JOHN MARTIN FISCHER’S SEMICOMPATIBILISM AND REFORMED THEOLOGY
The issues surrounding causal determinism, moral responsibility, and the “ability to do otherwise” have sparked perennial debate among philosophers. There is an added urgency to these debates for those who affirm some version of theological determinism such as is often the case in the Reformed tradition. This paper will examine the work of John Martin Fischer and his version of “semicompatibilism” to discern the possibility of its use by Reformed theology to bolster its theological position. In particular, Fischer’s use of Frankfurt-style counterexamples will be considered as they are put forth to deny that moral responsibility needs the principle of alternative possibilities in order to be coherent. After examining Fischer’s position, a brief analysis of Reformed theology will be engaged with to ascertain where Fischer’s program can be used by the Reformed tradition and where it may be problematic.
JOHN MARTIN FISCHER’S “SEMICOMPATIBILISM”
It is important to sketch out John Martin Fischer’s view and to observe where it is situated in the broader dialectic regarding free will, moral responsibility and the interrelationship between those two concepts. Fischer’s view fits under the broad category of “compatibilism.” Fisher helpfully defines this broad category in the following manner:
[T]he doctrine that both some central notion of freedom and also genuine, robust moral responsibility are compatible with the doctrine of causal determinism (which, among other things, entails that every bit of human behavior is causally necessitated by events in the past together with the natural laws.[1]
Fischer further distinguishes his view of “semicompatibilism” from “classical compatibilism.” Whereas both semicompatibilism and classical compatibilism argue that causal determinism is compatible with moral responsibility, they differ on their analyses of whether moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise. Classical compatibilism affirms that causal determinism is compatible with the freedom to pursue alternate possibilities. Fischer’s semicompatibilism does not need this tight correlation between moral responsibility and alternative possibilities. He notes, “A crucial element of the doctrine of semicompatibilism is that the compatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility does not hinge on the compatibility of causal determinism and freedom to do otherwise.”[2] Thus, even if causal determinism rules out the freedom to do otherwise, this does not entail that causal determinism rules out moral responsibility.
To show that moral responsibility is consistent with causal determinism, Fischer examines the concept of moral responsibility more fully in an attempt to tease out some crucial distinctions. He notes that moral responsibility “involves a freedom or control component and an epistemic component.”[3] In his discussion of the control component, Fischer makes a crucial distinction between “regulative control” and “guidance control.” He puts forward the illustration of a person driving a car to her favorite coffee shop. She intends to turn right into the coffee shop, and she guides the car into the appropriate spot. This is an example of “guidance control.” If we further specify that just prior to the decision to turn right, our driver also possessed freedom to do otherwise (i.e., turn left), then is an instance of “regulative control.”[4] Fischer notes, “In the normal case, we assume that agents have both guidance and regulative control—a signature sort of control of the car’s movements, as well as a characteristic kind of control over the car’s movements.”[5] Although this is normally the case, Fischer argues that concepts of regulative control and guidance control can be pulled apart and analyzed separately.
In analyzing regulative control, it is necessary to note that this conception of control requires access to alternative possibilities—oftentimes designated the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). Carl Ginet more formally designates PAP in the following manner:
PAP: An agent S is morally responsible for its being the case that p only if S could
have made it not the case that p.[6]
This notion of PAP is practically taken for granted by many incompatibilist thinkers as a necessary component of moral responsibility.[7] In other words, no PAP, then no moral responsibility. Since causal determinism seemingly rules out alternative possibilities, then any compatibilistic view which does not do justice to PAP is suspect. Fischer’s program of semicompatibilism attempts to undercut the need for regulative control by demonstrating that moral responsibility does not require PAP. To accomplish this part of his philosophical program, Fischer appeals to and develops in greater detail the work of Harry Frankfurt.
Harry Frankfurt penned a ground-breaking essay in 1969, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.”[8] He noted that the PAP was an almost unquestioned principle and some “even characterized it as an a priori truth.”[9] Through a series of thought experiments, Frankfurt sought to demonstrate that “the principle of alternate possibilities is false. A person may be morally responsible for what he has done even though he could not have done otherwise. The principle’s plausibility is an illusion, which can be made to vanish by bringing the relevant moral phenomena into sharper focus.”[10] Frankfurt’s thought experiments have come to be known as “Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples” (FSCs).
Fischer endorses FSCs and has sought to update and defend them as part of his philosophical project regarding semicompatibilism. He offers the following as his “favorite version of a Frankfurt case”:
Because Black dares to hope that the Democrats finally have a good chance of winning the White House, the benevolent but elderly neurosurgeon, Black, has come out of retirement to participate in yet another philosophical example. … He has secretly inserted a chip in Jones’s brain which enables Black to monitor and control Jones’s activities. Black can exercise this control through a sophisticated computer that he has programmed so that, among other things, it monitors Jones’s voting behavior. If Jones were to show any inclination to vote for McCain (or, let us say, anyone other than Obama), then the computer, through the chip in Jones’s brain, would intervene to assure that he actually decides to vote for Obama and does so vote. But if Jones decides on his own to vote for Obama (as Black the old progressive would prefer), the computer does nothing but continue to monitor—without affecting—the goings-on in Jones’s head.
Now suppose that Jones decides to vote for Obama on his own, just as he would have if Black had not inserted the chip in his head. It seems, upon first thinking about this case, that Jones can be held morally responsible for this choice and act of voting for Obama, although he could not have chosen otherwise and he could not have done otherwise.[11]
Fischer notes that such a FSC serves to threaten PAP as necessary for moral responsibility. The import of this for the debate about causal determinism and moral responsibility is great. The denial of PAP allows a compatibilist about causal determinism and moral responsibility to “side-step the contentious and evidently intractable debates about the relationship between causal determinism and ‘freedom to do otherwise’ (or real access to alternate possibilities).”[12] Fischer argues that Frankfurt’s conception of the issue has generated real philosophical progress. For if FSCs are sufficient to overthrow the necessity of PAP for moral responsibility then this allows the debate to be redirected to a more central issue—does causal determinism directly rule out moral responsibility.[13] Fischer can, thus conclude, that “the ground has shifted from the traditional debates about causal determinism and alternative possibilities, and arguably it has shifted to more compatibilist-friendly terrain.”[14]
Fischer summarizes the “basic insight” of FSCs in this manner: “if causal determinism rules out moral responsibility, it is not in virtue of eliminating alternative possibilities.”[15] Although he believes philosophical ground has been gained for compatibilism, Fischer is quick to note two important qualifications:
I do not suppose that the Frankfurt cases provide a decisive or knockdown argument for the basic insight; rather, they provide part of a strong plausibility argument for it. Nor, as above, do I suppose that the cases—or the associated argument—in themselves establish the compatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility; rather, they arguably help us to reconfigure the argumentation in a way that will be advantageous to the compatibilist.[16]
The first qualification is an expression of epistemic humility. Fischer recognizes that in philosophy there are rarely full-proof arguments or refutations. He is keen to not oversell the force of FSCs and their power. The second qualification also reflects a similar concern against over-extension. Fischer recognizes that simply doing away with PAP as a necessary component of moral responsibility does not, in and of itself, demonstrate the compatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility. More philosophical work needs to be done to show this harmonization. One further addition to Fischer’s view about FSCs is that he acknowledges that even if one does not accept FSCs as overthrowing PAP there are other arguments that could be used to philosophically reject PAP. In Fischer’s words:
I believe that the fact that there are various different routes to the same conclusion helps to establish the plausibility of the conclusion; if one finds the Frankfurt-cases unconvincing, there are still good reasons to accept that moral responsibility does not require regulative control.[17]
Of course, Fischer’s arguments regarding FSCs and their neutralization of PAP as necessary for moral responsibility have not gone unchallenged. The most important challenge is called “The Dilemma Defense.” The dilemma can be succinctly stated:
[T]he Frankfurt-type stories presuppose either that causal determinism is true, or that it is false. If the former, then the claim that the relevant agent is morally responsible is question-begging, and if the latter, then the claim that the agent lacks alternative-possibilities is false.[18]
Taking these alternatives in reverse order, consider the assumption of indeterminism as a presupposition to the FSCs. Taking the previous FSC endorsed by Fischer (McCain versus Obama), the indeterminist parses out the choice to vote for Obama into three distinct moments: t3 is the actual vote for Obama, t2 is the choice to vote for Obama, and t1 is some prior sign which is involuntarily associated Jones’s choice for a Democrat candidate.
Given this framework, Fischer outlines the problem in the following manner:
But now the contention that Jones cannot choose at t2 to vote for [McCain] at t3 is called into question. This is because there is no deterministic relationship between the prior sign exhibited by Jones at t1 and Jones’s subsequent choice at t2. So, if we consider the time just prior to t2, everything about the past can be just as it is consistently with Jones’s choosing at t2 to vote for [McCain]. Someone might think that if it takes some time for Jones to make the choice, Black can intervene to prevent the completion of the choice; but then Jones will still have the possibility of “beginning to make the choice.”[19]
On the indeterministic horn of the Dilemma Defense, FSCs do not adequately rule out all alternative possibilities. Thus, FSCs do not demonstrate that moral responsibility is consistent with the lack of PAP since there are still alternative possibilities latent within the FSCs.
The deterministic horn of the Dilemma Defense states that if Jones votes for Obama, then it is by no means evident that Jones is morally responsible for his decision. “After all, it is precisely the issue under debate whether causal determinism would rule out such moral responsibility; it would be question-begging to assume that causal determinism is true in the example (quite independently of the presence of Black’s device) and also to hold that it is uncontroversial that Jones is morally responsible for his choice and action.”[20]
Fischer spends the bulk of his time in his writing defending against the deterministic horn of the Dilemma Defense, but he does offer a few thoughts on the indeterministic side of the dilemma. He offers a two-fold response. First, Fischer counters the claim by indeterminists that FSCs do not rule out PAP. Fischer notes that some philosophers have developed FSCs “in which is both the case that indeterminism obtains and there are no alternative possibilities.”[21] Although these examples are not without their detractors, Fischer finds them “intriguing and highly suggestive.”[22] Second, even if the typical FSCs do not rule out all notions of alternative possibilities, Fischer argues that the “residual alternative possibilities” are not sufficiently robust enough to ground moral responsibility. As Fischer writes:
Recall that it is not enough for the proponent of the regulative control requirement to identify just any sort of alternative possibility; rather, he needs to find an alternative possibility that is sufficiently robust to ground attributions of moral responsibility, given the regulative control picture.[23]
Thus, the indeterministic horn of the Dilemma Defense is, if not neutralized, at least muted in its philosophical power.
Fischer next turns to the deterministic horn of the Dilemma Defense. Here he engages in a two-part argument. First, Fischer notes that FSCs do, intuitively, render it plausible that alternative possibilities are irrelevant to the understanding of moral responsibility. If one is inclined to accept this intuition, then the question of whether Jones has moral responsibility or not is not a function of alternative possibilities. No assumption about whether Jones has moral responsibility is being yet. The only assertion at this stage is to state that, if Jones lacks moral responsibility is not due to the lack of alternative possibilities. Frankfurt states the issue in this manner:
That is, the proponent of Frankfurt-style compatibilism does not assert, simply on the basis of Frankfurt-type examples, that the relevant agent is morally responsible for his behavior. Such a compatibilist should not take any stand about the responsibility of the agent simply on the basis of reflection on the Frankfurt-type examples. He should just say, “I don’t know at this point whether the agent is morally responsible for his behavior, but if he is not, it is not because he lacks alternative possibilities.[24]
So, it is not the case that FSCs, by themselves, show the compatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility. FSCs are simply a step in the argument.
This leads to the second step of the argument—examining the issue whether causal determinism directly rules out moral responsibility in the actual sequence of Jones choosing on his own (without interference from Black) to vote for Obama. Or, as Fischer succinctly puts it, “does causal determinism rule out moral responsibility apart from ruling out alternative possibilities?”[25] At this point Fischer examines several proffered reasons for why causal determinism rules out moral responsibility. “For example, an incompatibilist might insist that the presence of causal determination in the actual sequence is inconsistent with notions of ‘initiation,’ ‘origination,’ ‘being active rather than passive,’ or ‘creativity,’ where some (or all) of these notions are requirements of moral responsibility.”[26] Space constraints forbid an exhaustive analysis of Fischer’s arguments regarding these notions. Fischer, however, does note that for each of the listed ideas thought to be inconsistent with causal determinism, there are both compatibilist and incompatibilist interpretations of the notions and “that there is no strong reason to opt for the incompatibilist interpretation, apart from considerations pertaining to alternative possibilities.”[27] And, of course, it is precisely the issue of alternative possibilities that has been dealt with by FSCs.
Fischer argues that with the shift in the debate away from the relationship between causal determinism and PAP, “it is difficult to present a non-question-begging reason why causal determinism rules out moral responsibility.”[28] Fischer does take up the arguments of Robert Kane who attempts to offer arguments for the why causal determinism rules out moral responsibility. One argument offered by Kane revolves the idea that “if we allow for moral responsibility when there is actual-sequence causal determination, then we will need to say that agents who are covertly manipulated in objectionable ways are also morally responsible.”[29] Again, without going into the details of the case back-and-forth between Kane and Fischer, the simple answer offered by Fischer is that there are crucial differences between genuine cases of manipulation (which rule out moral responsibility) and the fact of causal determination. Fischer argues:
A compatibilist will certainly insist that not all causal chains are relevantly similar. The kind of manipulation that takes place at Walden Two does indeed rule out moral responsibility; for a compatibilist, this can be in virtue of the specific nature of the causal sequences that issue in behavior, rather than the mere fact of causal determination.[30]
This leads Fischer to discuss the history of the behavior in question. An action that is considered consistent with moral responsibility will be down by an agent which has specific ownership of the action and in which the agent is sensitive to reasons. This mention of “reason-responsiveness” leads into another aspect of Fischer’s theory of semicompatibilism which will not be dealt with in this paper. The focus of this paper has been on the issue of alternative possibilities and its relationship to causal determinism and moral responsibility.
APPLICATION TO REFORMED THEOLOGY
The following section seeks to engage the forgoing analysis of Fischer’s understanding of the compatibility and moral responsibility (without the need for PAP) with the Reformed theological tradition and its understanding of divine causal determinism and human responsibility. As Anderson and Manata note:
It is commonly held that Calvinism is committed to theological determinism. Calvinism also affirms that humans make choices for which they are morally accountable, and those choices are free in some morally significant sense. Thus, compatibilist freedom is typically assumed to be the only kind of freedom consistent with Calvinism.[31]
This raises methodological issues. How should those in the Christian-theistic tradition—especially those in the Reformed tradition—seek to relate the issues of philosophy and theology.
One way to configure the relationship is to take a “faith seeking understanding” approach. In a recent “four views” book on morality and evil, Paul Helm is tasked with representing a compatibilistic position. As a prelude to his arguments, he writes:
But in considering the matter of explaining evil, mine is not a viewpoint with compatibilism in the major premise. I think that would make it principally a philosophical viewpoint, compatibilism being a philosophical concept. But—I hope—mine is a viewpoint in the faith seeking understanding tradition.[32]
Such a conception of faith and reason requires a strong version of theistic realism wherein theological truths are conceived in a realist fashion. Exegetical engagement with the text of Scripture and systematic theological sources are considered valid sources of knowledge that help shape and guide the philosophical enterprise. Those in the Reformed tradition point to the larger case that can be made from Scripture and theological reflection as endorsing a strong version of theological determinism which is incompatible with libertarian notions of the will.[33] This scriptural and theological material is granted a primacy in the construction and evaluation of metaphysical considerations. As John Frame argues:
However, we cannot distort the Bible’s teaching in order to make it more palatable to people today. Even if there were no more to be said, even if there were no reply to these libertarian objections, we could not accept a nonbiblical view as the price of answering those objections. It would be better to leave the questions unanswered. For the time being, at least.[34]
This primacy of the biblical and theological does not negate the role of philosophy. It does, however, constrain philosophical reasoning.
Although the scriptural revelation is philosophically underdetermined, this does not negate the place of philosophy. Paul Helm helpfully articulates this relationship:
Biblical language and metaphysical concepts (whether these concepts are derived from Greek sources or from elsewhere) are not strict rivals. This is because of the fact that from the point of view of metaphysics the Bible is an underdeveloped book; there are few, if any, passages which are theoretical and reflective, or which make general claims and which rebut alternatives, of the sort typically advanced in metaphysical discussions. So the Bible does not repudiate developed metaphysics; rather, for the most part it obliquely sidesteps it, for its interests are for the most part elsewhere. But this does not mean that its first-order statements do not have metaphysical implications, only that they are not themselves metaphysical claims.[35]
Paul Manata helpfully articulates how this interplay between theology and philosophy might be conceptualized. He first notes the reality of the Reformed tradition’s teaching on the nature of God’s meticulous providence and human responsibility. This teaching is based in Scripture, summarized in its creedal and confessional tradition, and defended in systematic theologies as well as exegetical studies. From this scriptural and theological basis, there are certain deductions made in terms of the broad metaphysical entailments flowing from the scriptural and theological base. These two items—the theology and metaphysical entailments—function as a “perimeter fence” within which philosophical reason should function.[36] From these two—theology and its broad metaphysical entailments—there arises various philosophical models. As Manata reasons:
Thus, I think it is helpful to distinguish between the broad metaphysical issues Reformed theology entails, and the various models of how to understand the biblical and confessional data. The former is a set of commitments (to be discussed below) essential to Reformed theology, the latter is more like the project of natural theology or natural law. We use reason, the facts of the world, logic, and other conceptual tools to help make clear and consistent, or explicate, the broad theological and confessional baseline.[37]
Manata urges that such a perspective leaves a great deal of room for debate within the Reformed theological tradition. “This allows for freedom of conscience to develop models of the kind of determinism and compatibilism at work here.”[38]
Given these methodological considerations, how might Fischer’s ideas regarding causal determinism and moral responsibility, sans PAP, be appropriated by the Reformed theological tradition? A couple of different options are available. First, there are some who specifically appeal to Fischer’s work to bolster the case for the Reformed conception of the relationship between theological determinism and moral responsibility. Michael Preciado, in his book A Reformed View of Freedom: The Compatibility of Guidance Control and Reformed Theology, explicitly seeks to utilize the resources from Fischer’s semicompatibilist view. Preciado examines in detail the dialectic regarding PAP and concludes that Fisher’s defense of FSCs and the consequent denial of PAP is cogent. On the other hand, there are Reformed philosophers who do not endorse the use of FSCs to overthrow PAP as required for moral responsibility. For example, John Wingard Jr. argues that the FSCs “often get bogged down in controversy concerning whether they are really possible or whether they are question-begging.”[39] This is not to say that Wingard endorses PAP, he does not. Rather, Wingard choses to offer historical examples from Scripture which demonstrate theological determinism alongside the attribution of moral responsibility. By this methodological route, he argues that one can circumvent the controversy of FSCs altogether.[40]
Although Fischer’s arguments utilizing FSCs are potentially useful to Reformed theology, there may be concerns about the kind of causal determinism articulated by him. Fischer often explicates causal determinism along the following lines: Causal determinism is that which, among other things, entails that every bit of human behavior is causally necessitated by events in the past together with the natural laws.[41] This seems to be some sort of physical, nomological causal determinism. This understanding is reinforced when Fischer argues that his understanding of causal determinism can be consistent with materialism about mental states. He writes: “Let’s say that materialism about mental states is true, and, further, that causal determinism obtains. So there presumably exists an explanation of an agent’s choices and behavior entirely in terms of physical states and laws of nature.”[42]
This understanding of causal determinism need not be endorsed by Reformed theologians. James Anderson helpfully delineates and distinguishes divine causal determinism from other kinds of determinism. He first acknowledges that Reformed theology (“Calvinism,” as he denotes it) “is indeed committed to divine determinism: the view that everything is ultimately determined by God.”[43] Anderson more formally defines divine determinism as follows:
(DD) For every event E, God decided that E should happen and that decision was the
ultimate sufficient cause of E.[44]
Next, Anderson argues that Reformed theology does not entail causal determinism in the usual philosophical sense. Anderson writes: “Causal determinism, in this technical sense, is the idea that events subsequent to t are necessitated by (and thus in principle could be logically deduced from) the entire state of the world at t and those causal laws that govern the world.”[45] It is this conception of causal determinism that is not necessary for the Reformed theologian to embrace.
At the heart of the issue is the nature of causation. Anderson notes that the concept of causation is notoriously difficult to define. From this obvious point, Anderson draws the following conclusion:
For this very reason it’s important to recognize that Calvinism as such isn’t committed to any particular theory or account of causality. It is one thing to affirm that God’s will is the ultimate sufficient cause of every event; it is quite another to give a philosophical account of divine causation.[46]
Anderson urges that one ought not to assume that divine causation is similar in every way to other kinds of causation we experience. As he articulates, “Divine causation is not on par with intramundane causation.”[47] Anderson lists out several unique elements to divine causation:[48]
1. God’s causation can bring things into existence ex nihilo, sustain them in existence or annihilate them.
2. God’s causation is not spatially located.
3. God’s causation may not be bound by time as we are.
4. There is no cost to exercise God’s causal powers.
This leads Anderson to conclude: “In light of the Creator-creature distinction, then, we should recognize that divine causation is of a wholly different order than creaturely causation. It operates on a level of its own. Divine causation is sui generis and is thus related only analogically to creaturely causation.”[49]
It thus appears that the conceptions of determinism held by Fischer and some Reformed theologians may not be equivalent nor compatible. Although Reformed theology does not affirm PAP and, perhaps, could use Fischer’s defense of FSCs, it may be the case that Reformed theologians need not endorse Fischer’s notions of causal determinism. Anderson’s discussion of these issues shows a different path based on theological considerations.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alexander, David E. “Orthodoxy, Theological Determinism, and the Problem of Evil.” In
Calvinism and the Problem of Evil, edited by David E. Alexander and Daniel M. Johnson, 123-132. Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick, 2016.
Anderson, James N. “Calvinism and the First Sin.” In Calvinism and the Problem
of Evil, edited by David E. Alexander and Daniel M. Johnson, 200-229. Eugene,
Oregon: Pickwick, 2016.
Anderson, James N. and Paul Manata. “Determined to Come Most Freely: Some Challenges
for Libertarian Calvinism.” Journal of Reformed Theology 11 (2017) 272-297.
Bignon, Guillaume. Excusing Sinners and Blaming God: A Calvinist Assessment of
Determinism, Moral Responsibility, and Divine Involvement in Evil. Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick, 2018.
Fischer, John Martin. “Compatibilism.” In Four Views on Free Will, by John Martin Fischer, et
al., 44-84. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007.
Fischer, John Martin. “Frankfurt-Style Compatibilism.” In Free Will, edited by Gary Watson,
190-211. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Fischer, John Martin. “Semicompatibilism.” In The Routledge Companion to Free Will, edited
by Kevin Timpe, Meghan Griffiths, and Neil Levy, 5-14. New York: Taylor and
Francis, 2017.
Fischer, John Martin. “Semicompatibilism and Its Rivals.” Journal of Ethics 16 (2012) 117-
143.
Fischer, John Martin. “The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Story.” Philosophical Review
119 (2010) 315-336.
Frame, John. The Doctrine of God. Phillipsburg, New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed,
2002.
Frankfurt, Harry G. “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibilities.” The Journal of
Philosophy 66.23 (1969) 829-839.
Helm, Paul. “Evil and Christian Classical Theism.” In Explaining Evil: Four Views, edited by
W. Paul Franks, 49-65. New York: Bloomsbury, 2019.
Lister, Rob. God is Impassible and Impassioned: Toward a Theology of Divine Emotion.
Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2013.
Manata, Paul. Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology: A Contemporary
Introduction. N.P. 2011. Online: https://analytictheologye4c5.files.wordpress.com/2011/07/free-will-and-moral-responsibility-intro11.pdf
Preciado, Michael Patrick. A Reformed View of Freedom: The Compatibility of Guidance
Control and Reformed Theology. Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick, 2019.
Wingard, John C. “Confession of a Reformed Philosopher: Why I Am a Compatibilist about
Determinism and Moral Responsibility.” Themelios 42 (2017) 263-284.
[1] John Martin Fischer, “Compatibilism,” in Four Views on Free Will (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007), 44.
[2] John Martin Fischer, “Semicompatibilism,” in The Routledge Companion to Free Will, eds. Kevin Timpe, Meghan Griffiths, and Neil Levy (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2017), 5.
[4] Fischer uses slightly different versions of this illustration in “Compatibilism” (56-57) and “Semicompatibilism and Its Rivals” (120-121).
[6] Quoted in Michael Patrick Preciado, The Reformed View of Freedom: The Compatibility of Guidance Control and Reformed Theology (Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick, 2019), 8.
[7] Guillaume Bignon provides a catena of statements from philosophers (Plantinga, Flint, Rice, Widerker, van Inwagen) and theologians (Olson, Picirilli, Geisler, Reichenbach) demonstrating this affirmation of PAP. See his Excusing Sinners and Blaming God: A Calvinist Assessment of Determinism, Moral Responsibility, and Divine Involvement in Evil (Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick, 2018), 70-71.
[8] Harry Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969), 829-839.
[12] John Martin Fischer, “The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Story,” Philosophical Review 119 (2010), 316-317.
[17] Fisher, “Semicompatibilism and Its Rivals,”123. Fischer points to David Strawson and Daniel Dennett as presenting other arguments of use against PAP.
[18] John Martin Fischer, “Frankfurt-Style Compatibilism,” in Free Will, ed. Gary Watson (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2003), 193.
[19] Fischer, “Frankfurt-Style Compatibilism,” 194. In this essay written in 2002, Fischer uses as his example the presidential election between Bush and Gore. I have switched out the name Bush for McCain in the quotation to bring into coherence with the FSC illustration cited above.
[31] James N. Anderson and Paul Manata, “Determined to Come Most Freely: Some Challenges for Libertarian Calvinism,” Journal of Reformed Theology 11 (2017), 272-273.
[32] Paul Helm, “Evil and Christian Classical Theism,” in Explaining Evil: Four Views, ed. W. Paul Franks (New York: Bloomsbury, 2019), 51.
[33] For example, see the extensive biblical and theological reflections in John Frame, The Doctrine of God (Phillipsburg, New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed, 2002), 47-79, 138-145. David E. Alexander has a discussion of ten theological doctrines that lean against a libertarian notion of the will and, thus, predispose one to consider compatibilistic conceptions—see his essay “Orthodoxy, Theological Determinism, and the Problem of Evil,” in Calvinism and the Problem of Evil (Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick, 2016), 123-132.
[35] Quoted in Rob Lister, God is Impassible and Impassioned: Toward a Theology of Divine Emotion (Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2013), 173-174.
[36] Paul Manata, Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology: A Contemporary Introduction (n.p. 2011), 29—online: https://analytictheologye4c5.files.wordpress.com/2011/07/free-will-and-moral-responsibility-intro11.pdf
[39] John C. Wingard Jr., “Confession of a Reformed Philosopher: Why I Am a Compatibilist about Determinism and Moral Responsibility,” Themelios 42 (2017), 268.
[42] Fischer, “The Frankfurt Cases,” 332. Fischer goes on to argue: “Why does it follow—without all sorts of additional considerations and perhaps fancy philosophical footwork—that we cannot also have a perfectly good explanation of the agent’s choices and behavior in terms of his desires, beliefs, and intentions?” (332-333) But this seems confused. On materialism, or, better, physicalism, the agent’s desires, beliefs, and intentions must all be reduced to a physical substrate and this physical substrate is determined by physical, nomological laws.
[43] James N. Anderson, “Calvinism and the First Sin,” in Calvinism and the Problem of Evil, eds. David E. Alexander and Daniel M. Johnson (Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick, 2016), 204.
