Just War Theory
Introduction
·
“The classic just war doctrine as articulated by
the Church does not view all use of
force as evil; rather, it declares that war can actually be a positive act of
love entirely consistent with the character of God. Love of God and neighbor impels Christians to seek a just
peace for all, especially for their neighbors, and military force is sometimes
an appropriate means for seeking that peace.”[1]
·
“The version of just war theory we espouse takes
seriously all of the obligations of its criteria, not in some minimal or
negative checklist sense but rather along the lines of a discipline that
involves commitments, duties, and virtues as well as categories, criteria, and
principles. In short, love for the
enemy neighbor, along with their families and fellow citizens, is not to be suspended
or set aside either during or after the war.”[2]
·
“Just war is not set in stone. Composed of many theories, just war is
a living tradition that has changed and continues to develop in light of new
circumstances, technologies, and insights. As John Howard Yoder, a Mennonite pacifist theologian who
has written extensively on just war theory, observed, ‘It is appropriate to
speak rather of “tradition” than of a “doctrine” or a “theory,” for there is
not one official statement of this approach to which all would subscribe.’”[3]
Presumption Against
Violence or Injustice?
·
“[T]he historical moral basis of just-war
teaching is the presumption not against war or lethal force per se but against
evil that is directed toward my neighbor, against injustice and
oppression. Just-war thinking,
properly understood, begins with the presumption to restrain evil and protect
the innocent, not to forbid coercive force.”[4]
·
“Without justice, peace itself can be
illegitimate. The animating spirit
of just-war thinking is that ‘social charity comes to the aid of the oppressed.’ Therefore, anyone who categorically
rules out the possibility of war or coercive force violates the presumption
against injustice, which is a requirement of love rightly construed. The just-war tradition, hence, strongly
qualifies peace, acknowledging that if this peace is not justly ordered, it may
well be illegitimate, even oppressive.
Peace, therefore, is not merely the absence
of conflict.”[5]
Just War Theory as a
Mediating Position Between Militarism and Pacifism
·
“Properly understood, the just-war
tradition understands itself as a mediating or moderating position between two
poles that are absolutist in their attitude toward coercive force. On the one hand, the militarist—whether
secular (sometimes called the ‘political realist’) or religious (the jihadist
or crusader)—views war and coercive force as justifiable under any
circumstance. No moral restraints
beyond political expediency or the ‘command of God’ need be applied. On the other end stands the
pacifist. Given the suffering and
bloodshed caused by violence and war, the pure or principled pacifist believes
that war and coercive force are never
permissible; war is to be rejected under any and all circumstances.
“The just-war position—an
expression of consensual Christian thinking through the ages—seeks to mediate
this tension. This mediating
position is rooted in a certain Christian realism: we must never believe that
nothing is permissible, nor that everything is. There are
occasions in which, reluctantly, we may need to apply coercive force, even if
this means going to war, for the protection and preservation of a third
party. Resort to war is sometimes,
though not always unjust.”[6]
Just War Criteria
o Note
on criteria à
they are difficult to apply
“Just war theory, then, leads to valuable discussions about the ethics of
war, but it is rarely if ever definitive.
Even its criteria are often problematic and difficult to apply in real
situations.”[7]
§
Do all the criteria need to be met?
§
How stringently are the criteria followed? Can one be overly scrupulous so that no
war is ever justified—“just war pacifists”?
Jus ad bellum[8]
1.
Just
cause. War is seen as
legitimate if it is waged in self-defense, to protect the innocent, in defense
of human rights, or in response to acts of aggression.
2.
Competent
authority and public declaration.
The use of force is permissible if a legitimate authority engages in due
process and publically declares its intention to go to war.
3.
Comparative
justice. Meeting the just
cause requirement does not grant carte blanche rights to any state; its
objectives in war must be limited.
No party to war has absolute justice on its side.
4.
Right
intention. The only just
motives for waging war are those prescribed by the just cause principle. Ulterior motives (revenge, geopolitical
power plays, seizing natural resources, and so on) cannot be rationalized
within the just war tradition.
5.
Last
resort. This principle
requires that all reasonable peaceful alternatives to war must be fully
exhausted before going to war.
6.
Probability
of success. A war cannot be
considered just if it will have no positive influence on the situation. The intent is to prevent futile
attempts to change a situation when one side has a substantial advantage or
when engaging in conflict is the equivalent of mass suicide.
7.
Proportionality
(or macroproportionality). The
good expected to result from engaging in war must be worth it. The benefits that result from defeating
the aggressor must be proportionally better than the inherent evils of war.
Jus in bello
1.
Discrimination. Soldiers must distinguish between
combatants and noncombatants, and between military targets and the infrastructure
necessary for life (water supplies, sewage treatment facilities, hospitals,
crops, and so on). The intentional
targeting of civilians is never justified and is rightly condemned as murder. The principle forbids all weapons that
fail to discriminate between soldiers and civilians (including nuclear weapons
and devices such as land mines).
2.
Proportionality
(or mircoproportionality). The
use of military force must be proportionate to the objective. This principle forbids all weapons of
mass destruction (WMDs).
Jus post bellum[9]
1.
Just
cause principle. “The goal of
a just war must be to establish social, political, and economic conditions that
are more stable, more just, and less prone to chaos than what existed prior to
the fighting. The just cause principle
has three primary theoretical objectives: (1) hold parties accountable until
mission is accomplished, (2) restrain parties from seeking additional gains,
and (3) stem overly zealous post bellum
responses. In practice, this
criterion entails both the return of unjust gains and the prohibition of
unconditional surrenders.”
2.
Reconciliation. “The goal of reconciliation is to
transform a relationship of animosity, fear, and hatred into one of tolerance,
if not respect, to turn enemies into friends and to bring emotional healing to
the victims of war… This phase is not about cheap grace or taking a
forgive-and-forget approach. It
involves acknowledgment of wrongdoing, admission of responsibility, punishment,
forgiveness, and perhaps amnesty.
Ideally, reconciliation should lead to the return of the party to
communion. The goal of
reconciliation, in short, is justice tempered by mercy. In practice, the reconciliatory aims
can be promoted through ceasefire agreements, restrained post war celebrations,
public and transparent post war settlement processes, and apologies.”
3.
Punishment. “Here the primary objectives are
justice, accountability, and restitution.
The legitimacy of punishment depends on several factors: publicity and
transparency (punishment ought to be meted out through public forums to which
many, if not all, have access); proportionality and discrimination (appropriate
punitive measures ought not to be excessively debilitating and must make
distinctions based on level of command and culpability); and legitimate
authority (punishments ought to be assigned by an authority that all sides
recognize as legitimate). In all
likelihood, the legitimacy of the punishment phase depends on an independent
authority (meaning a third party) in order to avoid even the appearance of
victors acting as judge, jury, and executioner of the vanquished (which is
otherwise pejoratively referred to as ‘victor’s justice’). In practice, the punishment phase involves
compensation (restitution) and war crimes trials.”
4.
Restoration. “The goal of a just war is not simply
the cessation of violence but political, economic, social, and ecological
conditions that allow citizens to flourish. In other words, a just war should seek to create an
environment that permits citizens to pursue a life that is meaningful and
dignified. Doing so involves a
number of practical concerns, including providing and establishing security,
policing, and the rule of law; enabling sufficient political reform whereby a
functional government can promote the common good and provide public services
such as education, health care, and electricity; fostering economic recovery by
helping with the transition from a post war to a peacetime economy; providing
social rehabilitation for people who have been victimized by war and soldiers
who may suffer from injuries and trauma; and ecological cleanup efforts to
address the lingering pernicious effects of weapons such as cluster munitions
on people’s lives and livelihoods.”
·
Brian Orend in his important essay “Justice
After War” Ethics and International
Affairs 16.1 (2002), 43-56 lists out the following post bellum criteria (p. 55):
o Proportionality
and publicity
o Rights
vindication
o Discrimination
o Punishment
for leaders who violate ad bellum
criteria and soldiers who violate in
bello criteria
o Compensation
o Rehabilitation
Preemptive War vs.
Preventive War
|
Preemptive
War
|
Preventive
War
|
|
“Preemption
refers to the first use of military force when an enemy attack already is
underway or, at the least, is very credibly imminent.”[10]
|
“The
most essential distinction between preemption and prevention is that the
former option, uniquely, is exercised in or for a war that is certain, the
timing of which has not been chosen by the preemptor. In every case, by definition, the
option of preventive war, or of a preventive strike, must express a guess
that war, or at least a major negative power shift, is probable in the future. The preventor has a
choice….Obviously, temporally the more distant the danger, the greater has to
be the uncertainty.”[11]
|
|
“Preemption
is all about self-defense.
Indeed, if we define preemption properly, which is to say as the
desperate option of last resort prior to receiving an attack that one is
absolutely certain is on its way or all but so, it is not really
controversial.”[12]
|
“A
preventive war is a war that a state chooses to launch in order to prevent
some future danger from happening.
Because the future is by definition unknown and unknowable, preventive
action has to entail striking on the basis of guesswork about more or less
distant threats.”[13]
|
|
|
“Preventive
war doctrine wrecks havoc with the just war criteria of last resort.”[14]
|
“Preemptive war relaxes the requirement of
having to suffer aggression before attacking, allowing for the use of force in
situations of imminent danger.
Preventive war relaxes the notion of imminent danger.”[15]
“Each step from the paradigmatic case of
self-defense to preemptive war to preventive war allows for greater
permissiveness for using force, but no step is conceived as a qualitative
departure from the paradigmatic case.”[16]
·
Question: Does the movement from self-defense to
preventive war entail increasing obligations—epistemological probabilities and
clarity of expression of intention?
a.
Preemptive war is a response to an imminent
danger, a real and tangible threat.
i. Michael
Walzer identifies three components à
“sufficient threat”
1.
A manifest intent to injure
2.
Active participation that turns that intent into
a positive danger, a danger of being fatally exposed
3.
A situation in which doing nothing greatly
magnifies the risk
b.
Many
Just War theorists allow for preemption but not for preventive wars.[17] For example, Daniel Heimbach argues,
“Augustinian interpretation permits preemptive
war responding to material threats actually offered, but can never allow stretching the just cause principle to justify wars of prevention.”[18] J. Daryl Charles and Timothy J. Demy
argue that preventive wars violate a number of the just war criteria:
Also,
within jus ad bellum requirements,
preventive war fails to meet the criterion of just cause in that it assumes a certain future breach of justice
that has not yet occurred.
Further, it may also fail on limited
aims depending on how far-reaching or global the threat is considered to
be.[19]
c. Other criteria are compromised
as well. Richard Miller argues
that, “Preventive war doctrine wrecks havoc with the just war criteria of last
resort.”[20]
[17]
J. Daryl Charles and Timothy J. Demy, War,
Peace, and Christianity: Questions and Answers from a Just-War Perspective
(Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway, 2010), 217.
They also mention Just War ethicists Paul Ramsey and James Turner
Johnson as being opposed to preventive wars. They mention famed Just War ethicist Michael Walzer as
speaking of preventive war as “inherently more problematic.”
[18]
Daniel Heimbach, “In Justifying Regime
Change Are We Missing Augustine’s Rejection of War to Reduce Fear?” Presentation at the Evangelical Theological
Society (November 17, 2005), 10. Online: http://www.reclaimingthemind.org/papers/ets/2005/Heimbach/Heimbach.pdf.
