Death Penalty Discussion Board

 * For my ethics class discussion board.  I chose to respond to an article that was arguing against the death penalty.

Contra Bedau

 

Hugo Adam Bedau’s “The Case Against the Death Penalty” does not so much argue for an intellectual position but, rather, loudly asserts it.  And many of these assertions are logical fallacies masquerading as reasoned discourse.

 

Bedau’s introduction mentions that the arguments to oppose to capital punishment are moral, practical, and constitutional in nature.  The bulk of the essay (as least in this edited rendition) is taken up with practical matters in the current application of the death penalty.  The major headings are “deterrence,” “unfairness,” and “inevitability of error.”  Thus, it is in the introduction that the moral arguments against capital punishment are contained.  My focus will be here.

 

Bedau’s introduction is a target rich environment for logical fallacies and rhetorical recklessness.  Here a few problems:

 

The first bullet point simply begs the question by calling capital punishment “cruel and unusual” and calling it a barbaric practice.

 

The second bullet point engages in equivocation.  It starts out by talking about how “murder demonstrates a lack of respect for human life” as a general truth but then uses this framework to speak against “state-authorized killing,” thus seeming to equate murder with state-sponsored capital punishment.

 

The third bullet point begins by stating, “Capital punishment denies due process of law.”  This is factually incorrect.  There is due process involved but it is not infinitely extendable.  But the failure to extend out the process does not mean there was not “due process” in the legal sense.  Unless, of course, simply begs the question by assuming the death penalty cannot have due process at all.

 

The sixth bullet point reads, “Executions give society the unmistakable message that human life no longer deserves respect when it is useful to take it and that homicide is legitimate when deemed justified by pragmatic concerns.”  There are a number of problems with this one sentence.

            

·      The message is not “unmistakable” since many who endorse capital punishment do not even begin to think this.  They think it is a matter of justice.

·      The category of “useful to take it” is erroneously assumed as the motive.

·      The use of the word “homicide” is rhetorically prejudicial.  “Homicide” has connotations of the illegitimate taking of innocent human life.  Its use here with its connotations leans into the fallacy of begging the question.

·      The defenders of capital punishment do not rely solely on “pragmatic concerns.”  This is a strawman fallacy.

 

The seventh bullet point talks of “reliance on the death penalty” but this is, again, straw manning of the position.  Why not a “reluctant use” of the capital punishment in specialized and extreme circumstances?  This bullet point also states, “Politicians who preach the desirability of executions as a weapon of crime control deceive the public and mask their own failure to support anti-crime measures that will really work.”  Besides straw manning the argument (again) there is also a false dichotomy here.  One can consistently affirm the death penalty and support various anti-crime measures under consideration by Bedau.

 

The last bullet point is full of errors.

 

·      “A decent and humane society does not deliberately kill human beings.”  

 

o   If Bedau really believes this he will be pro-life on the abortion issue from the moment of conception.  (Just an aside…)

o   The statement is so lacking in specificity that is incorrect.  Here’s a counter-claim: “A decent and humane society does deliberately kill human beings… who are killing children in a shoot spree.”  We have snipers who we train and pay to be ready for such instances.  

o   If the claim is made more specific to take into account my counter-example it would have to be something like, “A decent and humane society does not deliberately kill innocent human beings.”  But the defender of capital punishment could easily agree with this modified statement—in fact, she would urge such a statement be adopted.

 

·      There is, again, the prejudicial language of “homicide.”

·      There is a one-sentence historical statement: “In this century, governments have too often attempted to justify their lethal fury by the benefits such killing would bring to the rest of society.”  Perhaps true, but irrelevant to the case under consideration.  An example of a Red Herring.

 

An essay which begins with such irrational devices and rhetorical excess is suspect.  Even granting most of his remaining points revolving around deterrence, unfairness, and error, this does not advance the fundamental moral question about the justness of the act of capital punishment.  His subsidiary arguments may challenge the defender of capital punishment to raise the bar epistemologically so that the problems in application are resolved.

Moral Choices: Case 8.1--Your Father's Living Will

 * For an assignment for my ethics class with Dr. Scott Rae for the MA in philosophy program at Biola University. 

** For another study on issues related to this see my "Life, Death, & Growing Old (Part 6): End of Life Issues"

Case 8.1: Your Father’s Living Will

Your elderly father has recently been diagnosed with terminal lung cancer.  His doctors estimate that he has roughly a year left to live before the cancer will overtake him.  His is wisely using this as an opportunity to think about what kinds of treatments he wants or wants to refuse as the cancer runs its course.  He has seen several of his friends die on life support in hospitals and wants to make sure that he doesn’t die that way.  He is asking you to be his medical decision maker should he lose the ability to make those decisions for himself.  Specifically, he does not want to be on ventilator support, especially if it looks like he cannot be weaned from it.  You realize that means that he may die sooner than if he were on such support, and you wonder if you can do that, given your strong view of the sanctity of life.  It feels as if you would be killing you dad if you authorized the withholding or withdrawal of ventilator support.  He has maintained that if his life gets too painful or has suffering that can’t be alleviated, he wants to have the option of physician-assisted suicide, since it’s legal in the state in which he resides.

 

Questions for Discussion

 

1.     Do you think it is acceptable to remove or withhold a ventilator from your father in his condition, even if it means he will die sooner?  If not, why not?  If so, under what conditions is it acceptable?

 

2.     Do you believe that removing a ventilator would be killing your father?  Would it make you complicit in his death?  Why or why not?

 

3.     Your father also does not want to be on feeding tubes for his nutrition and hydration should he lose the ability to swallow.  Would you consider feeding tubes the same as ventilator, or are feeding tubes more basic care?  Is removing the feeding tubes the same as starving someone to death?  Why or why not?

 

4.     Assuming you live in a state where physician-assisted suicide is legal, would you help facilitate physician-assisted suicide for him?  Why or why not?

 

 

            This case raises all sorts of ethical issues for end-of-life decisions.  Movement forward can be found in carefully delineating crucial distinctions that will help clarify the ethical boundaries within which one should move.  The following distinctions will be highlighted: (1) Withholding versus withdrawing treatment, (2) Killing versus letting die, and (3) Removing a ventilator versus removing feeding tubes.  Furthermore, a consideration of physician assisted suicide will be briefly examined.

Distinction One: Withholding/Withdrawing Treatment

            The first distinction to note in this situation concerns that of withholding treatment and withdrawing treatment.  Many ethicists recognize that there “is no significant moral difference between the two.”[1]  If there is a legitimate place for informed consent in refusing a treatment then there is also a morally appropriate place for withdrawing that treatment.  Although there is no morally relevant difference between the two there may be an emotional difference that is felt.  As Scott Rae notes, “The reason for this emotional difference is that the family sees their loved one being maintained on life support, and the decision to withdraw it often feels more like they are causing the death of their loved one.”[2]  The issue of whether one is causing the death of a loved one by withdrawing treatment will be taken up below under the distinction between “killing and letting die.”

            If the above is correct, then it is important to examine what morally legitimate reasons there might be to forgo medical treatment.[3]  The usual course of action is to pursue medical practices and procedures which elongate life with the goal of moving one toward healing and restoration.  There are situations, however, in which these goals cannot be met, and the prolonged use of certain medical practices and devices actually diminish the earthly goods intrinsic to life. Some of these intrinsic goods might include “physical comfort, the fellowship of family and friends, and the ability to work and play.”[4]  In light of these considerations the following guidelines can be offered as to when forgoing treatment is morally allowable:

1.     When a competent patient requests it.

2.     When the treatments are futile.

3.     When the burdens of the treatment outweigh the benefits.

Regarding number two—the issue of “futility”—Rae helpfully articulates a specified notion of “futility” in this context: “But more broadly, treatments are futile if they will not reverse an imminent and irreversible downward spiral toward death for the patient.  To put it another way, treatments are futile if they will not restore the patient to an acceptable quality of life.”[5]  This appears correct, with one caveat regarding the phrase, “quality of life.”

            VanDrunen correctly notes that the phrase “quality of life” is “a slippery phrase that different people use in different ways.”[6]  His thought here is worth quoting in full:

Some people use the idea of “quality of life” to ask whether certain sorts of lives are no longer valuable or not worth living.  For example, suppose that a course of treatment would prevent me from dying but result in a poor quality of life, because it would lead to physical discomfort and prevent me from performing many activities that I enjoy.  Should I forgo treatment because I would be better off dead than experiencing such a life?  I suggest that this is a morally problematic use of the “quality of life” idea.  All human life is valuable and… it is never our prerogative to seek death because of despair and discouragement.  There is a better use of the “quality of life” idea, however.  It is proper to ask whether life without treatment or life with treatment would be better.  The question is not about choosing life or death, but about choosing which sort of life (though we know that one choice might bring death sooner).[7]

 

With this caveat in view, the criteria can be appropriately applied to the case under consideration.

            Before applying all the above to the case under consideration, one more factor ought to be considered—the age of the father.  He is an elderly man.  This is a relevant factor considering the nature of death.  In Scripture death is seen as both an enemy (1 Corinthians 15.26), in that it is not an original intention of our Creator for humankind but, rather an alien intrusion into his good creation, as well as a natural part of the cursed created order under sin (Romans 3.23; 6.23).  Death’s normalcy and even the usual set time frame for a life is a settled reality for those who live in a cursed word.  Even someone who accords no value to the scriptural testimony can feel and see this two-edged perspective on death.  There is a general fear of death and an empirical reality to the extent of one’s lifespan.  With this understanding, “We instinctively judge that a child’s death at age nine is a tragedy in a way that an elderly person’s death at age ninety-nine is not.”[8]  All of this should be factored into the decision to forgo treatment.  As VanDrunen notes, “A person at an advanced stage of life cannot expect a significantly longer life even with treatment.  Nor can she expect, even under the best circumstances, to be able to pursue the range of human goods that a younger person could.”[9]

            This case is specifically about an elderly man who has been diagnosed with terminal lung cancer and has about a year to live.  He is fully cognizant of his medical situation and has also seen friends die on life support in hospitals and does not want to die in that manner.  In particular, he desires to avoid being put on a ventilator, especially if it appears that he will be unable to be weaned off it.  The decision by the man himself or his proxy appears to a morally acceptable one.  Of course, there could be underlying motives and intentions, unstated and undetected, that would sully the morality of the decision but the proxy who has strong beliefs about the sanctity of life ought not to feel guilty (since there is no moral guilt in the action) for removing his elderly father from the ventilator.  This leads to the second crucial distinction to be considered—the distinction between “killing” and “letting die.”

Distinction Two: Killing/Letting Die     

            Even if one is morally justified in removing one’s elderly father off the ventilator as per his stated intentions, is this act equivalent to killing him?  James Rachels and others argue that the distinction between killing a person and letting them die is not morally relevant.  The thought experiments brought up to justify this line of thinking drop out key elements of ethical analysis.  The most prominent element overlooked by Rachels, and others, is the intention of the moral agent involved.  Looking at only the overt action and failing to consider the moral relevance of intentions and motives renders this approach to moral analysis shortsighted.  This becomes crucial to examining the key difference between terminating life support (TLS) and physician assisted suicide (PAS).  In TLS the aim is not necessarily to bring about death whereas in PAS this is the explicit aim of the patient and doctor.  Rae helpfully distinguishes between intendingdeath, foreseeing death, and accepting death.[10]  The patient or proxy acting with the consent of the patient is not seeking death as the primary target—he is not intending death.  However, in the act of TLS, he does foresee death coming and accepts this consequent result.

            In accordance with this analysis, VanDrunen helpfully notes that the choice for TLS is not aimed at death, but at a different kind of life.  In the situation of a terminal case like the one being examined, the decision to forgo certain medical interventions may not be a decision to die.  VanDrunen argues as follows, using the example of cancer and the patient’s forgoing of chemotherapy: 

The fact of death has already been decided, apart from the cancer victim’s will.   Instead, the choice to forgo more chemotherapy may be a decision to live a somewhat shorter life than the chemotherapy might make possible, but a shorter life that is free from the debilitating burden of chemotherapy and that enables the person to enjoy her remaining life more—to finish projects, to spend time with loved ones, and to get her house in order.  It is not necessarily a choice between life and death, therefore, but a choice between one kind of life and another kind of life.[11]

 

Thus, the distinction between active killing and letting someone succumb to imminent death is a valid one.[12]

Distinction Three: Removing the Ventilator and Removing Feeding Tubes   

            This case study also asks for consideration of the removal of feeding tubes or, more accurately, artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH).  Some ethicists find that there is a morally relevant distinction between removing ANH and removing a ventilator.  Whereas the removal of the ventilator under certain conditions is morally allowable, the removal of ANH is never justified morally.  The most common situation consider in this regard is the person in a persistent vegetative state (PVS).  For the person in a PVS, the removal of ANH is still immoral.  

            This view is not above criticism.  It is important to recognize the situational details regarding ANH.  Scott Rae is careful to articulate the use of ANH as “medically provided nutrition and hydration” with a key stress on the concept of “medical.”  He helpfully writes:

The phrase “medically provided nutrition and hydration” is used intentionally to underscore the technological nature of the treatment.  There is a strong parallel to the ventilator insofar as medical technology is performing an essential function that the body, through injury or disease, can no longer perform itself.  Certainly, air to breathe is as basic a human need as food and water.  Yet very few question the morality of removing a ventilator under certain conditions since it is considered legitimate medical treatment.[13]

 

Although there is continuing debate among ethicists on the matter, Rae’s reasoning is sound.  There is not a significant distinction morally between the removal of a ventilator and the removal of medically provided nutrition and hydration.

Physician Assisted Suicide     

            In reference to the case study thus far, it has been argued that (1) there are legitimate reasons to terminate life support, (2) the termination of life support is not equivalent to killing, and (3) in certain situations there is not a morally relevant distinction between the removal of a ventilator and the removal of medically provided nutrition and hydration.  Therefore, the elderly father and his son acting as proxy may plan for and implement the withholding or withdrawal of a ventilator.  The case study also raises the possibility of the use of physician assisted suicide (PAS) in a state where such is legal.  Might it be the case the move from TLS to PAS is also morally legitimate?

            It is here that a moral boundary is crossed in that use of PSA is morally problematic.  It is helpful to remember that PSA is a subset of the general category of suicide.  From a Christian perspective, suicide is an immoral act of taking one’s own life.[14]  PAS is aimed at producing the death of the patient.  As such, the elderly father in the case study should be encouraged to refrain from pursuing the assistance in suicide from another and the son should not countenance PAS a valid moral choice.  The father should be counseled on the legitimacy of TLS and options available.  Furthermore, pain-reduction strategies should be surveyed with the father and son as they are clear on morally appropriate options available that fall short of PAS.  Besides standard pain management controls (i.e., morphine) there may be other options which are available which do not intentionally aim at death.  For example, the “sleep before death” option, in which the patient is sedated before they die, or the use of the doctrine of double effect, in which the amount of pain medication may be increased as needed to control pain but nonetheless knowingly brings about the death of the patient, may be utilized.  

            This brief essay has examined three crucial distinctions necessary to analyze this case study in an ethical manner.  The first distinction of withholding versus withdrawing treatment was found to be a distinction without morally relevant significance.  Reasoning which would allow for withholding a treatment ought to be considered for withdrawing treatment.  A brief review of the circumstances in which one would be morally allowed to withhold or withdraw treat was considered.  The second distinction of killing versus letting die was found to be a crucial distinction to uphold as morally relevant.  The two acts cannot be collapsed into one another.  The chief reason for this is that doing so fails to account for the key ethical element of intentionality.  The third distinction concerned whether the removal of medically provided nutrition and hydration was in a different moral category than the removal of ventilator for a patient.  Although there is dispute on this issue, it was argued that there is not morally relevant distinction that needs to be taken into consideration. A brief examination of physician assisted suicide was also offered with the conclusion that PAS was morally unacceptable, whereas there were other morally acceptable options available for consideration.  

---

     [1] Scott B. Rae, Moral Choices: An Introduction to Ethics—4^th ed. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2018), 239.  David VanDrunen writes: “In my judgment, the proposed distinction between withholding and withdrawing treatment is not morally significant, and it is not possible to identify different sets of criteria for evaluating each one.  As some writers have noted, insisting upon the moral significance of this distinction may have the unintended negative effect of discouraging people from beginning useful treatments because they fear they will be bound to a course of treatment that they will not be able to refuse at a later date.”  David VanDrunen, Bioethics and the Christian: A Guide to Making Difficult Decisions (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2009), 216. 

     [2] Rae, Moral Choices: An Introduction to Ethics, 239.

     [3] The use of the word “forgo” is intentionally following VanDrunen who uses this word “as a general term that includes both ‘withholding’ and ‘withdrawing.’”  VanDrunen, Bioethics and the Christian, 216.

     [4] VanDrunen, Bioethics and the Christian, 220-221.

     [5] Rae, Moral Choices: An Introduction to Ethics, 241.

     [6] VanDrunen, Bioethics and the Christian, 221.

     [7] VanDrunen, Bioethics and the Christian, 221.

     [8] VanDrunen, Bioethics and the Christian, 226.

     [9] VanDrunen, Bioethics and the Christian, 226.

     [10] Rae, Moral Choices: An Introduction to Ethics, 251.

     [11] VanDrunen, Bioethics and the Christian, 210-211.

     [12] VanDrunen offers an insightful note at this point: “I would concede that there are certain circumstances in which a decision to kill actively and a decision to let someone die when it is in our power to prevent it are equally morally reprehensible.  The example of the child in the bathtub may well be an example of this. In the medical context, we might imagine a doctor who dislikes a patient and wants her dead, despite the fact that she desires to be healed and has a curable illness.  We would probably condemn this doctor just as strongly if he intentionally withheld a treatment necessary to prevent her death as if he secretly gave her a lethal injection.  But even in such carefully constructed scenarios in which the moral guilt attaching to two different courses of action seem to be equal, the two different courses of actions themselves are not the same.  If one of my neighbors shouts an insult at me from across the street and another neighbor steals a flowerpot from my front yard, I might judge that they have wronged me in equally serious ways.  But I would not therefore conclude that there is no meaningful moral distinction to be made between insulting and stealing.  They are different moral actions and require a different moral analysis for understanding and evaluating them properly.”  VanDrunen, Bioethics and the Christian, 208-209.

     [13] Rae, Moral Choices: An Introduction to Ethics, 243-244.

     [14] If someone does not accept the Christian perspective then the form of ethical reasoning may need to start farther back and seek to demonstrate the moral unacceptability of suicide from a kind of natural law argument or, perhaps, from consequentialist considerations.  Nevertheless, the presentation of a Christian argument against suicide demonstrates the internal coherence of the Christian ethical viewpoint and allows for the manifestation of truth about God, humanity, and the human predicament.  For a fuller presentation on the Christian perspective on suicide see my lesson, “Life, Death, and Growing Old (Part Four): Suicide” White Rose Review (July 20, 2016)—online: http://whiterosereview.blogspot.com/2016/07/life-death-growing-old-part-four-suicide.html. 

MicroSort Technology Discussion Board

 * In our Ethical Issues class at Biola University's Talbot School of Theology we have various discussion board topics.  This one was for our unit on the ethics of reproductive technology.  I give the prompt and then my answer along with a few responses to other students' comments.

Discussion Board Prompt:

 

You are counseling a couple who has three children, all boys.  They very much want to have a girl and want to use Microsort sperm separating technology in order to improve their chances at having a girl.  They live in the US and realize that if they lived in a different culture, there may be cultural reasons for preferring one sex over another.  They have no sex preference in general, only that they want to balance their family by having a girl to go into the mix with their boys.  How would you counsel this couple about using technology to select for sex?  Where does Scripture speak to this couple about their decision?

 

My Answer:

 

I would use John Frame's "tri-perspectivalism" approach to ethics to help the couple think through the various aspects.  Frame speaks about three perspectives:

·       Normative perspective which considers deontological categories

·       Situational perspective which analyzes the nature of the situation and possible consequences flowing from various choices

·       Existential (personal) perspective which emphasizes the character (virtues) of the moral agent

So any ethical judgment (including this one about technological sex selection) involves the application of a norm to a situation by a person. (Frame, Doctrine of the Christian Life, 33).  All of this can be explained fairly simply and quickly (I've done it at church and over meals) by speaking of applying God's rules to the particular situation as we also take into account motives and intentions.

Note: Pedagogically and pastorally as I'm working through this issue I will be asking questions of them to ascertain their understanding of God's Word, ethical reasoning, and motives.  For example, in light of the normative perspective, as I explain what this is, I might ask, "Can you think of any commandments, rules, or principles from God's Word that might be relevant to this decision?"  This allows me to gauge their depth of maturity on ethical matters and their understanding of God's Word.  And, of course, patience and empathy are needed throughout the process

Normative Perspective

·       The desire for children is a good desire (Genesis 1.28--"Be fruitful and multiply") and children are considered a "gift from the Lord" (Psalm 127.3).  

·       There is also the fact of that humanity being the image of God is given the task of taking dominion for the glory of God (Genesis 1.28) and this would include laying bare the technological potentialities in the created order.

·       There doesn't seem to be anything, in principle, that forbids a couple from exercising directional control of the outcome of the sex of the child.  The idea that the doctrine of God's sovereignty precludes the use of this technology would need to be spelled out more fully to gain traction.  For those Protestants who allow for some forms of birth control the argument that "it's against God's sovereignty" would need to be nuanced so as not to preclude legitimate forms of birth control.

Situational Perspective

·       This perspective understanding the dynamics of understanding exactly what is happening when the Microsort procedure is done.  The Microsort website describes the process of how the individual sperm are "tagged."  There is no destruction of embryos (human persons) so this is not a problem.

·       Further study of their website would give the probabilistic success rate which is a factor to consider since one is paying for this procedure.  Microsort gives the following effectiveness rates: for girls 93% and for boys 82%.  These are both fairly high rates and in the case being considered (selection for a girl) it is the higher rate.  This interest in effectiveness rates is part of the general wisdom approach the Scripture would urge upon us as we live life.  One is not engaged in folly if one pursues a path such as this which has a 93% success rate.  For comparison, it is the height of folly and a waste of resources to play the state lottery hoping to bring financial stability through such an "investment."

·       One does need to consider unintended consequences to the use of this procedure.  Although the percentage is high for success, this is not a guarantee.  The couple could still get a boy, instead of a girl.  What will this mean for their long-term contentment?  Will they still rejoice in God's goodness and providence?  This begins to move into the Existential perspective with its emphasis on character and virtue formation.

Existential Perspective

·       Since this perspective deals with character and motives it will be important to help the couple engage in a healthy self-examination of their motives.  Why do they want to use this procedure in an effort to get a girl baby?  Their stated reason it to "balance their family."  I will examine this below.  But other motives that would be morally problematic would include:

o   Covetousness or envy of others for what they have.

o   Self-glory--"Look, I've a got a big, mixed family!" (Proverbs 25.27).

o   Discontent with one's current situation.

·       What of the issue of "balance?"  Dr. Rae asks the question, "Why do you think your current family is unbalanced" and then wonders if this quest for balance is not a subtle "shot at the sovereignty of God."  It certainly could be motivated by discontent with God's sovereignty, but it doesn't necessarily need to be.  My guess is (and I would want to probe this with the couple) the quest for "balance" is not a result of thinking their current family is unbalanced.  Rather, as they have a desire to have more children (a good desire, all things considered) the desire is to experience the God-ordained variety in the fruit of multiplication.  It can be a good desire to both to experience and express my parenting in relation to a girl.  As a parent of three children (two boys--25 and 23 and a girl--18) I can testify that I am changed by being a parent in general and I am changed in specific ways in relation to my boys that are distinct from the ways I am changed and developed in relation parenting my girl.  This is a reflection of the goodness of the sexual binary he has created to image himself.  Thus, the quest for balance could be (or could be developed) a reflection to experience and express the full range of parenting.

By looking at all three perspectives and helping the couple to see where their heart is at through prayerful self-examination, I think that a couple could use the technology of Microsort to select for the sex of their child.

 

Addendum to post after reading others’ contributions

 

I wanted to add an addendum to my original post in light of thinking of the issue with the other students' arguments in mind.  Here is thought experiment.

Suppose we discover the hitherto unknown fact that a child conceived by normal sexual intercourse on Mondays has a 82% chance of being male and one conceived on Fridays has a 93% chance of being female.  The other five days have a 50/50 chance of being male or female.  We do not yet understand the causal mechanisms as to why this is the case but the statistical analysis is secure.  Would it be morally permissible to choose to engage in sexual intercourse on Fridays only for a period of time in the hopes of conceiving a girl?  Now, of course, there could be all sorts of bad and base motives for such a move (i.e.,the belief that boys are bad or inferior to girls, etc.) but could there not be any good motives (i.e., such as the one I laid out in my original post under the discussion of "balance")?

Someone might object: "Your thought experiment presupposes that we are discovering the way the world is but 'the way the world is' is created by God.  Just because we don't yet understand the causal mechanism does not mean that God did not set up the world in the way you describe."

My response: Yes, God set up the world that way but it's also the case that he set up the world in such a way as to find the means to make the decision by use of a technology.  What is the morally relevant difference?

I'm not completely sure my thought experiment works.  It might be susceptible to a reductio--does the use of such a thought experiment justify too much?  Would it serve to justify anything that we can do technologically?  

 

Follow-up discussion with others:

[Student A],

Well, it looks like we came to diametrically opposite conclusions on this issue!  I hope our interaction can sharpen each other.

As I read your piece, you have two claims: (1) the use of sperm sorting as done by Microsort is immoral in that the couple is elevating their vision for what they want over God's will and (2) this technology involves the destruction of embryos. 

Let me take (2) first.  I think that this is a factual issue and you may have made a mistake here.  If you are correct in your understanding of the facts of the technology, then I would unhesitatingly agree with you on this basis.  But, as I understand the technology used by Microsort there are no embryos destroyed.  On page 211 of our textbook Dr. Rae writes that the Microsort technology "does not involve abortion or discarding embryos."  If it the case that no embryos are destroyed this leaves just your first reason.

Regarding (1), I want to ask for clarification on your view of "sovereignty."  You mention using the concept in a "magisterial sense, not a determinist one."  I'm unfamiliar with this distinction.  I am familiar with the distinction between God's decretive will and his preceptive will.  His will of decree cannot be overruled whereas his preceptive will is his will of command, such as "It is God's will for people to not commit murder."  His will of precept is violated all the time.  That's the rough-and-ready distinction.  Theologian John Frame adds a qualifier to "preceptive will":

"The term preceptive is somewhat misleading, for it does not always have to do with literal precepts (God's law,, commandments).  Sometimes God's preceptive will refers to states of affairs that God sees as desirable,  but which he chooses not to bring about (e.g., Ezek. 18:23; 2 Peter 3:9)."  John Frame, No Other God: A Response to Open Theism, p. 109

With this distinction, the Microsort technology cannot overrule God's decretive will.  I think Dr. Rae is alluding to this when he writes, "But to be clear theologically, no human action is capable of undercutting God's sovereignty." (Moral Choices, 211).  So this leaves God's will of precept.  Are you claiming that the couple is violating some specific moral stipulation of God's law/code?  If so, it would seem incumbent on you to specify exactly what this commandment is which is being violated.  Is the claim that there is some state of affairs that God's desires but is overruled by the couple?  Again, it seems like you need to specify what this and where in the biblical text or biblical reasoning such a state of affairs is set forth.

You do add one more detail to your argument when you imagine that the "couples’ vision is merely the idealized picture of their future family they formulated together early in their relationship."  This seems to be an overly negative assessment of people's motivations.  I don't doubt that such could be the case but I argue in my post above that there can be other motivations which are more healthy.

 

[Student B],

Thank you for your contribution.  There are a number of things I agree with in your post.  Two of the items are:

•   I agree with your thoughts in your second paragraph--particularly the dangers of sex selection in China and India.

•   I agree that children should not be mere means but proper ends of value in themselves.

 

Let me offer a few comments where I find myself less enthusiastic about your arguments:

•   You write, "Trying to determine their children's gender is the distorted greed of parents who think of their children as their own."  You seem to be saying that this is the only motive possible for parents considering the use of Microsort for the selection of the sex of a child.  I offer another kind of motive that is possible in my original post.  What do you think of it?

•   You write: "If children are God's gift, then their gender must also be God's will, so humans should not change it arbitrarily."  Yes, children are God's gift and their gender is also God's will (his decretive will).  But in engaging in sex selection through the use of specified sperm does not change a child's gender since that gender has not been actualized yet.  Nor does the decision to attempt to set the direction of a child's sex need to be done arbitrarily.  There can, potentially, be good reasons offered which are not arbitrary.

•   You write: "However, it is not appropriate to use this technology for simple family balance because it is against the providence of God. Before we adjust gender to suit our taste, we must think about why God gave a child of this gender to our family."  Before one can claim it is "against the providence of God" one should specify which conception of the providence of God one is working with--Reformed, Arminian, Molinist, Open Theism, etc.  I'm not sure any of the views argue that the procedure violates the providence of God.  It may be a violation of the law or command of God.  Or it might be construed along the following lines, "Human beings lack the authority to make certain decisions about the beginning or ending of life.  Such decisions are reserved to divine sovereignty."  (NBAC Report "Cloning Human Beings," p. 44). In other words, your objection might better be stated as an illegitimate overreach into an area where only God has the prerogative to act.  Also, your statement speaks of adjust the gender of the child and asking "why God gave a child of this gender to our family."  This presupposes that the child is already in existence but this is not the case in the situation under consideration.  The use of Microsort is not changing the gender of the child but attempting to set the direction of which sex is most likely conceived.