Nietzsche Essay #3: Human, All Too Human

 * I'm taking a class on Friedrich Nietzsche and we do a 2-page essay on our weekly readings.  This is one of my essays.

·      Articulate Nietzsche’s position in section 107 [Human, All Too Human]. Given his assumptions is there any other view he could have?

 

Nietzsche continues to seek consistency between a naturalistic, non-teleological vision of the world.  In line with this Nietzsche affirms a kind of physical determinism which undermines moral responsibility—a person can be neither responsible for their behavior or nature.  Julian Young has drawn attention to one reason why Nietzsche is at pains to promote the denial of human free will: “… the real payoff is the denial of guilt.” (Young, 258)

Nietzsche also denies the objective nature of good and evil.  In its place Nietzsche opts for a form of psychological egoism in which the “individual’s only demand for self-enjoyment… is satisfied in all circumstances.” (178)[1]  But this idea, when coupled with evolution, means that the standard of morality which is linked to human self-enjoyment is “constantly in flux” as the human nature continues to evolve.  Nietzsche goes so far as to call our actions “stupid” since the highest degree of human intelligence that we now have will be surpassed one day.  

Although morality is evolving in concert with the evolution of human nature there is a goal to which moral reasoning is moving. Nietzsche forcefully states: “Everything in the sphere of morality has evolved: changeable, fluctuating, everything is fluid, it is true: but everything is also streaming onward—to one goal.” (178) This goal seems to be the production of persons who are “wise and innocent.”  These should not be confused with classical virtues but, rather, wisdom replaces morality and innocence is the result of seeing that “good” and “evil” are merely constructs that can be overridden without guilt.

Nietzsche recognizes that the viewpoint he is articulating can be difficult to acknowledge and come to grips with for most people.  As he states, “To understand all this can cause great pain…” (178) and that many “fear the consequences” of such a proposal (174—section 39).  But Nietzsche believes that there are a “few” self-reflective individuals who will be able to see through the implications of evolution for morality.  They will be the ones who transform from the moral into the wise for they have the wisdom to see the “truth” of evolving morality.  Given time, then, “these men are the necessary first stage, not the opposite of those to come.” (178)  They, thus, serve as the vanguard of those to come in the process of social evolution.

Given Nietzsche’s philosophical assumptions of non-teleological evolution, determinism, and the lack of objective morality because of a commitment to evolving psychological egoism, it is not hard to see how Nietzsche develops his views.  His viewpoint seemingly flows necessarily from his assumptions. There may be one exception. Earlier in section 34 Nietzsche spoke of the potential responses to the lack of moral truth.  He looks at Schopenhauer’s conclusions that death may be preferable in light of the bleakness of existence.  Whereas for Nietzsche, he opts for “joy.” (170). The choice between despair and joy is not a logical one but, rather, one of “temperament.”  Nietzsche writes: 

“I believe that a man’s temperament determines the aftereffect of knowledge; although the aftereffect described above [tragedy and despair] is possible in some natures, I could just as well as imagine a different one, which would give rise to a life much more simple, more free of affects than the present one.” (170)

 

The act of choosing to see the implications of evolving, non-objective morality is not a logical one but, rather, an act of the will based, at least in part, by one’s temperament.  

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[1]This psychological egoism is also articulated in a previous section--# 57, page 175.