* A paper I wrote for a class on the problem of evil. The paper is more descriptive of Rational Presuppositionalism than evaluative or critical.
RATIONAL PRESUPPOSITIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
The problem of evil continues to be a major intellectual and existential challenge for Christian theism. The literature on this topic is legion. Although written in the eighteenth-century, David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779) continues to serve as a major statement regarding skepticism about the issue of Natural Theology and, in particular, the problem of evil. The purpose of this paper will be to examine the problem of evil as described and critiqued in Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [hereafter, Dialogues] and then to examine the particular approach of the philosophical view known as Rational Presuppositionalism as an answer to the problem of evil.
David Hume’s Dialogues contains twelve parts consisting of a series of exchanges between three participants: Demea, Cleanthes, and Philo. The problem of evil is specifically taken up in parts ten and eleven but the entirety of the Dialogues is relevant since the larger discussion of the existence and nature of God will affect one’s answer to the problem of evil. Throughout the Dialogues the views of the three participants are manifest and come to express three different approaches to the question of Natural Theology.
Demea is a religious rationalist and “is meant to represent the theologically orthodox philosopher.” He is opposed to an attempted empirical demonstration of the nature of God. Rather, he is partial to an a priori argument for God’s existence and nature—see part nine. Cleanthes is a religious empiricist and he is keen to demonstrate the existence of God and conclusions regarding his nature from a strict empirical analysis of the world. His main argument is a design argument that utilizes the principle of analogy. Cleanthes urges his companions to look at the world around them and see the intricate detail of “means to ends” which entails a divine Mind. Cleanthes argues in the following manner:
The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance; of human design, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since therefore the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man; though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned by the grandeur of the work, which he has executed. By this argument a posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity, and his similarity to human mind and intelligence.
The third person engaged in the Dialogues, Philo, is a philosophical skeptic who is committed to an empiricist epistemology. He does not seek to be a skeptic for skepticism’s sake. Rather, he is attempting to argue on the basis of Cleanthes’ empiricist methodology to show that such an epistemic starting point will not yield specific knowledge. James Anderson articulates the following understanding of Philo:
It is generally agreed that Philo serves as Hume’s primary mouthpiece in this work, although Philo keeps his cards close to his chest. His strategy is to raise critical questions about the arguments that Demea and Cleanthes use to justify their religious convictions, but he also effectively plays the two theists against one another, allowing their deep disagreements to vindicate his own skeptical position indirectly.
In his argumentation Philo reduces both Demea and Cleanthes’ reasoning to skepticism. He shows that their views on Natural Religion lack a basis in reason. Demea, for example, makes a move to render God completely incomprehensible, seemingly beyond reason itself. Regarding the nature of God, Demea urges that such a topic is “altogether incomprehensible and unknown to us.” When discussing the possibility of predicating sentiments of the human mind (i.e., gratitude, love, friendship) of the Divine Mind, Demea states, “…we ought to acknowledge, that their meaning, in that case, is totally incomprehensible; and that the infirmities of our nature do not permit us to reach any ideas which in the least correspond to the ineffable sublimity of the divine attributes.” With such a view, Demea is reduced to a kind of religious mysticism devoid of rational content.
Cleanthes is also pushed by the argumentation of Philo to severely modify the notion of theism, even being willing to countenance a finite deity. Ultimately, Cleanthes’ strict empiricism cannot get to the truth of God’s nature. Beyond being a designer of some sort, the arguments of Cleanthes cannot establish his infinitude, his unity, or his benevolence. Thus, Philo admonishes Cleanthes in the following manner:
In a word, Cleanthes, a man, who follows your hypothesis, is able, perhaps, to assert or conjecture, that the universe, some time, arose from some thing like design: But beyond that position he cannot ascertain one single circumstance, and is left afterwards to fix every point of his theology, by the utmost licence of fancy and hypothesis.
In light of this, it is no wonder that Philo and his skeptical empiricism is reduced to saying that, “All religious systems… are subject to great and insuperable difficulties” and that, “A total suspense of judgement is here our only reasonable resource.” Thus, for all three perspectives, a kind of religious skepticism devoid of actual knowledge is the conclusion of the matter.
This religious skepticism also comes out when the topic turns to the problem of evil. James Anderson succinctly brings out the tensions among the philosophical perspectives:
Hume’s overall strategy, in his discussion of the problem of evil, is to use Demea and Cleanthes (with Philo serving as middleman) to pose an intolerable dilemma for the theist: either (1) follow the a priori approach of Demea, positing an infinite God whose moral relationship with the world is utterly mysterious and inscrutable, and thus removing any basis for revealed religion, or (2) follow the empiricism of Cleanthes and settle for an anthropomorphic deity (or pantheon of deities) indifferent to the miseries we endure. Neither of these, as Hume well knows, will be appealing to an orthodox Christian.
In parts ten and eleven of Dialogues, there are essentially five different proposed solutions to the problem of evil that are put forward for consideration.
1. God is incomprehensible.
2. We will know more in the afterlife.
3. There is more good than evil.
4. God is finite.
5. God is amoral.
A quick recitation of some of the problems for each of these proposed solutions is in order.
(1) God is incomprehensible. The problem with total incomprehensibility is that one cannot know what it means to say God is “good.” This has the consequence that one cannot knowingly pray or praise to such an unknown god with any sense of genuine knowledge.
(2) We will know more in the afterlife. This solution, depending on how it is nuanced, may fall prey to the same objections to (1). Regardless, even in the eternal state a human person never becomes God and knows all things. Human finitude is never jettisoned so there may always be a problem of evil, the solution to which is never known.
(3) There is more good than evil. An immediate issue is how one goes about measuring “good” and “evil”—what unit of measurement should be used? Also, it should be noted that the intensity of pain seems incomparable to even large amounts of pleasure as Philo notes: “… you must at the same time, allow that, if pain be less frequent than pleasure, it is infinitely more violent and durable.” This solution also fails to answer the question, “Why is there any evil at all?”
(4) God is finite. Philo argues quite extensively that even a finite deity could have done a better job constructing the world with its law-like regularity and that such a being could have also done a better job in acting in secret, providential ways to avoid certain evils. Although in the reasoning of Philo and Cleanthes, “God” is more like Zeus, the notion of a finite deity is philosophically problematic in that an eternal Being could not be finite.
(5) God is amoral. In this view the categories of “good” and “evil” do not apply to God. This solution seems to land one in the objections to (1) above where the incomprehensibility of God leads to intractable problems. Furthermore, if God is amoral this has the consequence that the notion of God cannot be the foundation of human morality and, yet, Cleanthes wants to argue that, “The proper office of religion is to regulate the heart of men, humanize their conduct, infuse the spirit of temperance, order, and obedience…”
Excursus: “Freewill” as a solution to the problem of evil
Although not specifically mentioned in Hume’s Dialogues, theists often apply the free will solution to the problem of evil. In short form, it states:
(1)Natural evil is due to moral evil.
(2)Moral evil is due to free will.
(3)Free will is necessary to human dignity.
This is solution is not without its difficulties and objections. First, human free will may be necessary to explain evil but this does not mean it is sufficient. Second, it is possible for God to make humans with free will who never choose evil. Evil is not necessitated by free will since God himself is not evil and he has free will. Furthermore, the saints in their glorified state will be incapable of choosing evil but, nevertheless, will still have a faculty of choice. It is important to note that the free will solution presupposes an indeterministic view of the human will which states that an agent has the ability to do otherwise and that one’s choice cannot be causally determined. By contrast, a compatibilistic view of the will recognizes that “genuine free human action is compatible with causal conditions that decisively incline the will without constraining it. By constraint compatibilists mean conditions that incline the will contrary to the agent’s wishes.” Thus, there are competing definitions of the human will. At times, however, those affirming indeterministic freedom (or libertarian freedom) refuse to recognize the reality of any other type of freedom. John Feinberg argues this point forcefully:
Indeterminists typically refuse to acknowledge compatibilism as even a possible definition of freedom, because they say it is not what freedom means. Of course, this sort of defining one’s opponent out of existence is illegitimate regardless of who does it. It begs the question. The question is what is the correct account of free human action. One cannot win the debate by defining freedom one’s own way and refusing to admit that any other notion is possible.
Although it has been argued that indeterminist freedom is in accord with our intuitions and, thus, broadly accepted, it is not without its philosophical difficulties. One crucial problem is that a libertarian view of the will seems to commit one to an uncaused will which reduces its effects to chance happening. R. K. McGregor Wright argues, “How can a person be held responsible for chance events? If acts of the will are not caused in such a way as to be actually manifestations of the character, how can they be my actions any more than the result of tossing a coin?”
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After all the wrangling of argumentation, the Dialogues concludes with the words of Philo wherein he finally surmises that natural theology cannot take one very far in getting at the knowledge of God. The following is a key part of Philo’s conclusion:
If the whole of natural theology, as some people seem to maintain, resolves itself into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at least undefined proposition, that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence: If this proposition be not capable of extension, variation, or more particular explication: If it affords no inference that affects human life, or can be the source of any action or forbearance: And if the analogy, imperfect as it is, can be carried no farther than to the human intelligence; and cannot be transferred, with any appearance of probability, to the other qualities of the mind: If this really be the case, what can the most inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man do more than give a plain, philosophical assent to the proposition, as often as it occurs; and believe, that the arguments on which it is established, exceed the objections, which lie against it?
The language of “ambiguous” and “undefined proposition” should be noted. Shortly after the above quotation Hume speaks of a person who is “seasoned with a just sense of the imperfections of natural reason” and that a believing Christian should be “a philosophical skeptic.” All of this presupposes that the natural world—“general revelation” in Christian theological terminology—does not clearly reveal the existence and nature of God. As will be argued from within the Rational Presuppositionalist perspective, this Humean lack of clarity in general revelation will entail a lack of inexcusability thus rendering a lack of belief in the Creator God as potentially morally justified. It is to this Rationalist Presuppositionalist perspective this paper now turns.
Rational Presuppositionalism has recently been described as “an up and coming movement” and “a budding apologetic system.” Its principal architect is Surrendra Gangadean as developed in his book Philosophical Foundation: A Critical Analysis of Basic Beliefs (2008). Rational Presuppositionalism has a unique solution to the problem of evil; indeed, it calls its answer “an ironic solution.” It recognizes that the problem of evil can only be resolved, or, in its terminology “dissolved,” if the problem is situated within a larger philosophical program of natural theology. Therefore, it is imperative to understand Rational Presuppositionalism’s unique approach to natural theology and its attendant reasoning.
Rational Presuppositionalism (RP) has a robust understanding of natural theology. This is based on an understanding of “clarity” in which some things—the most basic things—are clear to reason. Reason is defined as the basic of laws of thought: (1) Identity: a is a; (2) Non-contradiction: not both a and non-a; and (3) Excluded Middle: either a or non-a. Reason can be used critically to test for meaning which is crucial, since one must know what a statement means before it can be tested for truth. Reason is understood to be natural(not conventional, but, rather universal), ontological(applying to being as well as thought), fundamental to other aspects of human personality, and transcendental(it cannot be questioned because it makes questioning possible). According to this understanding of reason, there are some things that “maximally clear” to reason: it is clear that a is not non-a.
A related corollary is that maximal clarity is necessary for maximal responsibility. This becomes important for natural theology since if reason is used to show God’s existence and eternal nature, this should be maximally clear. As Anderson and Gangadean write:
If humans are maximally responsible before God for seeking, understanding, and doing what is right then there must be this kind of clarity of about [sic] God’s existence and nature. For instance, if humans are responsible for knowing that only God is eternal, then it must be clear that connecting “eternal” with “non-God” (matter, a finite spirit, some combination of the two) is a contradiction.
Without this understanding of maximal clarity, it is argued that the notion of inexcusability is lost. The unbeliever may have a refuge of excusability if the revelation of God’s eternal nature is not clearly seen from the created order. Confirmation of this understanding is sought in Romans 1.20: “For since the creation of the world his invisible attributes, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly seen, being understood through what has been made, so that they are without excuse.” According to RP, the knowledge of God spoken here in Romans 1.18ff is a possible knowledge (not an actual knowledge) for all people. If a person would properly use reason in a discursive process and move from more basic things to less basic things, then the knowledge of God would be known. As Anderson notes, “And when Paul says that God’s existence and nature are known from the things that are made this suggests an inference, not an immediate or intuitive truth.”
Rational Presuppositionalism attempts to lay out the set of inferences and discursive reasoning which demonstrates this maximal clarity to those willing to properly use reason. Owen Anderson lists out ten steps needed to demonstrate God’s existence:
1. Show that there must be something eternal. Show that only some is eternal by showing:
2. Show that matter exists (vs. spiritual monism, and idealism).
3. Show that matter is not eternal (vs. material monism).
4. Show that the soul exists (vs. material monism and Advaita Vedanta).
5. Show that the soul is not eternal (vs. Dvaita Vedanta and other forms of spiritual monism).
6. Respond to the problem of evil (moral and natural).
7. Respond to natural evolution (vs. uniformitarianism and materialistic reductionism).
8. Respond to theistic evolution (the original creation was very good—without evil).
9. Respond to deism (the necessity for special revelation).
10.Show that there is a moral law that is clear from general revelation.
By an extensive use of syllogistic argumentation it is urged that clarity is manifested and the twin problems of skepticism and fideism are avoided. This is important since, as was discovered in Hume’s Dialogues, the normal course of argumentation pursued in natural theology fails to demonstrate the kind of clarity needed to bolster inexcusability. A full articulation and analysis of the above ten steps is beyond the scope of this paper, but a closer look at the problem of evil is warranted.
Standing within the Calvinistic tradition, RP makes no use of the “free will” defense. Rather, it affirms a compatibilistic understanding of the human will. Rational Presuppositionalism utilizes the familiar distinction between “moral” evil and “natural” evil although it has some specialized nuance to these concepts which provide for a unique answer to the problem of evil. For comparison, a recent popular-level treatment of the problem of evil from within the Reformed or Calvinistic tradition defines moral and natural evil as follows:
Moral evil: “Moral evil is any evil—that is, any significant case of pain and suffering—which is caused by free person, either intentionally or through culpable neglect of their responsibilities.”
Natural evil: “Natural evil is any evil that is not moral evil. It is significant pain and suffering in the world that are not caused by free persons, either intentionally or through culpable neglect of their responsibilities.”
Rational Presuppositionalism has a fairly close overlap with its definition of “natural evil.” For RP, natural evil “consists in toil and strife, and old age, sickness, and death and all amplification of these in famine, war, and plague.” Furthermore, natural evil is not original with creation. Rather, creation was originally good without any need for natural evil.
The concept of “moral evil” within RP is slightly different. Moral evil is defined as,
An act contrary to the nature of one’s being; for man as a rational being it is to neglect, avoid, resist or deny reason in the face of what it is clear; it is the failure to seek and to understand and to do what is right.
Thus, linking this definition with what has been discerned about the clarity of God’s existence it is understood that moral evil is the failure to use reason (either through neglect, avoidance, or resistance) to clearly see the existence and nature of God and what is, therefore, the proper human response to this knowledge. As Gangadean writes:
Evil is the failure to use reason to the fullest, the failure to understand basic things which are clear. It is the failure to know God. This definition assumes the clarity of general revelation, that only some is eternal. It is consistent both with the notion of the objective clarity of general revelation and the inexcusability of unbelief as well as with the subjective difficulty for anyone who fails to see what is clear to acknowledge one’s failure.”
With these conceptions of both moral evil and natural evil, there is an interesting relationship between the two. Natural evil serves the cause of a “call back.” Since the unbelief through lack of proper reasoning (moral evil) is primary, natural evil is imposed, in God’s sovereignty, not as a punishment, but, rather as a call back from moral evil. Natural evil is a summons to awaken one’s reasoning to confront that which is clear—the existence and nature of God.
This conception of a call back through natural evil is illustrated, it is argued, in various biblical passages. Genesis chapter three is thought to narrate three different kinds of “call backs” in response to human sin. First, there is the “inner” call back of shame when the eyes of Adam and Eve were opened “and they knew that they were naked.” (Genesis 3.7) The second call back is the “outer” call back of God’s voice when he asks them a number of questions to prompt repentance. The third call back is the “curse” in which the difficulties of life in work and child-bearing (and rearing) will be increased. This environment of, what David Hume would call “misery,” is to be the atmosphere in which people are to be shaken out of their laziness and meaningless with the hopes of reasoning about the most basic things which are clear to reason.
Another passage which is used to illustrate the relationship between moral and natural evil, is the famous parable told by Jesus, the prodigal son (and his brother!) in Luke 15.11-32. In leaving his father, the younger son is an example of unbelief in the father’s character of goodness. This unbelief is inexcusable and evil. The younger son ought to have seen his father’s character but he refused to do so. He leaves and then the consequences of natural evil are allowed to take effect. Only when he is the pigsty does the son begin to clearly think about the reality of his father’s house. This moves him to repentance and he makes his way home. The older son, who is does not embrace his younger brother, also is snared in unbelief. He does not enter into his father’s joy at the mercy shown his brother. He refuses to share in the very clear mercy that is pouring forth from the father.
With this understanding of moral and natural evil, as well as the Scriptural illustrations in hand, there can begin to be a more robust understanding of the purposes of evil in human history. In an important paragraph, Surrendra Gangadean lays out this fuller picture:
Applied to evil in world history, evil as unbelief obscures the clear revelation of God’s nature and will. It serves also to deepen the revelation of divine justice seen in the relation of sin and death, and the divine mercy seen in the call back, return, and restoration. If evil is removed abruptly the revelation will not be deepened; and if the evil is not removed the revelation will not be seen. The solution is to remove evil gradually. Evil, in every form of unbelief, and in every degree in combination with belief, is allowed to come to expression in world history, in the various civilizations and cultures. In an age-long and agonizing spiritual war between good and evil, between belief and unbelief, good gradually and eventually overcomes evil. This applies to mankind as a whole, not to each individual or culture.
This articulation combines elements of some traditional theodicies and defenses. For example, there are element of the “greater-good” defense in which God ordains or allows evil for the actualization of a state-of-affairs which are in some sense dependent on there being evil in the world. Greg Welty articulates the general understanding this way: “Typically, a theodicy has the following structure: there are goods that God is aiming at in his universe, but because of the kinds of goods God is aiming at, he cannot get them without permitting various evils.” Another theodicy taken up by the above articulation by Gangadean is a “warfare worldview” theodicy. Gregory Boyd states the view in this way:
Stated most broadly, this worldview is that perspective on reality which centers on the conviction that the good and evil, fortunate or unfortunate, aspects of life are to be interpreted largely as the result of good and evil, friendly or hostile spirits warring against each other and against us.
Whereas for Boyd, this warfare worldview entails the theology of Open Theism with its attendant notion of libertarian free will, the RP conception is able to incorporate an “age-long and agonizing spiritual warfare between good and evil” within its system without compromising its Reformed roots. In terms of the “greater-good” defense offered by RP, it is important to note that this is not the usual notion of “greater-good” which can be left undefined or posited as merely theoretical. Rather, according to RP, this greater-good has a very specific feature—it deepens the revelation of both God’s justice and mercy.
This leads to RP’s “ironic solution” to the problem of evil. The following is the entirety of the argument offered:
The ironic nature of this solution to the problem of evil can now be approached. If we consider the original statement of the problem of evil with the understanding of good and evil as explained above, the problem becomes transformed. The problem is not resolved; rather, it is, ironically, dissolved:
1. Because of all the evil in the world I cannot see how it can be said that God is all good and all powerful.
2. Because of all the unbelief in the world I cannot see how it can be said that God is all good and all powerful.
3. Because of all the unbelief in me I cannot see how it can be said that God is all good and all powerful.
4. Because I have neglected and avoided the use of reason I cannot see what is clear about God.
Based on the definitions provided by RP, the subsequent lines in the above argument function as a substitute for the previous line. The conclusion seems to entail the following. First, by the appropriate use of reason one should come to see that which is inexcusably clear, namely, the existence of God, his eternal nature, his goodness, and his wisdom. Second, from this is ought to be clear, not only that such a Being would have good reasons for the evil he allows, but, also, that moral evil is synonymous with unbelief and that natural evil serves the cause of God as a call back. All of this is what can be and should be known by natural theology.
Owen Anderson argues that the contours of Rational Presuppositionalism are to be found in the book of Job. In fact, in a few places Anderson humorously calls Job a “rational presuppositionalist.” Throughout Anderson’s exposition there are references to RP categories of thought: the relationship between moral evil and natural evil with natural evil being a “call back,”the categories of “self-deception” and “self-justification,”inexcusable unbelief and clarity of general revelation,and the need to “give proofs.” Anderson relies on these RP categories to interpret the book of Job and even chides other commentators for failing to recognize and use these categories.
Anderson argues that the purpose of God is to bring Job to a place of repentance. But, whereas, Job’s three friends—Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar—incorrectly accuse Job of “fruit sins,” God is working redemptively through natural evil to bring Job to a place of repentance of “root sin”—the failure to know what one should have known about God through the use of reason. Job’s “root sin” is variously and vigorously described throughout Anderson’s work.
Pride: “He’s not accusing Job of gross fruit sins, gross violations of sins. It’s coming back to overcoming that pride, which is the opposite of the fear of the Lord.”
Failure to know God: “It is cognitive; we do know God and we should know God. And that is the sin that Job is being called back from.”
Self-deception and self-justification: “There is a presumption that Job has displayed in his accusations against God. In his self-deception and self-justification he’s become presumptuous.”
Failure to find contentment in God: “Here’s how we know Job needed to go further. Do you remember what he said he had wanted out of life, followed by the famous ‘but now’? [Job chapter 29 and 30.1, “But now…”] … And you find your contentment in these things. You don’t find your contentment in knowing God. That’s what you saw Job describing for his sense of what the good like is. And he needs to go further. And God in his mercy is teaching Job to go further.”
Lack of self-knowledge: “Job needs to come to know himself. He doesn’t have self-knowledge. And that was revealed through these trials.”
Ignorance and unbelief: “What Job did, he did ignorantly and out of unbelief. Do you remember when Paul says that? Perhaps one of the greatest intellects in human history, and that very talent was turned on its head and used to try to eradicate the early church. And he summarizes it by saying, what I did, I did ignorantly, out of unbelief. God’s exposing that about Job.”
Failure to see what is clear about God: “I hadn’t seen what is clear and God brought this to me, this redemptive work of God.” “Repent of what? You didn’t see what was clear about God.”
God is attempting to “call back” Job from all these of sins by using the terrible trials of Job chapters one and two. Ultimately, the RP perspective on Job’s sin and repentance fails to convince. Old Testament specialist Michael Brown accurately notes the critical problem:
Although, in his final penitence he acknowledged his sin, he was not speaking of a state of guilt prior to his sufferings (contrast the confession of 33:27). In other words, the sin he was confessing was not the cause of his trial. Rather, he admitted to his sinful presumption in daring to speak against God in the midst of his trial.
The RP paradigm, whatever else may be its strengths, seems to be read into the text of Job rather than having a firm exegetical basis in the movement of the book.
Rational Presuppositionalism seeks to provide an intellectually rigorous defense of Christian theism firmly based in natural theology. With its commitment to reason as the laws of thought and its explication of the notion of clarity, it enters the realm of philosophical theology and seeks to add another voice to those represented in David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Whereas Hume’s discussion partners end up in skepticism and fideism, Rational Presuppositionalism seeks to provide a clear path of argumentation which demonstrates the inexcusability of unbelief. Its unique approach to the problem of evil is situated within this larger philosophical project and attempts to nullify the entire problem, rendering it incapable of being used as an excuse for unbelief.
