Tuesday, March 10, 2015

Josephs and Luke: Parallels Between the Emmaus Narrative and the Testimonium

These are the notes from a lecture I gave on Josephus and his mention of Jesus when discussing the historical evidence for Jesus outside the New Testament.  (Note: A few formatting issues are apparent)
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Josephus and Luke:
Parallels Between the Emmaus Narrative and the Testimonium

1.     Gary J. Goldberg, “The Coincidences of the Emmaus Narrative of Luke and the Testimonium of Josephus” The Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha 13 (1995), 59-77.  Online: http://www.josephus.org/GoldbergJosephusLuke1995.pdf

2.     Goldberg compares the Testimonium Flavianum in Antiquities 18.3.3 to a section in the Gospel of Luke—the Emmaus Narrative = Luke 24.19-21, 25-27.

3.     He notes coincidences of structure between the two texts.

A computer search of the New Testament on the vocabulary cluster “Jesus, man, deed” (Ιησοὺς, ανήρ, εργ*), which are the first three major nouns of the Testimonium, reveals that only this passage of Luke shares this cluster. Upon closer examination, one finds this to be only the first indication of a series of location correspondences, nearly synonymous phrases occurring in analogous positions in each text. One can best experience this sequence by reading the text of Luke, halting at each noun or each verb of action, and then looking to the Josephus text for a corresponding phrase at the same location.

Using this method with the Greek texts shown in Figure 1, the following phrase-by-phrase outline of coincident points is produced:

[Jesus][wise man / prophet-man][mighty/surprising][deed(s)][teacher / word][truth / (word) before God] [many people][he was indicted][by leaders][of us][sentenced to cross][those who had loved/hoped in him][spending the third day][he appeared/spoke to them][prophets][these things][and numerous other things][about him]

Each of the nineteen brackets represents a location correspondence and contains the words or summarizes the meaning at each such point. The order of the brackets strictly corresponds to the order that the phrases appear in the texts; it is only within each bracket that the order of two or more words may differ between the two texts. This strictness of order of sometimes even minor phrases forms what I call the coincidences of structure. (p. 6)

4.     In light of this Goldberg notes: “Most interesting is that the two passages of the Testimonium that are often regarded as inauthentic, ‘if indeed one ought to call him a man’ and ‘He was the Messiah,’ do not have parallels in the Emmaus passage at analogous locations.” (p. 6)

5.     Goldberg compares the structure to two other benchmark texts: Justin Martyr’s First Apology 31 and Acts 10.38-43.  Goldberg notes: “the Emmaus narrative more closely resembles the Testimonium in the phrase-by-phrase outline of content and order than any other known text of comparable age.” (p. 8)

6.     How do we explain this similarity of structure?  Goldberg answers:

Since Luke probably drew the Emmaus narrative from an existing tradition, its outline suggests the possibility that Josephus, if he was indeed the author of Testimonium, drew his passage from a similar or even identical source. Consider the two possibilities for Josephus’ construction of the Testimonium.

(1) Josephus created his own description of Jesus from information he had collected. The description is dominated by his selection of facts, as determined by his opinions and reactions to stories about Jesus.

(2) Josephus rigidly adhered to a pre-existing text that described Jesus, making alterations only to suit his written style. His text is dominated by a historian’s motivation to faithfully record a primary source that had come to his attention.

The coincidences with the Emmaus passage tend to support the second possibility. It seems less probable that two authors working independently would coincide to this extent, in light of the benchmark texts; as the Acts speeches demonstrate, even passages by a single author can take a variety of forms. (p. 8)

7.     Goldberg also notes coincidences of “textual difficulties”—unique features that are common to both Josephus and the Emmaus Narrative.

a.     “third day”
b.     “our leaders”
c.      Terse presentation of both texts yet similarities of presentation and vocabulary

                                               i.     “deeds”
                                              ii.     “prophets”
                                            iii.     indictment/sentence/crucifixion

8.     Coincidences of the Arabic Testimonium

a.     Quoted in 10th century work by Agapius (Arab Christian)

b.     Shlomo Pines’ translation:

At this time there was a wise man who was called Jesus. And his conduct was good and his learning outstanding. And many people from among the Jews and the other nations became his disciples. Pilate condemned him to be crucified and to die. And those who had become his disciples did not abandon their discipleship. They reported that he had appeared to them three days after the crucifixion and that he was alive; accordingly, he was perhaps the Messiah, concerning whom the prophets have recounted wonders. (p. 13)

c.      Goldberg notes the following correspondences:

There are four points that bear directly on this question of authenticity. Let us examine how these appear in the Greek Testimonium (abbreviated GT in the following), the Arabic Testimonium (AT), and the Emmaus narrative of Luke (L).

            1. The GT “if indeed one can call him a man” has no parallel in either         AT or L.

            2. The GT “he was the Messiah” has no location parallel with either AT or L.

            3. The AT has “They reported that he had appeared to them”, instead of the GT assertion that Jesus did appear to them. L here is indeterminate, since
      it itself is a dramatization of the report; compare, a few verses later,
      Luke 24:35, “they related the things in the highway.”

                                                4. The AT “accordingly he was perhaps the Messiah:”

(a) The doubtful “perhaps” has no parallel anywhere in GT. Oddly enough, L does frame a doubt, albeit rhetorically, at this point: according to the prophets, “Was it not necessary for the Messiah to suffer these things and to enter into his glory?”

(b) In the GT, the word “the Messiah (ο χριστὸς)” appears earlier, not at this location in the text. But L does employ it here, and nowhere else. This seems quite a surprising coincidence.

In regard to these four points, then, the Arabic Testimonium is actually    closer to Luke than it is to the Greek Testimonium. This tends to support the theory that Luke’s narrative resembles the original version of the Testimonium, a resemblance that a later editor disrupted with interpolations. (pp. 13-14)

9.     Conclusions

a.     Coincidences: structural, linguistic, and Arabic Testimonium

b.     Explaining the coincidences:

                                    Three explanations for these coincidences have been considered.

(1) They could be due to chance. But this would seem to gainsay the three independent forms of evidence listed above. In particular, it is difficult to ignore that the only two known examples of the ”third day” as a participial phrase appears in texts with so many other structural resemblances. Some common literary milieu seems mandatory; the question is the form it took.

(2) The coincidences may be due to a Christian interpolator who altered the Testimonium, or forged it entire, under the influence of the Emmaus narrative. This proposal has the weakness of supposing that a writer capable of imitating Josephus’ style and daring enough to alter his manuscript would at the same time employ non-Josephan expressions and adhere rather closely to a New Testament text. A forger of the required skill should have been able to shake free of such influences.

(3) Josephus and Luke may have used similar or identical sources in composing their passages. This explanation appears to be the simplest. It not only explains the series of coincidences, but it also goes a long way toward solving a number of mysteries that have bothered commentators of the Testimonium. What does Josephus mean by calling Jesus a wise man? What was the nature of the accusation by the leaders? If the passage is authentic, why does it approximate to a Christian creed? All these questions fall away if it were true that Josephus did little but rewrite a concise narrative that had, so to speak, crossed his desk. He may have known more about Jesus, or he may have known nothing but what was in his source; in either case, when it came to composing his own passage, it would have been easier and more accurate for him to adhere to a reliable source rather than to piece together secondhand knowledge.  (p. 15)

10. Goldberg’s proposal for what the original Testimonium said:

[T]he original form of the Testimonium as written by Josephus, without the later interpolations, may now be more identifiable. If Luke indeed is similar to Josephus’ source, and if the Arabic Testimonium of Agapius is not too corrupt, then we should be able to approximate the original by a simple “Majority Rule” methodology: accept as authentic those elements that appear in two out of the three texts, Josephus, Luke, and Agapius. Here is one proposal for the authentic text derived using this Rule:

About this time there was Jesus, a wise man. He was a performer of many Jews and many of the Greeks. And when, upon the accusation of the principal men among us, Pilate had condemned him to death on a cross, those who had first come to love him did not cease. They reported he appeared to them spending a third day alive again, and accordingly, that he was perhaps the Messiah, for the prophets of God had prophesied these things and a thousand other marvels about him. And the sect of the Christians, so called after him, has still to this day not disappeared.

This reconstruction differs from that of many commentators in that it retains the entire sentence describing Jesus’ resurrection appearance and the declarations of the prophets. That sentence had been doubted because it was a core Christian belief that seemed impossible for Josephus to assert. Yet it is found in all three of our texts; when cast in the above form, as a report not an assertion, it is not implausible; and, furthermore, it explains why the Christians “did not cease” and have still “not disappeared.” (pp. 15-16)


·      For more details and defense see: http://www.josephus.org/testimonium.htm

Jesus Seminar: Some Notes



The hey-day of the "Jesus Seminar" was from the mid-1980's to the early 1990's.  In my Apologetics and Worldview class I lectured on the Jesus Seminar.  The students had to read Craig Blomberg's essay critically interacting with the Jesus Seminar: The Seventy-four "Scholars": Who Does the Jesus Seminar Really Speak For?  Even though the Jesus Seminar is not the head-line grabbing entity it once was Blomberg's essay is worth reading in that he mentions a number of assumptions used by much of non-evangelical scholarship that should be challenged.  One of these concerns the fluidity of the oral history between the time of Jesus and the first written Gospels.  I explained this in class today and mentioned the work of Paul Rhodes Eddy and Gregory A. Boyd The Jesus Legend: A Case for the Historical Reliability of the Synoptic Jesus Tradition which looks at this issue.



Below are the notes I handed out in class today.  It's not a full analysis but a few introductory thoughts.
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Jesus Seminar: Critical Interaction

1.     Oral Tradition/History: approximately from AD 30-50/70

2.     Competing views: fluid vs. stable oral tradition

a.     Jesus Seminar = fluid oral tradition

b.     Jesus Seminar criteria for oral tradition:[1]

                                               i.     O1: In the oral transmission of Jesus’ words, his disciples remembered only the core or gist of his sayings and parables, not his precise words.

                                              ii.     O2: The bedrock of the sayings tradition is made up of single aphorisms and parables that once circulated independently.

                                            iii.     O3: The simpler forms of sayings and parables are more likely to be original with Jesus.

                                            iv.     O4: Hard sayings are frequently softened in the process of transmission to adapt them to the conditions of daily living.

                                              v.     O5: Words are frequently borrowed from the fund of common lore or from the Old Testament and put on the lips of Jesus.

c.      Another list of criteria mentioned by Paul Rhodes Eddy and Gregory A. Boyd:[2]

                                               i.     The assumption of a purely oral period

                                              ii.     The assumed lack of a coherent narrative

                                            iii.     The assumed lack of biographical interest

                                            iv.     Limited role of eyewitnesses

                                              v.     Assumed “laws” of oral and written traditions

                                            vi.     “Prophetic inspiration” and Jesus Sayings

3.     Some examples

a.     Mark 6.35-44

                                               i.     “…all the words attributed to Jesus are context-bound (N2) and so cannot be used to determine what Jesus said.”[3]

                                              ii.     N2: Quoted speech that is entirely context-bound is probably the product of the storyteller.[4]

b.     Mark 8.31-33

                                               i.     “Since these predictions mirror the ‘proclamation’ (Greek: kerygma) of the primitive church and accord with Mark’s conception of his narrative (W4, W8a), most scholars regard all three as composed by Mark after the events to which they refer (W10).”[5]

                                              ii.     W4: The evangelists frequently compose or revise and edit both sayings and narrative contexts to make them conform to their own individual language, style, or viewpoint, or to make saying and context conform to each other.[6]

                                            iii.     W8a: Sayings and parables expressed in “Christian “ language are the creation of the evangelists or the oral tradition before them.[7]

                                            iv.     W10: Sayings and narratives that reflect knowledge of events that took place after Jesus’ death are the creation of the evangelists or the oral tradition before them.[8]

4.     Challenging the Jesus Seminar

a.     “Though the authors regularly refer to oral cultures, the only actual examples they give come from a very non-oral culture, that of their own modern Western world.”[9]

b.     “The theory that sayings, aphorisms, memorable oneliners, and sometimes parables are the things that survive, whereas stories about Jesus, with his words embedded within them, do not, is clearly promulgated with one eye on the results.  ‘It is highly probable,’ we are told—this, recall, at the introductory level, before we have examined a single saying!—that the earliest layer of the gospel tradition was made up almost entirely of single aphorisms and parables that circulated by word of mouth, without narrative context—precisely as that tradition is recorded in ‘Q’ and Thomas.

“With the evidence thus well and truly cooked in advance, it is not surprising that the portrait of Jesus-the-quizzical-sage ‘emerges’ from the subsequent discussion.  It could not help doing so.  The theory about what sort of material survives in oral tradition, I suggest, was designed to produce exactly this result.

“Against this whole line of thought we must set the serious study of genuinely oral traditions that has gone on in various quarters.  Communities that live in an oral culture tend to be storytelling communities.  They sit around in long evenings telling and listening to stories—the same stories, over and over again.  Such stories, especially when they are involved with memorable happenings that have determined in some way the existence and life of the particular group in question, acquire a fairly fixed form, down to precise phraseology (in narrative as well as in recorded speech), extremely early in their life—often within a day or so of the original incident taking place.  They retain that form, and phraseology, as long as they are told.  Each village and community has its recognized storytellers, the accredited bearers of its traditions; but the whole community knows the stories by heart, and if the teller varies even the slightly they will let him know in no uncertain terms.  This matters quite a lot in cultures where, to this day, the desire to avoid ‘shame’ is a powerful motivation.”[10]

c.      “Early form critics such as Bultmann took it for granted that folk traditions consisted almost exclusively of short vignettes.  How could longer narratives, to say nothing of epics, be remembered and transmitted intact orally?  While this view is still prevalent today among many in New Testament circles, a significant number of folklorists, anthropologists, and ethnographers over the last several decades have justifiably abandoned it.  The reason for this reversal is that empirical evidence has shown it to be demonstrably wrong.  A large number of fieldwork studies have ‘brought to light numerous long oral epics in the living traditions of Central Asia, India, Africa, and Oceania, for example.’  Hence, as the famed Finnish folklorist Lauri Honko recently noted: ‘The existence of genuine long oral epics can no longer be denied.’  In fact, amazingly, scholars have documented oral narratives whose performance lasted up to twenty-five hours carried out over several days.”[11]

d.     “If the oral period of the early church functioned similar to the way we now know oral communities tend to operate, we should expect that those individuals who were closest to Jesus during his ministry would have played a significant role in the transmission of oral material about Jesus.  This does not in any way deny that the material was, to some extent, shaped by the needs of the early faith communities, for as we have seen oral tradents always shape their performances according to the particular situation of the audience.  But it does at the very least mean that we would expect to see this material being transmitted by, among other ‘strong tradition bearers,’ eyewitnesses from among the original followers of Jesus.  And this makes it much more difficult to suppose that the oral Jesus tradition acquired a significant amount of fictionalized material in the process of transmission during the several decades prior to the writing of the Gospels.”[12]

e.     “The Jesus constructed by the Jesus Seminar is a talking head whose teachings bear no intelligible relation to his death on a cross.  If Jesus said only the sorts of things judged authentic by the Seminar, it is very difficult to see how he could have been mistaken by Jewish and Roman authorities as a messianic pretender who needed to be executed.”[13]



     [1] Robert W. Funk (with Mahlon H. Smith), The Gospel of Mark: Red Letter Edition (Sonoma, Cal.: Polebridge Press, 1991), 35-38.
     [2] Paul Rhodes Eddy and Gregory A. Boyd, The Jesus Legend: A Case for the Historical Reliability of the Synoptic Jesus Tradition (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2007), 237-306.
     [3] The Gospel of Mark: Red Letter Edition, 119. 
     [4] The Gospel of Mark: Red Letter Edition, 48.
     [5] The Gospel of Mark: Red Letter Edition, 137.
     [6] The Gospel of Mark: Red Letter Edition, 41.
     [7] The Gospel of Mark: Red Letter Edition, 42.
     [8] The Gospel of Mark: Red Letter Edition, 44.
     [9] N. T. Wright, “Five Gospels But No Gospel: Jesus and the Seminar” in Crisis in Christology: Essays in Quest of Resolution (ed. William R. Farmer; Truth Incorporated, 1995), 140.
     [10] Wright, “Five Gospels But No Gospel,” 141.
     [11] Eddy and Boyd, The Jesus Legend, 252-253.  Eddy and Boyd note that J. Dewey “has pointed out that an oral narrative the length of Mark would take at most two hours to perform, which, as we have seen, is relatively short by oral-narrative standards.” (p. 256)
     [12] Eddy and Boyd, The Jesus Legend, 273-274.
     [13] Richard B. Hays, “The Corrected Jesus,” First Things (May, 1994), 46.

Monday, March 2, 2015

Resurrection Apologetic Resources

Jason Engwer over at Triablogue has put together a post Easter Resources 2015 which links to his (and others) many resources on the resurrection of Jesus.  You can find things like analyses of debates on the resurrection of Jesus, harmonization of the resurrection accounts, responses to critical attacks on the historicity of the resurrection, and much more.  This is a good page to bookmark for reference.

Sunday, February 22, 2015

On the Coptic Martyrs: "We Will Not Be Lost"

Monday 2/23/15: Important information I became aware of since I posted this video below.  Fox News is reporting that the original video may not be real.  See HERE for story.  The video below may still be valuable in that it responds to a PR war.  Also, Mark Durie's analysis is still relevant because ISIS is attempting to say something even if using a faked video.

The 21 Coptic Christian men that were killed have become well-known around the world.  Brian Mattson recently posted a moving video that honors these martyrs and attempts to redeem the video made by ISIS.





For those who want an in-depth analysis of the original ISIS video be sure to see Mark Durie's analytic explanation--HERE.

Friday, February 13, 2015

Thomas Morris on the Question of God's Existence

The question about the existence of God, 
likewise, is not just a question about 
whether one more thing exists in the inventory of reality. 
 It is a question about the ultimate context 
for everything else.  
The theist and the atheist should 
see everything differently.  
Thomas Morris 
Making Sense of It All p. 25. 

Monday, February 9, 2015

Romans 1.18-20--Interacting with Bill Vallicella's Thoughts


I recently had opportunity to enjoy breakfast with Bill Vallicella and few other gentlemen who love the philosophical pursuit of truth, beauty, and goodness.  Bill is an accomplished philosopher and has an award-winning blog called Maverick Philosopher.  There a number of topics on Bill’s blog that are too sophisticated for me to intelligently comment upon (e.g., his interaction with Peter Van Inwagen's theory of properties) .  However, I spent some time looking around and found some thoughts that Bill posted on Romans 1.18-20 (Is There Any Excuse for Unbelief?) and I thought I might interact with this post and offer a few thoughts.

1.     Bill is a theist who is “sympathetic to Christianity.”  His view of the apostle Paul does not appear to be so sympathetic.  He argues that Paul begs the question in this passage.  He also alleges that Paul appears to be resorting “to ad hominem attacks and psychologizing.”  As a conservative evangelical Christian my view of the apostle’s argument in Romans 1 is that it is divine revelation and as such carries divine authority.  Mark Thompson argues:

It is Paul’s apostolic commission which sets his epistles apart from other letters in the first century.  As letters of an apostle, indeed the apostle to the nations, they are placed alongside the other apostolic documents and continue to exercise a unique and normative role in the church of Jesus Christ.  The Pauline epistles should not be viewed as simply as some of the earliest ‘unchallengeable instances’ of gospel-speaking.  In and through their undoubted particularity the risen Christ continues to address his people.[1]

I have posted some additional pieces of Mark Thompson’s important essay “The Missionary Apostle and Modern Systematic Affirmation” (HERE) which argue this point more fully.  It appears, then, that Bill and I have different methodological starting points as we approach Romans 1.

2.     Bill recognizes a potential objection to his reasoning on Romans 1 and so offers a brief rebuttal to the charge that he has not taken into consideration the noetic consequences of original sin.  He offers two considerations.  The first revolves around the issue of moral responsibility for a sin that “one has not oneself committed but has somehow inherited.”  This is a standard objection to the doctrine of original sin and I’m going to let it go for now.  The literature on this issue is immense and the back-and-forth charges and counter-charges regarding original sin won’t be summed up here.  (I would, however, recommend Paul Copan's essay Original Sin and Christian Philosophy as a good introduction to the topic.) The second objection offered is more easily defused.  This objection reads:

Second, if our faculties have been so corrupted by original sin that we can no longer reliably distinguish between the evident and the non-evident, then this corruption will extend to all our cognitive operations including Paul's theological reasoning, which we therefore should not trust either. 

Bill has made a hasty move here.  The answer to this objection should be evident once the rest of Paul’s theology is taken into account.  Yes, our noetic faculties have been corrupted by sin and this corruption does extend to all our cognitive operations but this corruption can (and is) overcome by God’s grace.  This is the claim that Paul makes for himself and has been affirmed by the history of the church.  Paul has been the recipient of God’s grace and has been commissioned by the risen Christ to bring God’s word to the nations (Romans 15.15-16; 1 Corinthians 3.10; Galatians 1.15-16; 2.9; Ephesians 3.2, 7-8).  Once this larger perspective of Paul’s theology is recognized the potential for self-referential incoherence is overcome.

3.     Bill states:

But is the world a divine creation? This is the question, and the answer is not obvious. That the natural world is a divine artifact is not evident to the senses, or to the heart, or to reason. Of course, one can argue for the existence of God from the existence and order of the natural world.

There is an alternative way of understanding Paul’s comments in Romans 1.  I understand the text of Romans 1.18ff as teaching that unbelievers do indeed know God (in some sense).  There is a debate as to whether this passage is teaching that God is knowable or whether he is known.  In other words, is Paul teaching that people can reason to God through empirical means or is it the case that God’s existence is apprehended immediately through the natural order?  One author put it this way:

Two features of 1:19 are relevant to this discussion.  The first of these concerns the meaning of the phrase τὀ γνωστὀν τοῦ θεοῦ.  Does this phrase refer to actual or merely potential knowledge?  In other words, is there a real sense in which unsaved men know God, or is Paul simply saying that God is ‘knowable’?  This second view has the support of many well-known scholars.  However, H. G. Liddon’s statement is hard to disprove: ‘The phrase…must, according to the invariable New Testament and LXX use, mean that which is known not that which may be known about God.’...  While γνωστὀς may have a potential meaning in Classical Greek, it seems best in light of both NT usage and the context to understand it as a reference to a real yet suppressed knowledge.  There is no warrant here to speak of a potential knowledge of God to be gained by probability argumentation.  Paul is certainly not attempting a ‘cosmological argument.’  Rather, he is speaking of an actual knowledge of God obtained from nature.[2]

 Now may it may be possible to argue for the existence of God by using a discursive process that has its foundation in the natural order but this is not what Paul is doing in Romans 1.  Paul seems to be claiming that all people “know” the true God in some sense.  Specifying exactly how this knowledge is to be construed is difficult.  Reformed theologian Greg Bahnsen has attempted to articulate a philosophically nuanced perspective on the knowledge of God held by the unbeliever in light of the teaching in Romans 1.

When we say that men “know” that the living and true God exists, we are (in part) asserting that they “have evidence” that justifies the belief that He exists.  A word should be added here about the general nature of the warrant for believing, to which we implicitly allude in claiming that all men know God.

We do so because of a common but simplistic (and thus misleading) tendency to make inferential or discursive knowledge the model for all cases of knowing.  If Sam knows that milk gives him indigestion, he came to this conclusion through certain “steps of reasoning.”  He recalled a number of past experiences in which ingestion followed his drinking of milk, but could not remember any cases of ingestion where milk had not been in his diet, so he made a general association and interpreted it in a casual fashion, etc.  Sam did not simply look at milk and immediately apprehend it ingestion-producing quality (although some children claim to have this kind of intuitive ability when they encounter new vegetables); rather, he inferred the truth from his experience.  Likewise, if Sam knows that 487 multiplied by 139 equals 67,693, it would be highly unusual if he did not gain this knowledge by making a mathematical computation.  In a large number of cases, our knowledge of a proposition is warranted by a discursive process of inference.  For example, all of the union truckers are on strike; Sam is a union trucker; therefore, Sam must be on strike.  Such inferential or discursive knowledge is common, but that does not mean that knowledge arises only from such reasoning.  There are obvious cases of noninferential knowledge; it is implausible and artificial to insist that they must somehow be the product of an “unconscious” inference.

Surely there are times when one believes certain propositions with good reason, without inferring them from other propositions—as when one believes that one is typing with both hands, or believes that the music is painfully loud, or believes that one is not the same person as one’s neighbor, or believes the times tables in math.  When Sam knows that a black cat is in path, he does not infer it from propositions about his sensations, about forms of appearance, about animal categories, etc.  His knowledge is not discursive, following certain steps of reasoning to a likely conclusion; he immediately (without mediating lines of inference) apprehends the truth that a black cat is in his path.  (We need not concern ourselves here with debates over how to account for such noninferential cognition, whether by linguistic conventionalism, behaviorism, an intuitive faculty, etc.).  Such a non-propositional experience (an acquaintance with an object) is not something mystical and ineffable; rather, people have the ability to express and define the experience propositionally (thus describing it and relating it to other beliefs so that it is available for reference, memory, assertion, inference, application, etc.).  The “immediate” apprehension may very well be caused (“mediated”) by natural factors, but the recognition takes place in the absence of discursive inference (drawing a conclusion through the mediation of reasoning from premises).

When we encounter a person at the store and “know” that he is our friend Sam, our belief can indeed be warranted without being derived or reached by a series of mental arguments, computations, or inferences.  The same is true when we directly identify his signature on a letter.  There is evidence that justifies what we believe, but it is noninferential and direct.  This claim should not be too controversial, but it does require some attenuation.  In those cases where “knowing” is immediate or noninferential, we are speaking of the evidence as it is apprehended by a particular individual at the initial time of assenting to the proposition warranted by it.  No doubt somebody else who is unfamiliar with Sam might not immediately apprehend that this letter is from Sam.  And if someone should raise some doubt whether the letter is, after all, from Sam, the kind of “evidence” that would be brought forth to defend or vindicate the challenged belief would be the discursive or inferential kind, rather than the initial evidence of direct apprehension.[3]

Bahnsen, following his theological mentor Cornelius Van Til, goes on to apply these basic epistemological principles to Romans 1 and the knowledge of God.

Van Til maintained, following the teaching of Paul in Romans 1-2, that all men have a knowledge of God that is justified by direct apprehension of His handiwork in the world and within themselves.  Even without a discursive argument or a chain of inferences from elementary observations about experience, all men see and recognize the signature of their Creator in the world that He created and controls, as well as in themselves as His created image… This knowledge of God is mediated in the sense of being caused by the stimulus of the external world and man’s internal constitution, but it is apprehended immediately without argumentation, computation, or self-conscious reasoning.[4]

It is important to affirm that this reality of the unbeliever’s knowledge of God is a revealed truth.  It is not a truth that is drawn from empirically questioning the unbeliever.  Bahnsen recognizes that unbelievers will claim they have no such knowledge.  According to Bahnsen’s understanding the unbeliever is in a complex epistemic state in which he both knows God and also engages in a process of self-deception. 

With these elements of the complex situation at hand, we can adequately resolve the paradox of saying that the unbeliever believes or (by extension) that the man who does not know God knows God.  We will take Sam as our hypothetical unbeliever.  When we say that Sam does not believe in (or know) God, we are describing him according to certain features of his behavior and thinking: for example, his immoral conduct and attitudes, his refusal to glorify God, and especially his profession not to believe in God.  After all, Sam acts and talks like a person who sincerely disbelieves; indeed, he argues vehemently against believing in God’s existence.  However, the fact of the matter is that Sam actually does believe in God.  When we say that he believes in God, we are (in accordance with the diagnosis of God’s word) describing him according to certain features of his behavior and thinking that manifest belief: for example, his living in terms of some kind of moral standards, his acceptance of the need for logical consistency, his expectation of uniformity in nature, his fear of death, and his assuming of freedom of thought.  As in the case of believers, we say that Sam knows God in the sense that he has justified, true beliefs about Him.  So then, it turns out that Sam’s belief is mistaken.[5]

4.     Even if one is not convinced by Bahnsen’s analysis there is still something to be appreciated.  By taking Paul’s thought in Romans chapter 1 as a revelational set point and attempting to reason from this point allows one to explore epistemological options that may not have been immediately evident.  Bahnsen’s conceptualization of the epistemological situation does precisely this without the quick dismissal of Paul’s thought as being engaged in “ad hominem psychologizing.” 


     [1] Mark D. Thompson, “The Missionary Apostle and Modern Systematic Affirmation” in The Gospel to the Nations: Perspectives on Paul’s Mission edited by Peter Bolt and Mark D. Thompson (IVP, 2000), 370.
     [2] David L. Turner, “Cornelius Van Til and Romans 1:18-21: A Study in the Epistemology of Presuppositional Apologetics” Grace Theological Journal 2 (1981), 53.  Online: http://faculty.gordon.edu/hu/bi/ted_hildebrandt/NTeSources/NTArticles/GTJ-NT/Turner-Rom1-GTJ-81.pdf. 
     [3] Greg L. Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings and Analysis (Phillipsburg, New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1998), 182-183.
     [4] Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 184.
     [5] Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 450.