.[9]
This use of analogy in place of evidence has not gone
unnoticed even by friendly reviewers.
Jon Marks is one such reviewer; he writes of BW:
The prose is extraordinary,
especially from a scientist. As in
his previous books, Dawkins shows himself to be a master of the seductive
metaphor… And consequently, one may need to step back periodically from Dawkins’
engaging style to recognize that there is
precious little substance to The Blind Watchmaker. The work abounds with wonderfully
clever expositions, turn of phrases…, plausible scenarios and captivating
analogies. But at the bottom line The Blind Watchmaker discusses at great
length what biological evolution is like,
not what biological evolution is. While this is a very useful literary
and pedagogical device, it is simply
that—a device. I venture to
say that Dawkins is without peer as an illustrator-by-analogy,… all of which is
interesting and appealing, as long as you
do not think too hard about it. (Marks, p. 517—emphasis added)
Why this reliance on analogies and stories to the exclusion
of empirical evidence? If, as
Dawkins claims, “Cumulative selection,
by slow and gradual degrees, is the explanation, the only workable explanation
that has even been proposed, for the existence of life’s complex design” (BW,
p. 317). Why doesn’t he show the
reader the necessary empirical data for such a claim? As stated before, I believe it is because of Dawkins’
control belief of atheistic naturalism that causes him to take the case for
neo-Darwinian evolution as the sole force in creating all of life as
unproblematic. Dawkins appears to feel
that all is needed to defend his case are plausible stories and analogies
instead of a perusal of the empirical data supporting his claims. Robert Nisbet convincingly writes,
Although science is commonly
defined as the search for knowledge by observation and experimentation, it
should be noted that evolution for most scientists is usually accepted as a
fact not on the basis of data, but rather on the basis of the naturalistic presupposition.
(Nisbet, p. 1)
It is in the light of atheistic, naturalistic evolution that
Dawkins sees all of reality. Any
evidence offered must be construed in light of this fundamental
presupposition. Of course, Dawkins
will see confirming “evidence” for his beliefs all around him. “Once we have become convinced by our
theory, for whatever reason,
artifacts of that belief are bound to emerge, for we see the world in the
context of our belief” (Brady, p. 91).
For Dawkins the Darwinian worldview—including atheism for
Dawkins—doesn’t just happen to be
true but has to be true (BW, p.
x). Although not specifically
dealing with Dawkins’ BW, R. H. Brady’s remark is very appropriate:
The theory is unbeatable because it
is allowed to interpret our
observations while they are being made or being recorded. Once this has been done, it is only
logical that the data so collected cannot be used to question the
interpretation, being a product of it.
(Brady, p. 92)
This can been seen in the way Dawkins deals with empirical
data that has the appearance of running counter to his theory. One such instance is the problem in the
fossil record during the Cambrian period in which “we find most of the major
invertebrate groups. And we find
many of them already in an advanced state of evolution, the very first time
they appear. It is as though they
were just planted there, without any evolutionary history” (BW, p. 229). In an effort to bring this data into
conformity with his control belief of neo-Darwinism Dawkins once again resorts
to storytelling. But even Dawkins
recognizes that, “If you are a creationist you may think that this is special pleading” (BW, p. 230).
Thus, one comes again to the question of whether Dawkins
succeeds in his defense of the neo-Darwinian worldview. If success is measured by an appeal to
empirical evidence within the framework of a plausible, non-problematic theory
then the answer must be a decisive “no.”
As has been shown over and over again, Dawkins fails to adduce the
necessary evidence and, furthermore, fails to deal with such often used but yet
problematic notions like extrapolation in the biological realm. One is again reminded of the words of
Charles Lumsden cited earlier: “The informed will read and have their views
reaffirmed by the clear arguments.
Skeptics will read and remain unmoved. In part, the division
is not one of stupidity, but of faith” (Lumsden, p. 500—emphasis
added). Dawkins’ faith is that of
atheistic naturalism and it is this faith which he is most zealous to
defend. But, as Carl F. H. Henry
states, “The plain fact is, however, that naturalism is not a demand of reason
but reflects an arbitrary conceptualization of reality” (Henry, p. 148). Dawkins’ atheistic naturalism is not
demanded by the scientific evidence available in the world. Rather, it is the beginning point for
Dawkins from which he launches his neo-Darwinian research program. For those, like this writer, who do not
do obeisance at the altar of atheism Dawkins remains unpersuasive. My feeling is captured by the words of
Tom Pittman in his review of BW:
I think we can conclude that The
Watchmaker is not blind; the biologist looking over His shoulder is blind. (Pittman, p. 11)
APPENDIX: DAWKINS AND THEOLOGICAL SPECULATION
Dawkins in BW doesn’t have much to say about God as Creator
except to argue that natural selection rules out the need for such a
Being. There are, however, a few
remarks that deserve special attention.
On page 92, after discussing what he feels is one “telling imperfection”
that lends support to evolution, Dawkins states:
The whole skull of a bony flatfish
retains the twisted and distorted evidence of its origins. Its very imperfection is powerful
testimony of its ancient history, a history of step-by-step change rather than
of deliberate design. No sensible designer would have conceived
such a monstrosity if given a free hand to create a flatfish on a clean drawing
board. (Emphasis added)
Dawkins also points to “imperfections” in the eye as
evidence against a designer and writes, “it is the principle of the thing that would offend any tidy-minded engineer!”
(BW, p. 93)
It appears that Dawkins’ argument essentially reduces down
to the following: “Since that is not the way I would have designed a bony flatfish or eye there must therefore
be no God who is a creative designer.”
As an argument this lacks any cogency nor it is even intuitively
appealing. Perhaps, just perhaps,
it is the case that the designer has reasons unknown to Dawkins as to why the
bony flatfish and the eye are the way they appear in nature. If a designer exists must he let Dawkins in on every move he
makes? When Dawkins considers
problems for his theory he comments, “Even if the foremost authority in the
world can’t explain some remarkable biological phenomena, this doesn’t mean
that it is inexplicable” (BW, 39).
Well, if such a “saving” ploy is allowable for Dawkins then the believer
in a creative designer is just as justified in using the same argument within
the confines of his worldview.
Just because one doesn’t know why a given phenomenon is the way it is,
it does not therefore follow that there is no answer to the “why”
question. Of course, within a
theistic framework the answer may only be known by the Creator himself but this
would not necessitate the end of rational, scientific inquiry. The main point is that Dawkins’
argument can be answered utilizing principles he is willing to accept when he
confronts problems for his position.
It would therefore be hypocritical of him to disallow the theist to use
the same principles within the confines of his worldview. Perhaps Dawkins should spend less time
contemplating the mind of God in the name of science. Phillip Johnson’s words urge a corrective to Dawkins’ ways:
The task of science is not to
speculate about why God might have done things this way, but to see if a
material cause can be established by empirical investigation. If evolutionary biology is to be a
science rather than a branch of philosophy, its theorists have to be willing to
ask the scientific question: How can Darwin’s hypothesis of descent with
modification be confirmed or falsified? (Johnson, p. 71)
Does Dawkins have an answer as to why the bony flatfish and
the eye are the way they are? He
bluntly states: “I don’t know the exact explanation for this strange state of
affairs” (BW, p. 93). It would
appear that both Dawkins and the one who postulates a designer are in the same
boat. Thus, it is not the
empirical evidence that of necessity
militates against a designer but Dawkins’ faith in naturalism.
Dawkins feels confident in disposing of God and the concept
of creation by the use of a philosophical argument. Dawkins refers to those who “smuggle God in the back door:
they allow him some sort of supervisory role over the course that evolution has
taken” (BW, p. 316). Earlier
Dawkins referred to this concept as a “transparently feeble argument, indeed it
is obviously self-defeating” (BW, p. 141). Dawkins argues as follows:
But of course any God capable of
intelligently designing something as complex as the DNA/protein replicating
machine must have been at least as complex and organized as that machine
itself… To explain the origin of the DNA/protein machine by invoking a
supernatural Designer is to explain precisely nothing, for it leaves
unexplained the origin of the Designer.
You have to say something like ‘God was always there,’ and if you allow
yourself that kind of lazy way out, you might as well just say ‘DNA was always
there,’ or ‘Life was always there,’ and be done with it. (BW, p. 141)
In the last chapter of BW Dawkins thus concludes that
creationists “assume the existence of
the main thing we want to explain,
namely organized complexity” (BW, p. 316).
Paul Nelson, in his review of BW, masterfully answers
Dawkins at this point and deserves to be quoted in full.
This is an interesting
argument. However, it trades on an
equivocation, and hence is fallacious.
Let me illustrate the fallacy. Suppose a biologist and some students
are walking through a field, and they come upon a stream dammed by branches and
debris. The students ask the
biologist to tell who, or what, made the dam. A number of possible explanations exist: the branches which
form the dam might have accumulated randomly by the action of water; humans
might have assembled the dam; or, perhaps, some beavers did the work. After studying the dam and its surroundings,
the biologist concludes on the basis of the available evidence that it was
built by beavers.
But on hearing his explanation, the
students laugh. “That’s silly,”
they object, “you’ve just explained one organized complexity—the dam there—by
postulating another organized complexity—some beavers. If you’re going to take that lazy way
out, you might as well say the dam has always been there!”
The problem should be obvious. “Organized complexity” is not of a kind. The dam is an instance of organized complexity, as are the
beavers, but they’re hardly the same thing. In charging creationists with circularity, Dawkins trades on
this equivocation of “organized complexity.” To be sure, a Designer is in some sense “organized
complexity.” However, when offering
an explanation for the origin of life,
creationists are not obligated to explain the origin of the Designer. That wasn’t the question. (Nelson, p. 16)
Dawkins also claims that to posit a designer is
“superfluous” since natural selection can go it alone. Two points can be raised in response to
this objection: 1. It could only be superfluous if the case for natural
selection as the mechanism for major morphological change can be sustained. As the body of this paper argued,
Dawkins fails to do this in BW. 2.
Even if natural selection is the all-powerful process Dawkins claims it is, a
designer is still not necessarily superfluous. One may have a worldview in which
factors other than scientific ones (i.e., historical, philosophical,
revelational) constrain one to posit a God who is the Designer and
Creator. Science, as a limited
methodology, cannot rule out the existence of God. But, as Howard J. Van Till points, “the temptation to make
metaphysical assertions as if they were the logical deductions from scientific
discoveries is a strong temptation that is not easily avoided” (Van Till, et
al, p. 139).
Part and parcel of Dawkins’ atheistic worldview is the
corollary control belief of scientism—the belief that science and science alone
is the sole consideration in the formulation of a worldview. Only if scientism is true can Dawkins’
“superfluous” objection carry any weight.
But scientism is a metaphysical belief system, just as much as theism,
and is not proven to be true by scientific evidence. It is a faith commitment with which one approaches the
scientific data. Why should one
think that scientism is true?
Philosopher J. P. Moreland speaks of the proper nature of worldview
assessment and science’s place in such a process when he writes:
The rationality of a worldview is a
multifaceted affair, involving scientific, historical, and philosophical
considerations. It is difficult to
see why science should be singled out for the role of dictator in world view assessment, since world
views are broad paradigms which must take into account all the facets of life…
Science is an important part of world view assessment, but it is only one
part. The rationality of accepting
any scientific hypothesis involves bringing rationally justified external
conceptual problems to bear on that hypothesis, even if those problems do not
come from science. (Moreland, p. 204)
I reject scientism and atheism—for what, I believe, are
cogent and rational reasons—and therefore find Dawkins’ arguments for the
superfluity of God horribly unconvincing.
Perhaps Dawkins is willing to argue for his faith in scientism and
atheism but to do so is to engage in matters philosophical. If Dawkins desires to argue in such a
manner he must give up the pretense of speaking from a scientifically empirical
minded position and earn his keep like all others who engage in the
philosophical discipline by justifying his control beliefs.[10]
·
Thanks to Andy, Gary, Nathan, Paul, and Sean for their questions and
comments on a draft of this paper presented 11/21/91 at the University of
Arizona philosophy club.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anderson, J. Kerby and Harold G. Coffin. Fossils
in Focus. Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 1977.
Brady, R. H. “Dogma and Doubt” Biological Journal of the Linnean Society (17) 1982.
Cairns-Smith, A. G. Seven
Clues to the Origin of Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985.
Dawkins, Richard. The
Blind Watchmaker. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1986.
Denton, Michael. Evolution:
A Theory in Crisis. Maryland:
Adler and Adler, 1985.
Dose, Klause. “Review of Clay
Minerals and the Origin of Life” Bio
Systems vol. 22, no. 1,
1988.
Frame, John. The
Doctrine of the Knowledge of the God. Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and
Reformed, 1987.
Henry, Carl F. H. God,
Revelation, and Authority—vol one. Dallas: Word, 1976.
Hitching, Francis. The
Neck of the Giraffe: Darwin, Evolution, and the New Biology. New York:
Mentor, 1982.
Hull, David. “Review of The
Blind Watchmaker” The Quarterly
Review of Biology vol. 62,
September 1987.
Johnson, Phillip. Darwin
on Trial. Washington D. C.: Regnery Gateway, 1991.
Joyce, Gerald F. “RNA Evolution and the Origin of Life” Nature vol. 338, March 1989.
Lester, Lane P. and Raymond Bohlin. The
Natural Limits to Biological Change. Dallas: Word,
1989.
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Marks, Jon. “Review of The
Blind Watchmaker” Journal of Human
Evolution vol. 15, no. 6,
1986.
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the Secular City. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1987.
Nelson, Paul. “The Hopeless Watchmaker: A Skeptical Look at
Dawkins and Darwinism”
Origins
Research vol. 11, no. 2, 1988.
Nisbet, Robert A. “A Presuppositional Approach to the Four
View Model of Biological
Origins” Origins Research vol. 11, no. 2, 1988.
Pitman, Michael.
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Watson, David, C. C. “Review of The Blind Watchmaker” Creation
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[1]
Closely akin to control beliefs is the concept of “presuppositions” as defined
by John Frame: “A presupposition is a belief that takes precedence over another
and therefore serves as a criterion for another. An ultimate presupposition is a belief over which no other
takes precedence” (Frame, p. 45).
It is in the sense of “ultimate presupposition” that I use the phrase
“control beliefs” in this paper.
[2]
The issue of whether empirical data can overthrow one’s control beliefs is
important and should be briefly commented upon. The way I am using control beliefs, namely as ultimate
presuppositions, necessitates that empirical data cannot overthrow one’s
control beliefs. The reason for
this is that one’s ultimate presupposition is not merely an arbitrarily chosen
paradigm but, rather, one’s primal orientation in life. All of reality—including empirical
data—is thus viewed in terms of these fundamental presuppositions. The ultimate presupposition, therefore,
has primacy over the evidential data.
Although I cannot argue for it here, my position is that of Reformed
Christian theism wherein there are but two fundamental, ultimate
presuppositions—either commitment to
or revolt against the living God who
is revealed in the Bible. Whether
one is a “friend” or “enemy” of God will affect all of one’s subsequent noetic
activities. See Frame, pp. 40-164
for more details.
[3]
I do not wish to commit the genetic fallacy of faulting Dawkins’ arguments
simply because they have their genesis in a worldview I find untenable. Rather the argument of this paper is
that Dawkins doesn’t supply the reader with empirical evidence but, rather,
that he relies on analogies and stories to argue for his position. Furthermore, the analogies and stories
only convince those already committed
to Dawkins’ view of neo-Darwinian evolution.
[4]
If Dawkins’ question 3. is taken to mean, “Do we observe in the evidence
available a continuous series from no eye to human eye?” then the answer is, of
course, no. I am well aware that
neo-Darwinians point to “living intermediates” such as single celled organisms
with a light sensitive spot and certain worms with the light sensitive spot in
a cup (see BW, p. 85 and Hitching, pp. 77-79) but the problem with this
argument is that “(n)one of these different types of eyes are thought to have
evolved from any of the others, however, because they involve different types
of structures rather than a series of similar structures growing in complexity”
(Johnson, p. 35). This leads
Michael Pitman to comment that “a list of eyes from various animals, not
necessarily related, no more demonstrates evolution than a carefully ordered
range of lamps” (Pitman, p. 216).
[5]
As an aside it should be noted that there are mechanisms of stasis which might
have great bearing on Dawkins’ answer to question 4. as well as Dawkins’ whole
general argument. See Michael
Thomas, “Stasis Considered” Origins
Research vol. 12, no. 2, 1989.
[6]
Some neo-Darwinians would argue that Johnson’s assertion is false if we
construe “vision” as including being light sensitive such as found in some
single celled organisms. There is,
perhaps, some truth to their objection.
If “vision” is construed as being light sensitive then “many complex
parts” may not have to be working together. There is, of course, the difficulty of defining with
precision “many complex parts” and “working together.” Be that as it may, Johnson still
pointedly demonstrates a grave flaw in Dawkins’ reasoning, namely that there is not a one-to-one correspondence
between “5 per cent of an eye” and “5 per cent normal vision.” This point, in and of itself, serves to
dismantle Dawkins’ argument.
My guess is that when Johnson
wrote, “For an animal to have any useful vision at all, many complex parts must
be working together” he had in mind “higher” animals such as humans. This seems reasonable in view of the
fact that he is responding to Dawkins’ argument and Dawkins’ example was that
of the human eye. For the human
eye, Johnson’s remark is most certainly correct.
The remarks of biologists
Lane Lester and Raymond Bohlin are also important to note in this context:
It certainly seems unreasonable
to propose that the eye developed slowly by chance mistakes to its present
complexity of nerves, cones, rods, lens, pupil, retina, etc. If the eye is not capable of providing
a picture that successfully aids in survival, of what good is it? If all the parts are not in sufficient
working order, it is of no use to the organism. The more we learn of the eye, the more we appreciate
Darwin’s fear. Darwin’s only
suggestion, which remains today, is to observe the many types of eyes found in
lower creatures, from light sensitive structures on some single-celled
organisms to the compound eye of insects, to the focusing, color-receiving
human eye. This is satisfactory to
most Neo-Darwinians, but does it actually solve the problem? All that this technically demonstrates
is that there are various organisms that possess light sensitivity in
nature. Each contains its own
complexities and unique properties.
No true historical series has
ever been proposed for the evolution of the human eye. Darwin’s solution may only add new
examples to the list of complex adaptations waiting to be explained. (Lester and Bohlin, pp. 97-98)
[7] Two pieces
of information, although, are curiously left out by Dawkins:
(1) The oldest bat-fossil
skeleton is exactly the same as a modern bat’s, bone for bone; (2) All bats
have their pelvis twisted 180o from that of ground mammals, and no
fossil every discovered shows any sign of a 900 or any other degree
of twist. What happened to all the
intermediates? The question is not
even raised. (Watson, p. 202)
[8]
Cf. “The Paradox of Natural Selection” by Arthur LaGrange Batson III in Origins Research vol. 9, no. 2, 1986 and
subsequent discussion in Origins Research
vol. 10, no. 2, 1987.
[9] Quick
mention should be made of chapter six of BW—“Origins and Miracles”—where
Dawkins utilizes the theory of A. G. Cairns-Smith in Seven Clues to the Origin of Life as a possible answer to the
mystery of the origin of life.
This chapter appeared to me to be one long “story” devoid of any real
empirical data. Cairns-Smith’s
theory, although provocative, is, as of yet, still lacking in experimental
evidence. Klause Dose, in a review
of Cairns-Smith’s theory, stated the following:
Cairns-Smith’s thesis of
‘genetic takeover and the mineral origins of life’ is as yet without
experimental basis… This thesis is beyond comprehension of all biochemists who
are daily confronted with the experimental facts of life. (Dose, p. 89)
Gerald Joyce also cautions that “enthusiasm has to be
tempered until there is experimental evidence” (Joyce, p. 217). The words of Hubert Yockey are perhaps
the wisest concerning origin of life scenarios:
Since science has not the
vaguest idea how life originated on earth… it would be honest to admit this to
students, the agencies funding research, and the public. Leaders in science, speaking ex cathedra, should stop polarizing the
minds of students for which faith is the only evidence. Research on the origin of life is
legitimate and it would be much better off if the effort absorbed by defending
scenarios which cannot meet the most elementary criteria for a scientific
contribution were directed in a search for new knowledge. It is new knowledge not another clever
scenario that is needed to achieve an understanding of the origin of life.
(Yockey, p. 29)
