Showing posts with label Moral Choices. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Moral Choices. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 4, 2023

Moral Choices 12.4: Going Vegetarian? A Response with a Focus on the Teaching and Example of Jesus



 Case 12.4: Going Vegetarian?

You are friends with several people in your community who are committed vegetarians.  You have always eaten meat and not really thought much about it until you became friends with some of your current peer group.  They have challenged your views on eating meat and have encouraged you to join them in going vegetarian.  Some have gone a bit further and gone vegan, which means that they use no animal products at all.  They maintain that it is a healthier diet and that you’ll feel better once you make the transition.  But the main reason they give is that they don’t want to contribute to the mistreatment of animals that are kept and processed for food.  According to your friends, the animals have the right not to be abused or killed for food.  They cite the abuses that come from factory farming of animals and urge you not to violate your conscience with the food you eat.  Some of these friends are Christians.  They remind you that at creation the first human beings were vegetarians, and when the kingdom of God comes in its fullness at Jesus’ return, there will be peace in the kingdom and there will be no predator-prey relationships.  They maintain that minimizing meat today might be a way to anticipate life in the fullness of God’s kingdom.

 

·      How do you respond to your friends who are vegetarians/vegans?  Do you think they have a valid point?  Why or why not?

·      What do you think of their theologically based reasoning for their views?

·      What do you think of their views on animal rights not to be mistreated?

 

 

            

Case 12.4 concerns the moral legitimacy of eating meat and the arguments in support of the supposed moral superiority of vegetarianism.  I will argue that the moral imperative to vegetarianism is incorrect, and that Christians should feel no guilt in eating meat.  Toward this end, specific focus will be directed to the teaching and example of Jesus Christ.  A brief look at a few apostolic texts and a consideration of Isaiah 11 as used by pro-vegetarian interpreters will be addressed.  

A brief word about the focus and methodology of this paper.  I am primarily speaking to Christians who affirm something of the authority and relevance of the scriptural teaching as found in the Bible.  Space constraints forbid a fuller answer that could be developed without dependence on Scripture.[1]

Key Foundational Beliefs

            Although space will not allow a full treatment, the following points should be seen as foundational for any Christian understanding of how to approach meat-eating.  First, humans are distinct from animals by virtue of being created in the image of God (Genesis 1.26-28).  As such, humans have more value than animals and have “dominion” over the animals.  Second, animals throughout the entirety of the Old Testament are used for sacrifices and for food; this is all divinely sanctioned.  Third, although the Scriptures do speak against cruelty to animals there is a distinction that is assumed between “suffering” and “cruelty.”  Animals may be used for food and thus undergo “suffering,” but this is morally legitimate.  As Stephen Vantassel argues, “In one sense everyone could agree that human actions with animals can cause suffering, but should they agree that this suffering involves moral guilt?... I can concede that the animal is suffering, but I do not concede that the action is necessarily morally evil or unjust.”[2]  This distinction will be helpful in considering the teaching and example of Christ Jesus since he seemingly allows for a certain amount of suffering for animals.  “For if, as many animal rights activists subtly suggest, the killing of animals is, by definition, cruelty, then we have, in effect, made Jesus Christ a participant in cruelty and thereby besmirched his character.”[3]

Jesus and the Apostolic View of Meat-Eating

For Christians, the person and practice of Jesus of Nazareth is paramount in understanding who God is and what he desires.  When one examines the biblical evidence, the portrait and practice of Jesus is not one who endorses the premises of the “animal rights” position.  Consider the following items that demonstrate Jesus’ view of animal use and suffering.

First, in Luke 5.1-11 Jesus kills fish “for the sole purpose of demonstrating his power, and possibly enriching the disciples.”[4]  Stephen Vantassel draws out the ethical implications of this action:

Christ’s acceptance of fishing provides a useful rubric by which to investigate the issue of the treatment of wild animals and trapping.  Animal activists contend that fishing is cruel because fish suffer during the capture process.  Despite the pain fish underwent, Christ never condemned fishing.[5]

 

Furthermore, Jesus commands his disciples to fish in order to obtain tax money (Matthew 17.27).  Vantassel notes that the crucial issue is not whether the fish died but “the important fact is that Christ would permit the fish to suffer the pains/stress of being hooked and removed from its natural environment in order to recover a coin and pay a tax.”[6]

            Second, Jesus’ approach to the sacrificial system and food laws of his time do not align with those who promote the animal rights perspective.  Vantassel perceptively notes, “If Christ was so concerned about the suffering of animals in food production then why didn’t He condemn the sacrificial system as immoral and add further restrictions to the laws of kashrut regarding clean meat (Mk 7:19).”[7]  In fact, Jesus actually commands a recently healed leper “to go show yourself to the priest and make an offering for your cleansing, just as Moses commanded, as a testimony to them” (Luke 5.14).  Such a command was, essentially, a command to go kill an animal in that the directive in Leviticus 14.1-20 required the death of a bird and two lambs.  Furthermore, Jesus’ teaching in Mark 7 is taken by Mark to entail that Jesus “declared all foods clean” (Mark 7.19).  This truth effectively expands the dietary choices of God’s people—not narrow them.  Finally, in concert with the point above, the book of Acts depicts the risen Lord Jesus as saying, “Get up, Peter, kill and eat!” (Acts 10.13).  This is a direct command from Jesus to kill animals and eat them.

            Third, Jesus feeds thousands of people on at least two different occasions with fish (feeding of 5000: Matthew 14.13-21; Mark 6.30-44; Luke 9.10-17; John 6.1-14/feeding of 4000: Matthew 15.32-39; Mark 8.1-10).  Someone may object: “These were not live fish which were killed; thus, there is no suffering.”  This is true, but one still needs to explain why Jesus would use an object lesson of fish which reinforces meat-eating.  Taken in conjunction with the above points about Jesus killing fish and commanding disciples to fish, this takes on added significance.

            Fourth, Jesus himself eats fish after his resurrection (Luke 24.42; John 21.9-13).[8]  He does this to help demonstrate his actual resurrection; that he is truly an embodied being, risen from the dead.

            Fifth, Jesus is not above allowing demonic activity to influence and kill 2000 pigs.  This does not directly address the issue of eating meat, but it does reinforce the principle that people are more valuable than animals.  In this case, 2000 pigs are sacrificed to save one human.

            Sixth, Jesus’ examples used in his teaching presuppose the moral legitimacy of eating meat.  In Luke 12.24 Jesus states, “Consider the ravens, for they neither sow nor reap; they have no storeroom nor barn, and yet God feeds them; how much more valuable you are than the birds!”  As Paul Copan notes, God provides for ravens by giving them meat to eat.[9]  “Perhaps we could paraphrase here too: ‘If God provides meat for the ravens, will he not do so for you, who are much more valuable than they?’”[10]  In other parables, Jesus mentions the eating of oxen and fattened livestock at times of celebration (Matthew 22.4; Luke 15.23).[11]  These positive representations of killing and eating animals seem to presuppose their moral legitimacy by Jesus.

            In turning to the apostolic witness regarding meat-eating there is nothing that is inconsistent with the teaching of Jesus on this issue.  A full discussion is not possible here of all the relevant texts, so a few key passages will be noted.  In Romans 14 the apostle Paul is addressing the issue of eating meat versus eating vegetables.  His context revolves the Jew/Gentile differences resulting from upholding the ceremonial food laws.  Paul recognizes that the one who is strong in faith “may eat all things, but he who is weak eats vegetables only” (Romans 14.2).  Later in this text he echoes the thought of Jesus when notes, “All things indeed are clean” and, thus, are morally allowable if done in a manner with consistent with love toward another person’s conscience (Romans 14.20).  There is no hint of any moral prohibition on meat-eating in principle.

            Another Pauline text of relevance is 1 Timothy 4.1-5.

1But the Spirit explicitly says that in the later times some will fall away from the faith, paying attention to deceitful spirits and doctrines of demons, 2by means of the hypocrisy of liars, seared in their own conscience as with a branding iron, 3men who forbid marriage and advocate abstaining from foods which God has created to be gratefully shared in by those who believe and know the truth.  4For everything created by God is good, and nothing is to be rejected if it is received with gratitude; 5for it is sanctified by means of the word of God and prayer.         

 

Although the background to this text is the familiar Jew/Gentile split and the food laws, Paul’s express teaching allows for the acceptance of all kinds of meat.  Such foods are recognized as good and to be received with gratitude.  Especially noteworthy are the strong words regarding those who would forbid such food.  These words need to be heeded by all those who seek to place an ethical limitation on what foods are acceptable in God’s sight.

Vegetarianism in Anticipation of the Eternal Kingdom: A Valid View?

            The argument that minimizing meat-eating is a way to anticipate the eternal kingdom has been made based on Isaiah 11.6-9:

6And the wolf will dwell with the lamb, and the leopard will lie down with the young goat, and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together; and a little boy will lead them.  7Also the cow and the bear will graze, their young will lie down together, and the lion will eat straw like the ox.  8The nursing child will play by the hole of the cobra, and the weaned child will put his hand on the viper’s den.  9They will not hurt or destroy in all my holy mountain, for the earth will be full of the knowledge of the Lord as the waters cover the sea.

 

There are, however, several problems in appealing to this text for the conclusion that one ought to minimize or, even, outright deny meat-eating.  

            First, according to Vantassel, this passage should be read as an “anthropocentric blessing.”  He elaborates:

We would suggest the passage is not about the cessation of animal death (i.e., a time when sheep would no longer be eaten by humans), it is about the cessation of predation and animal attacks that harm human interests.  In other words, in the messianic age, shepherds will be liberated from the burden of having to guard their sheep at night (Lk 2:8).  The reason this observation is overlooked is likely due to the urban context of most biblical interpreters.  When one is not familiar with the challenges of raising livestock where hungry predators roam, it is difficult [for] readers to appreciate how great a blessing the conversion of predators to grass eaters would be.[12]

 

This anthropocentric perspective by itself may not overthrow the pro-vegetarian reading of this passage but it does give one pause.  This pause is further extenuated by other passages in Isaiah which may be reasonably taken to refer to the future state and in which there is indication that eating meat may be involved.  Consider Isaiah 25.6: “On this mountain the Lord Almighty will prepare a feast of rich food for all peoples, a banquet of aged wine—the best of meats and the finest of wines” (NIV).[13]

            Second, this passage may not require that every element of it be taken literally.  The main point is that there will be no harm for God’s people.  One reason to think that perhaps there are non-literal elements in it is that later in Isaiah it is said, “No lion will be there, nor will any vicious beast go up on it” (Isaiah 35.9).  This leads Paul Copan to ask, “So which do we take literally—feasting on fine meats, lion with lamb, or no lion at all?”[14]

            Third, even if it is granted that there will be no meat-eating in the new creation there are still reasons to avoid the conclusion that one ought not to eat now.  Jesus’ bodily resurrection is the beginning of the new creation and yet, as was seen above, he ate meat in his resurrected body.  Furthermore, since marriage is not going to be a part of the new creation, should we, by this logic, also forbid (or, at least, discourage) marriage now?  Would it not be a good thing to live out this ideal state now?  In light of 1 Timothy 4.1-5, which mentions both abstaining from certain foods and marriage in a negative light, the answer to those questions should be “no.”  Paul Copan concludes, “If we admit that marriage has a vital place for humanity up until the new heavens and earth arrive (as part of the ‘dominion’ task), then the ‘dominion’ of meat-eating should also be included up until the very end.”[15]

Conclusion

            The attempt to defend vegetarianism from the Bible and Christian doctrine is fraught with numerous difficulties.  This view fails to fully reckon with the teaching and practice of Jesus and the apostles.  Its use of Isaiah 11.6-9 is underdeveloped and fails to consider contextual issues within Isaiah and the larger body of scriptural data.  There is no moral imperative to avoid meat-eating.  Rather, there is the freedom to “eat all things” (Romans 14.2).


     [1] This footnote will have to serve as a guide to this literature.  The work of Tim Hsiao utilizes a “natural law” perspective which argues for the moral legitimacy of eating meat.  See the following articles (the first two are popular in nature whereas the remaining are peer-reviewed, full expositions): “There is Nothing Morally Wrong with Eating Meat,” in What Would Jesus Really Eat? The Biblical Case for Eating Meat, eds. Wes Jamison and Paul Copan, (Florida: Castle Quay Books, 2019), 51-60; “Human Lives Matter: Reflections on Human Exceptionalism,” in What Would Jesus Really Eat? The Biblical Case for Eating Meat, eds. Wes Jamison and Paul Copan, (Florida: Castle Quay Books, 2019), 61-71; “In Defense of Eating Meat,” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 28.2 (2015), 277-291; “Industrial Farming is Not Cruel to Animals,” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 30.1 (2017), 37-54.

     [2] Stephen M. Vantassel, “Animal Suffering Should Not Trump Environmental Stewardship,” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 53.3 (2010), 463.

     [3] Stephen Vantassel, “A Biblical Assessment of Andrew Linzey’s View of Animal Rights,” Emmaus Journal 12 (2003), 192-193.

     [4] Stephen Vantassel, “A Biblical Assessment of Andrew Linzey’s View of Animal Rights,” Emmaus Journal 12 (2003), 190.

     [5] Stephen Vantassel, “Should Wildlife Trapping Have a Place in a Christian Environmental Ethic?” Evangelical Review of Society and Politics1.2 (2007), 41.

     [6] Stephen Vantassel, “A Biblical Assessment of Andrew Linzey’s View of Animal Rights,” Emmaus Journal 12 (2003), 190-191.

     [7] Stephen M. Vantassel and Nelson D. Kloosterman, “Compassionate Eating as Distortion of Scripture: Using Religion to Serve Food Morality,” Evangelical Review of Society and Politics 5.1 (2011), 41.  Vantassel explains in a footnote that Josephus in ‘Wars 6:423-424’ “says, the number of sacrifices for Passover numbered 254,500, suggesting a first century equivalent of industrial agriculture.”  Consider, also, the words of Wes Jamison, “There is simply no way the Jews could have raised and slaughtered the number of animals commanded by God without intensive agricultural practices… Although the Old Testament sacrifices differed quantitatively from modern intensive animal slaughter, there is little qualitative difference.”  This, as Jamison notes, helps to answer the charge by philosopher John Hare, “There is nothing in ancient Israel like our factory farming and how we treat chickens and veal calves.”  See Wes Jamison, “Joy or Grief? Understanding the Challenges to Christian Meat-Eating,” in What Would Jesus Really Eat? The Biblical Case for Eating Meat, eds. Wes Jamison and Paul Copan, (Florida: Castle Quay Books, 2019), 40.

     [8] In that this example, and many of the above, revolve around fish, Paul Copan’s words are worth hearing: “Some may argue that fish are not technically considered ‘meat’ according to certain modern regulatory (or other) standards; for example, vegetarians of the pescatarian variety will include fish in their diet but avoid all other meat.  But why think that modern regulatory standards are relevant for inhabitants of first-century Palestine?  This is an arbitrary imposition.  Clearly Jesus is cooking and eating animals.  Ultimately, all such trivial distinctions are rendered irrelevant by the fact that Jesus ‘declared all foods clean’ or kosher (Mark 7:19).”  Paul Copan, “What Would Jesus Eat? From Kosher to Everything,” in What Would Jesus Really Eat? The Biblical Case for Eating Meat, eds. Wes Jamison and Paul Copan, (Florida: Castle Quay Books, 2019), 98.

     [9] In the wild, ravens are opportunistic feeders and their diet varies based on habitat and available food sources. They are omnivorous and will feed on everything from small mammals to nesting birds, eggs and berries. They will also eat carrion, scavenge from other predators and even from human landfills. A group, or a flock, of ravens will raid seabird colonies, consuming the eggs and young of these colonies.” Smithsonian’s Natural Zoo and Conservation Biology Institute, “Common Raven: Fact Sheet” (no date)—online: https://nationalzoo.si.edu/animals/common-raven#:~:text=They%20are%20omnivorous%20and%20will,and%20young%20of%20these%20colonies.  The biblical narrative also illustrates this when ravens bring bread and meat to Elijah in 1 Kings 17.6.

     [10] Paul Copan, “What Would Jesus Eat? From Kosher to Everything,” in What Would Jesus Really Eat? The Biblical Case for Eating Meat, eds. Wes Jamison and Paul Copan, (Florida: Castle Quay Books, 2019), 100.

     [11] Vantassel adds this interesting note: “I also think that Luke 15:27 ‘fatted calf’ also provides some additional insight.  If we look at Prov. 15:17 as the stall fed calf, isn’t is possible that the fatted calf was a stall fed calf?  While the calf certainly didn’t suffer the degradations of the alleged actions of modern veal manufacturing, certainly the calf was treated a certain way to develop tender meat.” Stephen Vantassel, “Should Wildlife Trapping Have a Place in a Christian Environmental Ethic?” Evangelical Review of Society and Politics 1.2 (2007), 41.

     [12] Stephen M. Vantassel and Nelson D. Kloosterman, “Compassionate Eating as Distortion of Scripture: Using Religion to Serve Food Morality,” Evangelical Review of Society and Politics 5.1 (2011), 40-41.

     [13] The phrase “best of meats” is more literally translated “rich food, filled with marrow.”  See J. Alec Moyter, The Prophecy of Isaiah: An Introduction and Commentary (Downers Grove, Ill.: Intervarsity Press, 1993), 209.

     [14] Paul Copan, “What Would Jesus Eat? From Kosher to Everything,” in What Would Jesus Really Eat? The Biblical Case for Eating Meat, eds. Wes Jamison and Paul Copan, (Florida: Castle Quay Books, 2019), 104.

     [15] Paul Copan, “What Would Jesus Eat? From Kosher to Everything,” in What Would Jesus Really Eat? The Biblical Case for Eating Meat, eds. Wes Jamison and Paul Copan, (Florida: Castle Quay Books, 2019), 104.

Sunday, March 19, 2023

Moral Choices 13.1: Bribery, or the Cost of Doing Business?

 


Case 13.1: Bribery or the Cost of Doing Business?

 

You are starting a new business in a suburb of Jakarta, Indonesia, located next to a major university.  It’s a coffee house with WiFi, a place for students to study, relax, and congregate.  You have secured the location, signed the lease for the building, and are ready to begin remodeling the site.  You will need your utilities, such as electricity, water, internet connection, and gas, before you can officially begin renovating the location.  When you approach the technicians to have them initiate these services, they inform you that if you want to have them turned on in a timely way, an additional “service charge” of $1,000/utility is required.  When you offer to pay it by making out a check to the utility company, the technician informs you that is a “cash only” transaction.  You are reasonably certain that the respective technician will pocket the cash in exchange for giving you the service in a timely way.  If you refuse to pay, he informs you that you could wait anywhere from six to nine months for these services to be started.  You realize that would be very harmful to your business its opening for so long.  It feels like you are being asked to pay a bribe, and you know that it is illegal for US companies to pay bribes to officials in other countries.  You have reservations but are told by reliable sources that this is a customary way of doing business in Indonesia and that you really have no choice but to pay the people involved.

 

1.     What decision will you make—to pay what is demanded or refuse?  Be sure to spell out the reasons for your decision thoroughly.

 

2.     How does the Bible’s teaching on bribery impact your thinking on this decision?

 

3.     Imagine that the situation was a bit different, that you were leading a mission trip for your church.  You and a group of twenty adults and high school students are attempting to get audio equipment into the country to facilitate translation of the “Jesus film” into several languages in that country.  You are held up by a customs official who demands a payment of $500 cash to let the equipment through customs.  Would you be morally justified in making this payment?  Why or why not?

 

            

 

The ethical issue of bribery in business as it relates to cross-cultural contexts is a deeply relevant concern.  This paper attempts to analyze Case Study 13.1 in terms of guiding ethical principles as well as virtues.  John Frame uses a "tri-perspectivalist" approach to ethics that can be fruitfully applied to this ethical case study.  Frame speaks about three perspectives:

·       Normative perspective which considers deontological categories.

 

·       Situational perspective which analyzes the nature of the situation and possible consequences flowing from various choices.

 

·       Existential (personal) perspective which emphasizes the character (virtues) of the moral agent.

 

Thus, any ethical judgment involves the application of a norm to a situation by a person.[1]  Consider the following analysis using Frame’s approach.

Normative Perspective 

            The key norms will come from an accurate understanding of God’s Word and the ethical stipulations that naturally and logically flow from its commandments.[2]  The Christian Scriptures—particularly the Old Testament—are replete with ethical stipulations and examples that forbid bribery.  Across the full spectrum of Old Testament genres, bribery is consistently portrayed as an act of injustice: Torah (Exodus 18.21; 23.8; Deuteronomy 16.18-20), Historical (1 Samuel 12.3-4), Wisdom (Psalm 26.10; Proverbs 15.27; 17.23; 24.23; Ecclesiastes 7.7), and Prophets (Isaiah 1.23; 33.15; Ezekiel 22.12).  Most of these references are specifically dealing with a legal, judicial context where a judge or witness is tempted to thwart the cause of justice for a price.  The general principle of upholding justice is secure and can be applied outside the judicial context to other social contexts (i.e., the economic realm).

            Although the New Testament does not have a great deal of direct teaching on bribery, Scott Turow, in his essay “What’s Wrong with Bribery,” has an especially apt allusion to the teaching of Jesus.  He writes:

Mail fraud/bribery is predicated on the theory that someone—the bribee’s governmental or private employer—is deprived, by a bribe, of the recipient’s undivided loyalties.  The bribee comes to serve to two masters and as such is an ‘unfaithful servant’.[3]

 

Turow goes on to note that the equality of humans and their fundamental dignity “demands that each stand as an equal before the government they have joined to create.”[4]  Turow argues that what makes bribery so morally repugnant is that, “Bribery asks that that principal (sic) be violated, that some persons be allowed to stand ahead of others, that like cases not be treated alike, and that some persons be preferred.”[5]

Situational Perspective

            This perspective asks one to define and delimit, as much as possible, the nature of the act under consideration.  The situational perspective also asks one to consider potential consequences that may flow from the act.[6]  In order to properly understand the nature of bribery so as to apply that definition to this case-study it will be helpful to distinguish bribery from extortion.  

            A standard definition of bribery is offered by Stephen Unger when he writes:

[B]ribery is the act of making payments, usually secretly, intended to induce the recipient to act in a manner that is illegal, or favorable to the payer, at the expense of the recipient’s employer, of the payer’s competitors, or of other parties, including the general public.[7]

 

Michael Pritchard draws attention to the intentionality of the briber as another key consideration in defining bribery.  He writes, “Bribery explicitly includes the notion of an inducement to violate a duty or obligation as an essential element: the briber’s intent is to get the bribee to violate a special duty or obligation.”[8]

            Extortion, in contradistinction to bribery, as some unique elements that set it apart.  Pritchard helpfully lays out some of the key distinctions:

Extortion is the attempt to coerce someone into making payment by threatening harm.  Both extortionists and bribers take the initiative; however, extortionists seek payment, whereas bribers offer payment.  In contrast to extortion, successful bribery is best viewed as a mutual exchange, a voluntary relationship.[9]

 

Thus, the person who is paying in the extortion example is being coerced into this payment under some level of duress.  Power differentials are being leveraged to induce the person to pay.  

            With these distinctions in view, it might be argued that the case study under review is actually an example of extortion.  The payee is being coerced, or, at the very least induced, to make a payment to keep the project moving at a reasonable pace so as not to hurt the prospects of the business.  This case study is not one in which the payee (the “briber”) is seeking to subvert the normal processes by secret and illegal means.  Rather, the payee is being pressured to pay to have some rightfully expected service rendered.  In other words, the service is being held hostage and only the payee’s monetary payment will release the service.  This type of payment situation is typically called “facilitating payments.”[10]  Antonio Argandona articulates the nature of these facilitating payments:

The main distinction between facilitating payments and ordinary bribery and extortion is that facilitating payments tend to be mad to obtain something to which the payer is entitled: what the payer wants the corrupt official or employer to do is not something illegitimate, improper or immoral—something that exceeds their authority such that the normal course of business would be perverted through dishonest or unlawful behavior—but rather to do what it is their duty to do in the procedure for resolving a particular manner.[11]

 

As is evident, the case-study fits the definition of facilitating payments as articulated above.  Does this shift of terminology and the “lower level” of corruption justify the paying of facilitation payments?  Not necessarily.

            Antonio Argandona states that “facilitating payments involve a set of questionable behaviours.”[12]  After listing out the prerequisite actions needed to engage in facilitating payments, Argandona argues that such payments “will always be extortion, which is immoral because it forces the company to make a payment that is not included in the terms and conditions attaching to the service, for the exclusive benefit of the official.”[13]

Although the case study may not have the traditional and defining marks of bribery and, instead, look more like extortion, it would be too hasty to justify the morality of payment in the case under review.  Scott Turow brings nuance to the bribery/extortion dichotomy.  He writes:

Interestingly, the law does not regard extortion and bribery as mutually exclusive; extortion requires an apprehension of harm, bribery as desire to influence.  Often, in fact, the two are coincident.  Morally—and legally, perhaps—it would seem that bribery can be justified only if the bribe-giver is truly without alternatives, including the alternative of refusing payment and going to the authorities.  Moreover, the briber should be able to show not merely that it was convenient or profitable to pay the bribe, but that the situation presented a choice of evils in which the bribe somehow avoided a greater evil.[14]

 

Turow raises the issue of moral alternatives.  Often those who are being pressured into facilitating payments do not fully consider all the options available to them.  Since “facilitating payments may represent a step towards a culture of corruption in society,” it is incumbent upon the business to consider all other options available before making the payment.[15]  This may require “moral imagination [which] can suggest alternatives to capitulation.”[16]  

Existential Perspective

            This perspective asks one to consider the motives and character of the moral agent.  In this case there is seemingly no malicious or evil intent in the moral agent being pressured to offer payment; there is not a “heart that devises wicked plans” (Proverbs 6.16-19).  Nevertheless, there may be other virtues that are lacking or may be compromised if the payment is made.

            First, is the virtue of moral courage.  Are there no alternatives available to the moral agent?  It is granted that some alternatives besides paying the “fee” will cost more but sometimes the virtuous path requires risk and cost.  Second, there is the preceding factors which led to the moral agent being in this situation.  As the case study is written, the agent is seemingly unaware of the cultural corruption of facilitating payments.  Does this lack of knowledge speak of a lack of wisdom (Proverbs 19.2)?  Ought the person to have known that this situation might reasonably arise given readily available background knowledge?  A quick Internet search quickly revealed that “a culture of bribery is deeply rooted with the Indonesian public sector.”  This source furthered noted that, “many companies look at bribery as a necessary ‘cost of doing business’—whatever the potential penalties of breaking the law, they are seen as worth it to ensure that projects stay on track.”[17]

Putting It All Together

            Considering the above tri-perspectivist analysis, I tend to think that the use of a facilitating payment in this situation is morally suspect.  There may be situations where such facilitating payments are allowable, but these should be firmly circumscribed by key factors.  Argandona writes:

Our opinion is that a blanket decision to make facilitating payments is ethically unacceptable because, as we said earlier, they can only be justified in certain circumstances (when there is genuine extortion, when the cost to the company of not making the payment is very high, or when the foreseeable indirect consequences—in terms of creating a culture of corruption in the company, fostering a corruption among public officials, setting a bad example for employees, etc.—are negligible.[18]

 

Argandona further notes that if a company does decide to offer a facilitating payment this should be done within a delineated set of rules which should be included in the company’s ethical code or code of conduct.  He mentions the following considerations a company should note:[19]

·      The company must specify the criteria being used to justify the payment in this situation.

 

·      The company must specify its decision-making procedure (i.e., who in the company is authorized to approve such payments?).

 

·      The company must specify the rules of disclosure (i.e., how will the payment be recorded?  Who will see this?  How will this be presented to the public?).

 

Mission Trip Extortion

            I tend to think that making the $500.00 payment in the mission trip scenario would be morally justifiable.  Some of the key differences in this scenario, in contradistinction to the business case study above, move me to make this moral judgment.  First, the Christians are operating under a divine mandate to bring the message of Jesus to the nations (Matthew 28.18-20).  There is no such mandate for a business.  Second, in this scenario it truly seems as though the equipment is being held hostage.  So, although it is immoral for the customs official to ask for the payment, it is not necessarily immoral for the payment to be made to release the equipment.  



     [1] John M. Frame, The Doctrine of the Christian Life (Phillipsburg, New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed, 2008), 33.

     [2] This presupposes a Christian analysis, which is what is being offered here.  For someone who rejects the ethical authority of the Christian Scriptures, the normative standards will have to have their deontological foundations elsewhere.  See the thought of Scott Turow below for a way to flesh out these deontological claims.

     [3] Scott Turow, “What’s Wrong with Bribery?” Journal of Business Ethics 4 (1985), 249.

     [4] Scott Turow, “What’s Wrong with Bribery?” Journal of Business Ethics 4 (1985), 250.

     [5] Scott Turow, “What’s Wrong with Bribery?” Journal of Business Ethics 4 (1985), 250.

     [6] This does not entail that it is consequentialist categories that drive the ethical analysis; only that consequences are often a relevant factor to consider in any ethical analysis.  As Old Testament specialist Christopher J. H. Wright notes, the Old Testament Wisdom literature often has a consequentialist view of ethical decision-making.  He writes, “Much of the advice and guidance given in Proverbs is prudential.”  He adds, “Moral rules and moral consequences actually reinforce one another in this way of thinking.”  As set within a strong creation theology and robust view of God’s sovereign justice this consequentialism is “thoroughly personal and theistic.  It is not impersonal fate, or karma… they are not a matter of mechanical cause and effect, but the outworking of God’s own order in his world.”  Walking in the Ways of the Lord: The Ethical Authority of the Old Testament (Downers Grove, Ill.: Intervarsity Press, 1995), 121.

     [7] Stephen H. Unger, “Ethical Aspects of Bribing People in Other Countries,” Science and Engineering Ethics 4 (1998), 289.

     [8] Michael S. Pritchard, “Bribery: The Concept,” Science and Engineering Ethics 4 (1998), 282—emphasis in original.

     [9] Michael S. Pritchard, “Bribery: The Concept,” Science and Engineering Ethics 4 (1998), 282.

     [10] “Facilitating payments, also known by terms such as grease payments, speed money, expediting payments, tea money or democratic corruption, are a form of petty corruption.”  Antonio Argandona, “Corruption and Companies: The Use of Facilitating Payments,” Journal of Business Ethics 60 (2005), 253.

     [11] Antonio Argandona, “Corruption and Companies: The Use of Facilitating Payments,” Journal of Business Ethics 60 (2005), 254.

     [12] Antonio Argandona, “Corruption and Companies: The Use of Facilitating Payments,” Journal of Business Ethics 60 (2005), 256.

     [13] Antonio Argandona, “Corruption and Companies: The Use of Facilitating Payments,” Journal of Business Ethics 60 (2005), 256.

     [14] Scott Turow, “What’s Wrong with Bribery?” Journal of Business Ethics 4 (1985), 251.

     [15] Antonio Argandona, “Corruption and Companies: The Use of Facilitating Payments,” Journal of Business Ethics 60 (2005), 257.  Robert Bailes quotes the Economist (February 28, 2002) in this line of thought, “Facilitation payments are the first move… in a chess game that leads to bribery.”  Robert Bailes, “Facilitation Payments: Culturally Acceptable or Unacceptably Corrupt?” Business Ethics: A European Review 15.3 (2006), 297.

     [16] Michael S. Pritchard, “Bribery: The Concept,” Science and Engineering Ethics 4 (1998), 285.

     [17] Decky Windarto, “Getting Away with It: Bribery Culture in Indonesia,” Glass Lewis (March 20, 2019)—online: https://www.glasslewis.com/getting-away-with-it-bribery-culture-in-indonesia/.

     [18] Antonio Argandona, “Corruption and Companies: The Use of Facilitating Payments,” Journal of Business Ethics 60 (2005), 259-260.

     [19] Antonio Argandona, “Corruption and Companies: The Use of Facilitating Payments,” Journal of Business Ethics 60 (2005), 260.