Examining the Case for "Pronoun Hospitality"

Reflections and Interaction on Gregory Coles’ “What Pronouns Should Christians Use for Transgender People” The Center for Faith, Sexuality & Gender—Pastoral Paper

Richard Klaus

March 12, 2020

 Gregory Coles begins his paper with the following:

·     “I’ll argue in this paper that the most biblical response to transgender people’s pronouns is posture of unequivocal pronoun hospitality.  That is, I believe that all Christians can and should use pronouns that reflect the expressed gender identities of transgender people, regardless of our views about gender identity ethics.” (p. 1)

 

o   Not merely “can” but “should”—an ethical ought that is “the most biblical response.”

 

§ Given Coles’ thesis he should be able to provide substantial biblical support.  He is laying a requirement upon God’s people (a “should”) and he should be able to biblically demonstrate this.

 

o   There may be room for “can” in some modified ways.  Coles mentions Andrew T. Walker’s essay in this regard on page 5.

 

·     Coles self-identifies as a “celibate gay Christian” (p. 3).  This designation is telling.  This speaks of an identity as “gay.” The words of Sam Allberry are helpful here:

 

“In western culture today the obvious term for someone with homosexual feelings is ‘gay’.  But in my experience this often refers to far more than someone’s sexual orientation.  It has come to describe an identity and a lifestyle.

 

“When someone says they’re gay, or for that matter, lesbian or bisexual, they normally mean that, as well as being attracted to someone of the same gender, their sexual preference is one of the fundamental ways in which they see themselves.  And it’s for this reason that I tend to avoid using the term.  It sounds clunky to describe myself as ‘someone who experiences same-sex attraction”.  But describing myself like this is a way for me to recognize that the kind of sexual attractions I experience are not fundamental to my identity. They are part of what I feel but not who I am in a fundamental sense.  I am far more than my sexuality.”[1]

 

·     The repeated use of the word “cisgender” highlights that Coles is using the transgender paradigm of language.  This alerts the reader that Coles is operating out of the transgender paradigm regarding language and this will affect his subsequent argumentation. Andrew T. Walker defines cisgender as follows:

 

“Cisgender—A term used to refer to people who have a match between their gender they were assigned at birth, their bodies, and their personal identity.  Cisgender is often used within the LGBTQ community to refer to people who are not transgender.  (In general, Christians should avoid using this term since it implies that cisgender and transgender are equally normative, i.e., the opposite of heteronormative.)”[2]

 

·     On page 6, Coles begins assessing “two important assumptions about the nature of language.”

 

o   “Assumption #1: Pronoun gender always and only refers to an individual’s appointed sex.”

 

o   “Assumption #2: When our definitions of words differ from other people’s definitions, ‘telling the truth’ means using our own definitions.”

 

·     “Assumption #1: Pronoun gender always and only refers to an individual’s appointed sex.”

 

o   Cole begins by discussing the etymology of the word “gender” and notes that origins of the word did not contain a functional synonym for sex.  He then discusses Greek, Hebrew, French, and Spanish.  This is all largely irrelevant.  No one is claiming that words cannot change meaning.  Nor is contemporary meaning necessarily determined by historical origination.  Ryan Anderson correctly notes:

 

“Historically, ‘gender’ was primarily a linguistic and grammatical term.  But when the word ‘gender’ was used to mean a personal attribute, it was synonymous with a person’s sex—until recently.  The term has now acquired another meaning, related to sex though distinct from it—and in some people’s opinion, separable from it.”[3]

 

o   Coles writes:

 

“For many English speakers today, there remains a significant difference between the terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender.’ While ‘sex’ corresponds at least to some degree with an externally perceptible state of being, ‘gender’ describes a person’s internal sense of self-identification as male or female.” (p. 7)

 

§ Everything in Coles’ essay will hinge on this distinction.  It is precisely this distinction which is presupposed by transgender ideology.  For Coles to adopt this framework is to presuppose the transgender framework. Of course, if this is reality then it follows that our linguistic usage should reflect this reality.  By accepting the transgender language paradigm, Coles is begging the question for the entire discussion in favor of transgender pronouns.  

 

o   Coles writes:

 

“Most major English language publications in the West now treat pronoun gender as a tool for indicating a person’s gender identity rather than a person’s appointed sex.”

 

“According to today’s journalistic practice, pronouns still have a very important meaning and function: they communicate to readers the gendered self-understanding—the gender identity—of the person being referred to.”

 

“The shift in dominant usage causes pronouns to work differently than they used to.  Pronouns’ meaning isn’t ‘lost’; it has been exchanged for a subtly different meaning.  Linguistic shifts like this one, occurring in response to shifts in cultural usage, have always been part of the evolution of language.”  (p. 7)

 

§ It is true that language evolves.  Coles is correct to note that this linguistic change is a result of shift in the culture.  And, this is indicative of a major worldview shift.  The radical separation of “gender” from its biological substrate is a major philosophical move.  Nancy Pearcey draws attention to this worldview shift in her book Love Thy Body.  

 

§ Transgender ideology rests upon key philosophical concepts: postmodern, antirealist assumptions

 

1.    Gender is fluid

 

2.    Transgender activist Judith Butler argues in her book Gender Trouble…

 

When “gender is theorized as radically independent of sex, gender itself becomes a free-floating artifice, with the consequence that man and masculine, might just as easily signify a female body as a male one and woman and feminine a male body as easily as a female one.”[4]

 

 

3.    “At the heart of the transgender movement are radical ideas about the human person—in particular, that people are what they claim to be, regardless of contrary evidence.  A transgender boy is a boy, not merely a girl who identifies as a boy.  It is understandable why activists make these claims.  An argument about transgender identities will be much more persuasive if it concerns who someone is, not merely how someone identifies. And so the rhetoric of the transgender movement drips with ontological assertions: people are the gender they prefer to be.  That’s the claim.”[5]

 

4.    “At the core of the ideology is the radical claim that feelings determine reality.”[6]

 

5.    Philosopher Elliot Crozat argues that…

 

“These claims appear to rest on the postmodern antirealist assumption that what one takes as reality is a mere subjective or sociocultural construct.”[7]

 

6.    Professor Crozat goes on to give the implications of such a view…

 

o   “Hence, there are no objective natures, no human nature, no male nature, no female nature, and no such thing as human flourishing that results from the proper functioning of the essential properties and capacities of a human nature.”[8]

 

§ Ryan Anderson better captures the relationship between “sex” and “gender” when he writes:

 

“Sex is a bodily, biological reality, and gender is how we give social expression to that reality.  Gender properly understood is a social manifestation of human nature, springing forth from biological realities, though shaped by rational and moral choice.  Human beings are creatures of nature and of culture, but a healthy culture does not attempt to erase our nature as male or female embodied beings. Instead, it promotes the integrity of persons, in part by cultivating manifestations of sex differences that correspond to biological facts.  It supports gender expressions that reveal and communicate the reality of our sexual nature.”[9]

 

·     Link to John Frame’s tri-perspectivalism

 

o   Normative: Biological

o   Situational: Social

o    Existential: Rational & moral choice

 

·     “Assumption #2: When our definitions of words differ from other people’s definitions, ‘telling the truth’ means using our own definitions.”

 

o   Coles uses two examples to show how context is used “to determine what words are true.” (p. 8)

 

§ (1) Father persuading his three-year-old daughter to eat her broccoli by saying, “If you do, then you can have as many cookies as you want.”  She complies and then the father sits in front of the computer with a web browser open and says, “Here are your cookies.”

 

§ (2) An American and Brit have a controversy over what a sugary treat is to be called—“cookie” or “biscuit.”  The American refuses to grant that the entity in question is a “biscuit” because he knows it is a “cookie.”

 

§ Let’s analyze these two examples a bit more…

 

§ (1) Father/daughter: In this example there is one word—“cookie”—which is being used in two different ways.  This raises the issue of equivocation.  In the example, the father knowingly deceives his daughter with this equivocation.  He knows what she will think when she hears the word “cookie.”  

 

§ (2) American/Brit: In this example there is one object—a baked good—which is called two different names by persons from two different countries.  The American, in this example, is ignorant or obstinate.  He is unable or unwilling to recognize that a single object can have two different words used to describe it—especially when there are two people from different linguistic backgrounds.

 

§ It might be argued that example one has some relevance to what is happening in our current culture climate.  Consider this example: You are the manager of a gym where people pay to exercise.  You receive a call from someone asking, “I’m calling for a friend, do you have locker rooms for men and women?”  After hearing an affirmative answer, the person asks on behalf of her friend, “Will she be allowed to use the women’s locker room?”  You, of course, answer, “yes.”  When the person actually shows up it is obvious that the person is a male who nevertheless wants to be considered a female.  This example, like the one above, raises the issues of equivocation.  The pronoun “she” is being used in two different ways.  This is a result of a cultural and worldview shift which separates “appointed sex” from a person’s internal sense of gender identity.  Without impugning any specific individual, it can be considered that this is a case of cultural deception.  In much the same way that the father deceived his young daughter, so the equivocal use of “she” to refer to an internal sense of gender identity separable and at odds from one’s appointed sex is a kind of deception.  Again, to accept the bifurcation between sex and gender in one’s linguistic habits is to already implicitly endorse the rejection of a Christian worldview which holds these two things together.

 

§ Coles draws the following conclusion from the two proffered examples:

 

“The point of these trivial (but delectable) examples is to show how meaning is shaped by context to determine what words are true.  If the truth of language were determined exclusively by a person’s own understanding of what words mean, then the statements ‘you can have as many cookies as you want’ and ‘your son never baked me any biscuits’ would both be perfectly truthful.  However, both of these statements cause their hearers to believe a thing that is untrue.  They might be true in an abstract sense, but they communicate falsely when placed in context.” (p. 8)

 

·     Notice the overly individualistic orientation in the quotation above—“… determined exclusively by a person’s own understanding of what words mean…”

 

·     In his examples this individualistic orientation is there.  The father is more educated and knows much more than a three-year-old so he can dictate and manipulate the outcome.  The American is ignorant or recalcitrant thus highlighting his individualistic orientation and refusal to consider other possibilities.

 

·     This is not analogous to those who wish to reserve gendered pronouns for those with a specific assigned sex.  This has been the cultural norm until only very recently.  It is not due to some manipulation of language or a born of an ignorant refusal to recognize other alternatives.  Rather, those who refuse to use pronouns in the ways being suggested by Coles do so because they recognize the worldview assumptions embedded in such language.

 

§ Coles notes that, “If we speak words that seem truthful to us while ignoring how other people will hear and understand our words, we’re not really communicating.  We’re just talking to ourselves, for our own benefit.  This isn’t linguistic integrity.  It’s linguistic narcissism.” (p. 8)

 

·     This fits his example (2) above fine.  But it does not do justice to the issue at hand.  The refusal to engage in pronoun revision—what Coles calls “pronoun hospitality”—is not narcissistic.  There is still communication happening.  Coles, and others, may not like the result of the communicative process in this case, but it is nonetheless communication. It can still be linguistic integrity.  Coles gives us two choices: linguistic integrity or linguistic narcissism.  We also need to avoid linguistic obsequiousness. 

 

§   Coles writes, “Instead, pronouns are now regularly used to communicate information about a person’s internal sense of gender identity, regardless of whether that gender identity is normatively paired with their appointed sex.”

 

·     Two points: (1) It can be challenged just how “regularly used” they are in the ways Coles states.  I would surmise that vast majority of North American English speakers do not make the radical disjunction between sex and gender that is inherent in Coles’ view.  (2) The fact that the linguistic patterns are changing is, again, reflects a shift in worldview in our culture.  Not all language evolution has these worldview entailments but this shift does.  To fail to recognize this is to treat this issue superficially. 

 

·     Coles’ section on “A Defense of Pronoun Hospitality” is where he turns to give a biblical rationale.  He uses Acts 17.27-28 and 1 Corinthians 9.19-23.

 

o   Acts 17.27-28 has Paul quoting two pagan poets.  The quotations in their original contexts are in reference to Zeus.  Coles argues:

 

“Paul uses these same lines to make claims about the one true God, drawing parallels between Yahweh and Zeus through a pronoun that ambiguously names them both.  It seems that Paul isn’t overly fixated on determining the single ‘true’ meaning of this pronoun and insisting that he can only speak truthfully using this definition.  Instead, Paul shifts his language to accommodate the language of his hearers, meeting them where they are.” (p. 10)

 

o   Coles’ argument based on the pagan quotations is superficial and fails to adequately take into account the historical context and the larger context of the sermon in Acts 17.22-31.  A few comments on these issues:

 

§ It doesn’t seem to accurate to say, “Paul shifts his language to accommodate the language of his hearers.”  Rather, he picks up a common premise between later Stoicism and the Hebrew worldview.  The nature of God, as understood by both Stoicism and the Jewish Scriptures, preclude idolatry. Bruce Winter accurately states, “Given that his audience conceded the premise of their poets Paul deduced, ‘Being therefore the offspring of God we are compelled not to think that the Deity is like gold.’”[10]  

 

§ Even if Paul can be construed to be “meeting them where they are,” he does not leave them there long.  He goes on to deconstruct the pronoun by setting forth of the truth of God in such a way that antithesis to their conceptions is clearly seen.  Greg Bahnsen states:

 

“The themes of Paul’s address in Acts 17 parallel those of Romans 1: creation, providence, man’s dependence, man’s sin, future judgment.  Paul boldly sets the revelational perspective over against the themes of Athenian philosophy.  The statements of Paul’s Areopagus address could hardly have been better calculated to reflect Biblical theology while contradicting the doctrines of pagan philosophy.  Paul did not appeal to Stoic doctrines in order to divide his audience (a ploy used in Acts 23:6).  Rather he philosophically offended both the Epicurean and Stoic philosophers in his audience, pressing teaching which was directly antithetical to their distinctives.”[11]

 

§ The fact that Paul found common ground culturally with a pagan text in the cause of an evangelistic encounter does not justify the continued use of pronouns which do not adequately reflect the biblical worldview.

 

§ Furthermore, even if Coles reasoning about Acts 17 is granted, it would not necessarily warrant “pronoun hospitality” in the church, among God’s people.  A more direct and challenging teaching may be appropriate in the church.  This is Paul’s example.  Christopher J. H. Wright, in his book The Mission of God: Unlocking the Bible’s Grand Narrative, compares Paul’s teaching to the church and his teaching as set out in his evangelistic sermons in Acts.  

 

“Comparing Paul’s theological argument to Christians in Romans 1 with his evangelistic preaching to pagans recorded in Acts, there is a marked difference of tone, even though there is certainly no clash of fundamental conviction.

 

“Romans, written to Christians, highlights the wrath of God.  Acts, referring to speeches made to pagans, highlights God’s kindness, providence and patience.  Both, however, insist on God’s judgment.

 

·     Romans portrays idolatry as fundamentally rebellion and suppression of truth. Acts portrays it as ignorance.

 

·     Romans portrays the wickedness that idolatry spawns.  Acts portrays idolatry as ‘worthless.’

 

·     Romans points out how perverted the idolater’s thinking has to be.  Acts points out how absurd it is when you stop and think about it.

 

·     Paul could excoriate idolatry as ‘a lie’ before Christian readers, but did not blaspheme Artemis before her pagan worshippers.

 

“So there is a difference in tone and tactic in Paul’s confrontation with idolatry, depending on the context of his argument.  However, we should be clear that in both cases, he is building all he has to say on very solid scriptural foundations, for every one of the points mentioned above, even though they have differing and balancing emphases, can be related to the Old Testament rhetoric against idolatry. It is particularly noteworthy that although Paul nowhere quotes Old Testament texts in his evangelistic preaching among Gentiles (as he so profusely does when speaking among Jews in synagogues), the content of his message is thoroughly grounded in and plainly proclaims the monotheistic creational faith of Israel.”[12]

 

§ Wright goes on to discuss two more biblical contexts for confronting idolatry: Pastoral guidance and prophetic warning.  For “pastoral guidance” he looks at Paul’s instructions in 1 Corinthians 8-10 and how he instructs the believers in the Corinthian church to navigate their polytheistic pagan context.  In this regard, Wright comments:

 

“The subtlety and sensitivity with which Paul constructs the pastoral and ethical application of his theology (i.e., the missiological implications of radical monotheism in the context of powerful cultural polytheism) is very illuminating.  It surely has much to offer to Christians in many different religious and cultural contexts, caught in the pressure between theological conviction and social conventions.”[13]

 

§ For completeness, I’ll add Wright’s fourth context: Prophetic warning.  This is addressed to the people of God themselves when they are caught in the sin of idolatry.  One comment from Wright:

 

“It seems that Paul attacked idolatry much more fiercely in discipling those who had been delivered from it than he did in his public evangelistic ministry among those still involved in it.”[14]

 

§  I think these four contexts mentioned by Wright are worth considering in detail as applied to the larger issue of sexual ethics and the more focused debate on pronoun usage.  There may be wisdom here for a path forward without falling into the compromise of an alien worldview in a quest to be nice.

 

o   Coles draws the following conclusion from his examination of Acts 17.27-28:

 

“When we apply Paul’s linguistic approach to the pronouns we use about transgender people, I believe we arrive at a posture of pronoun hospitality: a willingness to accommodate the pronouns of our transgender neighbor regardless of our own views about the Christian ethics of gender identity.  That is, when we order our language toward making sure that the truth of the gospel can be heard in an understandable way by those around us, we are compelled to use pronouns in a way that effectively communicates our respect for transgender people.” (pp. 10-11)

 

§ First, accommodating pronouns does not follow from Acts 17.  Coles is making a leap here.  Second, Coles has failed to consider the scope of the gospel that he wants to share with people.  The gospel is grounded in the reality of creation.  This is why when Paul speaks to the pagans in Athens he starts with the created order and God as Creator.  Our language and use of pronouns should reflect this creational reality as well.  Pronouns are not neutral.  They reflect a vision of reality—a vision of what the human person is and to whom he or she is accountable.  Of course, it takes much more than pronouns to adequately depict these creational realities but our use of pronouns should be consistent with this creational reality.  For those who might balk at this use of pronouns, this may be an indicator of a refusal to acknowledge the portrait of creation undergirding such usage.  

 

§ Another problem with the above quotation by Coles is noted by Laurie Higgins:

 

“If, instead of referring to ‘our own views about the Christian ethics of gender identity,’ Coles had referred to “the truth of Christian ethics regarding gender identity,’ the problem with his worldview would become clearer. Imagine a Christian saying, ‘We should be willing to use the pronouns of our transgender neighbors regardless of the truth of Christian ethics regarding gender identity.”[15]

 

·     On pages 11-13 Coles turns to the issue of how such language is perceived.  He writes, “For [Mark] Yarhouse, pronoun gender communicates respect or disrespect for persons rather than agreement or disagreement with gender identity expression.” (p. 11).  This is a classic example of a false dichotomy. It can communicate both respect and agreement.  By the use of this false dichotomy people are being led to believe that it is only respect for the person that is being communicated and not implicit agreement with an underlying view of the human person which divorces sex and gender.  And, of course, it should be noted that “respect” for Yarhouse and Coles is that subjective feeling of being respected—not necessarily an objective demonstration of respect which is true whether subjectively appropriated or not.  

 

·     Coles has a few transgendered persons respond to the issue of how the use of pronouns has affected them.  At times the rhetoric gets reckless.  This is an attempt to create a sense of guilt in those who may think of not using pronouns in the way Coles is advocating.  If you can pigeon-hole someone as an agent of shame and disrespect then it is easy to induce them to give up the behavior that is allegedly causing the shame and disrespect.  Laurie Higgins is helpful here with a corrective to this guilt-inducing argumentation.  She writes: “The ethics of speech are not determined by the subjective response of hearers of that speech.  The ethics are determined by the content (i.e., is it true) and the delivery (i.e., is it civil).”[16]

 

·     Coles writes: “In none of the above testimonies is there a sense that pronoun refusal serves as a useful tool for communicating beliefs about gender identity ethics.” (p. 12)

 

o   This fails to reckon with the fact that just because someone doesn’t like the communication doesn’t mean that the communication wasn’t effective.  Subjective acceptance is the only standard being used by Coles but this is a truncated view of communication.

 

o   The larger issue of who is being communicated to is also important.  There are more than two individuals involved.  The way I communicate teaches others in my community, church, family, etc. how what is appropriate language to use.  Again, Coles has an overly individualistic portrayal of the communication process.

 

·     Coles writes: “Pronoun refusal is instead coded as a message of disdain, of shame, of distance, and of disrespect.” (p. 12)

 

o   This is not argumentation—this is name-calling.

 

o   Once we grant the assumption of Coles that subjective reception is the only thing needed or pursued then it is possible to use the same sentence above and fill in the blank with all sorts of other things people might find subjectively alienating.

 

§ “_____________________ is instead coded as a message of disdain, of shame, of distance, and of disrespect.”

 

·     Refusal to accept same-sex marriage…

 

·     Refusal to accept my version of spirituality without Jesus…

 

·     Etc…

 

 

Some concluding thoughts:

 

1.    I find Coles essay problematic for a number of reasons:

 

a.    There is an implicit endorsement of a non-biblical approach which radically separates gender and sex.  This is not argued for but assumed.

 

b.    There are a number of informal logical fallacies in his argumentation.

 

                                               i.     Equivocation

 

                                              ii.     Begging the question

 

                                            iii.     False dichotomy

 

c.     There is superficial Scriptural exegesis.

 

d.    There is reckless rhetoric that seeks to induce guilt.  This is not based on good biblical evidence or rational argument.

 

2.    I do think we ought to consider the thoughts of Christopher J. H. Wright noted above. This may be a way forward which allows for some pronoun use in line with Coles desire without the endorsement of implicit acceptance of a non-biblical worldview.

---

     [1]Sam Allberry, Is God Anti-gay? And Other Questions about Homosexuality, the Bible and Same-sex Attraction(The Goodbook Company, 2013), 10-11.

     [2]Andrew T. Walker, God and the Transgender Debate: What Does the Bible Actually Say About Gender Identity?(The Goodbook Company, 2017), 166—boldface added.

     [3]Ryan T. Anderson, When Harry Became Sally: Responding to the Transgender Moment(New York: Encounter Books, 2018), 148.

     [4]Nancy R. Pearcey, Love Thy Body: Answering Hard Questions About Life and Sexuality(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2018), 202.

     [5]Ryan T. Anderson, When Harry Became Sally: Responding to the Transgender Moment (New York: Encounter Books, 2018), 29.

     [6]Ryan T. Anderson, When Harry Became Sally: Responding to the Transgender Moment (New York: Encounter Books, 2018), 48.

     [7]Elliot R. Crozat, “Reasoning About Gender” Evangelical Philosophical Society Website(2016), 3.  Online: http://www.epsociety.org/userfiles/art-Crozat%20(Reasoning%20about%20Gender-final).pdf.

     [8]Elliot R. Crozat, “Reasoning About Gender” Evangelical Philosophical Society Website(2016), 3.

     [9]Ryan T. Anderson, When Harry Became Sally: Responding to the Transgender Moment (New York: Encounter Books, 2018), 149.

     [10]Bruce W. Winter, “Introducing the Athenians to God: Paul’s Failed Apologetic in Acts 17?” Themelios31/1 (October, 2005), 56.

     [11]Greg L. Bahnsen, “The Encounter of Jerusalem with Athens” Ashland Theological Bulletin13/1 (spring, 1980), 33.

     [12]Christopher J. H. Wright, The Mission of God: Unlocking the Bible’s Grand Narrative(Downers Grove, Ill.: Intervarsity Press, 2006), 182.

     [13]Christopher J. H. Wright, The Mission of God: Unlocking the Bible’s Grand Narrative(Downers Grove, Ill.: Intervarsity Press, 2006), 184.

     [14]Christopher J. H. Wright, The Mission of God: Unlocking the Bible’s Grand Narrative(Downers Grove, Ill.: Intervarsity Press, 2006), 186.

     [15]Laurie Higgins, “Christians Caving to ‘Trans’-cultists’ Language Rules” (11-26-19)—online: https://illinoisfamily.org/homosexuality/christians-caving-to-trans-cultists-language-rules/.

     [16]Laurie Higgins, “Christians Caving to ‘Trans’-cultists’ Language Rules” (11-26-19)—online: https://illinoisfamily.org/homosexuality/christians-caving-to-trans-cultists-language-rules/.